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ABSTRACT
A shared cryptographic key enables strong authentication. Candidate sources for
creating such a shared key include biometrics and physically unclonable functions.
However, these sources come with a substantial problem: noise in repeated readings.
A fuzzy extractor produces a stable key from a noisy source. It consists of two
stages. At enrollment time, the generate algorithm produces a key from an initial
reading of the source. At authentication time, the reproduce algorithm takes a re-
peated but noisy reading of the source, yielding the same key when the two readings
are close. For many sources of practical importance, traditional fuzzy extractors
provide no meaningful security guarantee.
This dissertation improves key derivation from noisy sources. These improvements
stem from three observations about traditional fuzzy extractors.
First, the only property of a source that standard fuzzy extractors use is the
entropy in the original reading. We observe that additional structural information
about the source can facilitate key derivation.
Second, most fuzzy extractors work by first recovering the initial reading from the
noisy reading (known as a secure sketch). This approach imposes harsh limitations on
vii
the length of the derived key. We observe that it is possible to produce a consistent
key without recovering the original reading of the source.
Third, traditional fuzzy extractors provide information-theoretic security. How-
ever, security against computationally bounded adversaries is sufficient. We observe
fuzzy extractors providing computational security can overcome limitations of tradi-
tional approaches.
The above observations are supported by negative results and constructions. As
an example, we combine all three observations to construct a fuzzy extractor achieving
properties that have eluded prior approaches. The construction remains secure even
when the initial enrollment phase is repeated multiple times with noisy readings.
Furthermore, for many practical sources, reliability demands that the tolerated noise
is larger than the entropy of the original reading. The construction provides security
for sources of this type by utilizing additional source structure, producing a consistent
key without recovering the original reading, and providing computational security.
viii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In today’s online world, personal information is distributed among many services.
Private details such as health records, bank accounts, and private relationships are
stored online. A service storing sensitive details should authenticate a user’s iden-
tity before granting access to resources. The standard mechanism for authenticating
identity is a password shared between a user and the service.
Passwords are easy to deploy, update, and revoke. However, passwords have a
significant weakness. Ideally, passwords would consist of random characters to make
password guessing infeasible, however, there is a strong tradeoff between password
strength and memorability [YBAG04, WACS10]. Large-scale system compromises
have revealed large files of hashed password, allowing attackers to perform brute-
force guessing attacks against passwords [Lys]. There is strong evidence that the
average user’s password can be guessed by a determined attacker [WACS10]. The
entropy (uncertainty) of authentication information is critical.
There are two natural alternatives to passwords, something the user has or some-
thing the user is [KH11]. We collectively refer to one of these alternatives as a source.
While many sources have higher entropy than passwords, they present a new prob-
lem. Sources instantiated from physical phenomena are often noisy [Dau04, MRW02,
PRTG02, TSSˇ+06]. That is, repeated readings from the same physical source are
close (according to some distance metric) but not identical.
The classic way to use a noisy source for authentication is to take an initial reading
of the source and store this reading as a template. Then subsequent readings are
accepted if they are close enough. This approach has two significant weaknesses: 1)
the original template can be stolen and used for enrollment [GRGB+12], and 2) there
2is a binary decision on access that can be manually forced to output accept [RCB03].
An alternative is to directly derive keys from noisy sources. However, when trying to
derive a stable and consistent key, noise becomes a substantial problem.
Dodis, Ostrovsky, Reyzin, and Smith [DORS08] designed fuzzy extractors to de-
rive keys from noisy sources. Let w represent an initial reading of the source and
w′ a nearby reading. A fuzzy extractor consists of two algorithms. Generate (Gen)
takes w as an input, and produces key and some helper information p. The second
algorithm Reproduce (Rep) takes a nearby reading w′ and the helper information, p.
We assume that the distance between w and w′ is at most t. Rep and Gen should
produce the same key if dis(w,w′) ≤ t. History has shown that stored authentication
information is often compromised, so key should be cryptographically strong even if
an attacker knows the helper data p.
Bennett, Brassard, and Robert identified two crucial tasks for deriving keys from
noisy data [BBR88].1 The first, information-reconciliation removes errors from w′.
The second, privacy amplification converts w to a uniform value. Traditionally,
a fuzzy extractor uses two separate algorithms to accomplish these tasks. A se-
cure sketch [DORS08] performs information-reconciliation and a randomness extrac-
tor [NZ93] performs information-reconciliation. We call a fuzzy extractor that sepa-
rates information-reconciliation and privacy amplification the sketch-and-extract con-
struction. In this work, we concentrate on fuzzy extractors and secure sketches.2 A
secure sketch consists of two algorithms: SS takes w and produces a public value ss,
and Rec takes a nearby w′ and ss to recover w. The goal of fuzzy extractors is to
ensure that w has high entropy conditioned on ss.
1Bennett, Brassard, and Robert consider an interactive version of the problem. We discuss their
setting in Section 3.2.
2Randomness extractors have matching upper and lower bounds on the security loss: for every
extra two bits of output key, they lose one bit of security.
3Limitations of Standard Techniques Fuzzy extractors and secure sketches must
contain some information about the initial reading w in order to accept nearby w′.
We call a point w′ accepting if it is within distance t of the original reading w. A
larger t means that more w′ are accepting. For a fuzzy extractor, the adversary can
use Rep on accepting w′ to produce key. (For a secure sketch, the adversary can use
Rec on accepting w′ to obtain w.) This means if an adversary can find an accepting w′
with noticeable probability, they can learn key with noticeable probability and break
security. Key derivation becomes more difficult as more points are accepting. This
creates a tension between the length of key and the error tolerance t.
This tension is quite strong for secure sketches. Secure sketches are closely linked
to error correcting codes.3 The syndrome of a linear code is used to compute where
errors occurred in transmission. The syndrome can also serve as a secure sketch
(Construction 3.3.5). The entropy of w conditioned on this secure sketch is at least
the starting entropy minus the length of the syndrome. Standard analysis assumes
this is the remaining entropy in w. The length of a syndrome increases as the error
tolerance t increases. This means the lower bound on the remaining entropy of w
decreases as t increases.4
This is not a limitation of this particular secure sketch. Dodis et al. show that
secure sketches are linked to the best error-correcting code containing points of
w [DORS08, Appendix C]. Upper bounds on the size of error-correcting codes trans-
late to lower bounds on entropy loss of secure sketches. Error-correcting codes have
a long and rich history, with many bounds on the best codes. All of these bounds are
translate into limitations on the best secure sketches. Most fuzzy extractors use se-
cure sketches (we discuss some exceptions in Section 1.2.1) for error correction. Fuzzy
extractors that use secure sketches also inherit these bounds.
3We provide a limited introduction to error-correcting codes in Section 2.3.2.
4If a perfect error-correcting code is used, there are distributions with a matching upper bound
on the remaining entropy. That is, there are distributions where the standard analysis is tight.
4Standard fuzzy extractors and secure sketches only take as parameters the entropy
of w and the number of errors to be corrected. However, secure sketches are connected
to the best code containing points of w. This varies widely for different sources w.
If all points of w are far apart, then correcting t errors is easy. Without information
about the distribution of w, standard secure sketches must work for all distributions
of entropy m and errors t. The worst case distribution has all points close together.
For this distribution, to recover the correct w′ from an original reading w, the value ss
must disambiguate which point w within distance t was seen. For this distribution, a
secure sketch must decrease entropy by the logarithm of the number of points within
distance t of any w′. Thus, if a secure sketch provides a guarantee for the worst
distribution, the bound on entropy loss is proportional to this quantity (in most
settings, the number of points within distance t is exponential in t).
Losses due to secure sketches (and the resulting fuzzy extractors), prevent key
derivation from many practical sources. For many sources, there are no known fuzzy
extractors that provide meaningful security. As an example, the human iris is thought
to be the strongest biometric [Dau04] and current fuzzy extractors provide no guar-
antee about the strength of a key derived from the human iris [BH09, Section 5].
1.1 Overview of Contributions
In this dissertation, we improve key derivation from noisy sources. Our improvements
derive from three lessons about how to construct fuzzy extractors. We organize this
dissertation around these lessons. We list the lessons below. Under each lesson we
list our major technical results that serve as supporting evidence.
• Incorporating structure of a noisy distribution Traditional fuzzy extrac-
tors consider the worst-case distribution with entropy m for a desired error-
tolerance t. We know more about the structure of physical sources. It may
5be possible to avoid the losses of traditional approaches by constructing fuzzy
extractors whose security analysis uses structure of a physical source beyond its
entropy. This motivates us to modify the definition of fuzzy-extractors to work
for limited family of distributions rather than all distributions with entropy
m. We describe a precise measure of a noisy distribution’s suitability for key
derivation called fuzzy min-entropy. Fuzzy min-entropy is a necessary condition
for key derivation (Proposition 4.1.2).
– Theorem 4.2.7: Fuzzy min-entropy is sufficient for security if a distribution
is known exactly. This motivates fuzzy min-entropy as the right measure of
a distribution’s suitability. Furthermore, it shows that precise knowledge
of a source’s distribution allows key derivation.
– Theorems 4.3.1 and 4.4.1: Unfortunately, it is imprudent to assume that
high entropy distributions are known precisely. This uncertainty is handled
by providing security for a family of distributions. We show there are
families of distributions (where each distribution has fuzzy min-entropy)
that no information-theoretic secure sketch or fuzzy extractor can provide
meaningful security for most members of the family. This shows that
uncertainty of a source’s distribution comes at a cost to security.
• Look beyond sketch-then-extract Secure sketches are subject to consid-
erably stronger negative results than fuzzy extractors. We provide additional
negative results for computationally secure versions of secure sketches. We then
construct improved fuzzy extractors that do not use secure sketches.
– Corollary 5.1.5: Computational definitions of secure sketches are subject to
upper bounds on remaining entropy. If computational secure sketches are
defined using pseudoentropy, they are subject to almost the same bounds
6as information-theoretic secure sketches.
– Construction 5.2.2: For many practical sources, reliability demands that
the number of tolerated error patterns is greater than the starting entropy
of the source. We call this condition more errors than entropy. Previous
approaches have provided no security for such distributions. One cannot
provide security for all such sources, restricted to a limited class of dis-
tributions is necessary (discussion in Section 1.3). We construct the first
fuzzy extractor secure for large classes of distributions with more errors
than entropy. This construction does not use a secure sketch.
• Leverage Computational Security Fuzzy extractors were defined with infor-
mation theoretic security due to the use of information-theoretic tools. However,
there is no compelling need for information-theoretic security. Fuzzy extractors
can be improved by providing computational security. We provide computa-
tional constructions with new features. All of our constructions are for the
Hamming metric (the number of symbols that differ between strings w and w′).
– Construction 6.1.1: A computational fuzzy extractor whose key is as long
as the input entropy.
– Construction 7.1.1: A computational fuzzy extractor that allows a source
to be securely enrolled across multiple services. This is known as a reusable
fuzzy extractor (see Definition 3.3.9).5
– Construction 7.2.3: A computational fuzzy extractor that improves on the
class of sources and error tolerance of the previous construction. These
improvements come at a cost of a large symbol size in w.
5The work of [Boy04] contains some limited positive results on reusable fuzzy extractors. We
discuss these in Section 1.4.2.
71.1.1 Organization
The results in this dissertation are drawn from three works [FMR13, CFP+14, FRS14].
We cover preliminaries and common notation in Chapter 2. We discuss key derivation
from noisy sources and fuzzy extractors in Chapter 3. We organize this dissertation
by the lessons: incorporating structure of a noisy source (Section 1.2, technical results
in Chapter 4), moving away from sketch-then-extract (Section 1.3, technical results
in Chapter 5), and providing computational security (Section 1.4, technical results in
Chapters 6 and 7).
1.2 Incorporating Structure of a Noisy Distribution
The goal of this section is to more precisely characterize the quality of a noisy dis-
tribution for key derivation. We begin by introducing a new notion that describes a
noisy distribution’s suitability for key derivation. The technical results described in
this section can be found in Chapter 4.
Fuzzy Min-Entropy Usually, fuzzy extractors only take as parameters the entropy
m of a source and desired error tolerance t. However, this ignores crucial structural
information about the distribution W . The number and weight of points contained in
neighborhoods of W is crucial for key derivation. We introduce a new entropy notion
that combines entropy and error tolerance into a single measure. It measures a noisy
distribution’s suitability for key derivation.
Consider an adversary that tries to guess values w′ close to the original reading
w (without considering the helper string). If an adversary is able to guess some w′
within distance t of the original reading w, they can subvert the security of key by
running Rep. To have the maximum chance that w′ is within distance t of w, the
adversary would want to maximize the total probability mass of W within the ball
8Bt(w
′) of radius t around w′. We therefore define fuzzy min-entropy
Hfuzzt,∞ (W )
def
= − log max
w′
Pr[W ∈ Bt(w′)].
Observe that this quantity can be bounded in terms of min-entropy: H∞(W ) ≥
Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) ≥ H∞(W )− log |Bt|.
Super-logarithmic fuzzy min-entropy is necessary for nontrivial key extraction
(Proposition 4.1.2). However, existing constructions do not measure their security in
terms of fuzzy min-entropy; instead, their security is shown to be H∞(W ) minus some
loss that is at least log |Bt| due to error-tolerance. Since H∞(W )−log |Bt| ≤ Hfuzzt,∞ (W ),
it is natural to ask whether this loss is necessary. This question is particularly relevant
when the gap between the two sides of the inequality is high. As an example, iris scans
appear to have significant Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) (because iris scans for different people appear to
be well-spread in the metric space [Dau06]) but negative H∞(W ) − log |Bt| [BH09,
Section 5].6 We therefore ask: is fuzzy min-entropy sufficient for fuzzy extraction?
There is evidence that it may be when the security requirement is computational
rather than information-theoretic—see Section 1.2.2.
Tight Characterization for the Case of a Known Distribution We show
that for every source W with super-logarithmic Hfuzzt,∞ (W ), it is possible to construct
a fuzzy extractor with a super-logarithmic length key (Corollary 4.2.8). We thus show
that Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) is a necessary and sufficient condition for building a fuzzy extractor
for a known distribution W . It is important to emphasize that these constructions
incorporate the knowledge of the complete distribution of W (and, in particular, they
are not polynomial-time).
A number of previous works in this known-distribution setting have provided
6When H∞(W ) − log |Bt| is negative we say a source has more errors than entropy. We discuss
this condition further in Section 1.3.
9efficient algorithms and tight bounds for specific distributions—generally the uniform
distribution or i.i.d. sequences (for example, [JW99, LT03, TG04, HAD06, WRDI12,
IW12]). Our characterization may be seen as unifying previous work, and justifies
using Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) as the measure of the quality of a noisy distribution, rather than
cruder measures such as H∞(W )− log |Bt|.
Impossibility of Fuzzy Extractors for Families of Distributions Assuming
full knowledge of a distribution is often unrealistic. Indeed, high-entropy distributions
can never be fully observed directly and must therefore be modeled. It is imprudent to
assume that the designer’s model of a distribution is completely accurate—the adver-
sary, with greater resources, would likely be able to build a better model. Therefore,
fuzzy extractor designs cannot usually be tailored to one particular source. Existing
designs work for a family of sources (for example, all sources of min-entropy at least
m with at most t errors). Thus, the design is fixed before the distribution is fully
known, and the adversary may know more about the distribution than the designer
of the fuzzy extractor.
We show that this extra adversarial knowledge can be devastating (Theorem 4.4.1).
Specifically, we describe a family of distributions W and show that not even a
2-bit fuzzy extractor can be secure for most distributions in W . We emphasize
that each distribution W ∈ W has super-logarithmic fuzzy min-entropy—in fact,
Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = H∞(W ), because all points in W are distance at least t apart. This
result shows that distributional uncertainty is a real obstacle to key derivation from
noisy sources. Our proof relies on high dimensionality of W and on perfect correctness
of the Rep procedure.
Stronger Results for Secure Sketches As described above, fuzzy extractors
often use secure sketches to perform information reconciliation (mapping w′ back to
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w).
We show comparable, but stronger, results for secure sketches. Namely, we show
in Corollary 4.2.8 that secure sketches are possible if the distribution W is precisely
known. (In fact, we obtain our fuzzy extractors for the case of a known distribution
from this result by applying a randomness extractor.)
On the other hand, there is a family of sources with super-logarithmic Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) =
H∞(W ) for which no secure sketch correcting even a few errors is possible (Theorem
4.3.1). The impossibility result applies even when Rec is allowed to be incorrect with
probability up to 1/4 (as opposed to our fuzzy extractor impossibility result).
1.2.1 Techniques
Techniques for Positive Results for Known Distributions We now explain
how to construct a secure sketch for an arbitrary known distribution W . We be-
gin with distributions in which all points in the support have the same probability
(so-called “flat” distributions). Consider some subsequent reading w′. To achieve
correctness, the sketch algorithm must disambiguate which point w ∈ W within dis-
tance t of w′ was sketched. Disambiguating multiple points can be accomplished by
universal hashing, as long as the size of hash output space is slightly greater than the
number of possible points. Thus, our sketch is computed via a universal hash of w.
To determine the length of that sketch, consider the heaviest (according to W ) ball
of radius t. Because the distribution is flat, it is also the ball with the most points
of nonzero probability. Thus, the length of the sketch needs to be slightly greater
than the logarithm of the number of non-zero probability points in that ball. Since
Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) is determined by the weight of that ball, the number of points cannot be
too high and there will be entropy left after the sketch is published.
For an arbitrary distribution, we cannot afford to disambiguate points in the ball
with the greatest number of points, because there could be too many low-probability
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points in a single ball despite a high Hfuzzt,∞ (W ). We solve this problem by splitting the
arbitrary distribution into a number of nearly flat distributions we call “levels.” We
then write down, as part of the sketch, the level of the original reading w and apply
the above construction considering only points in that level. We call this construction
leveled hashing.
Techniques for Negative Results for Distribution Families We construct
a family of distributions W and prove impossibility for a uniformly random W ∈
W (instead of proving impossibility for a worst-case W ). We start by observing
the following asymmetry: Gen sees only the sample w (obtained via W ← W and
w ← W ), while the adversary knows W . To exploit the asymmetry, we construct
W so that conditioning on the knowledge of W reduces the distribution to a single
affine line, but conditioning on w leaves the rest of the distribution uniform on a large
fraction of the entire space.
Then we show how the adversary can exploit the knowledge of the affine line
to reduce the uncertainty about w (in the secure sketch case) or key (in the fuzzy
extractor case). In the secure sketch case, ss can be used to find fixed points of
Rec(·, ss) which, by the correctness requirement of the sketch, must be separated by
minimum distance t. This means there aren’t too many of them, so few can lie on an
average line, permitting the adversary to guess one easily.
In the fuzzy extractor case, the nonsecret value p partitions the metric space
into regions that produce a consistent value under Rep (preimages of each key under
Rep(·, p)). For each of these regions, the adversary knows that possible w lie t-far
from the boundary of the region. However, in the Hamming space, the vast ma-
jority of points lie near the boundary (this follows by combining the isoperimetric
inequality [Har66] showing that the ball has the smallest boundary and Hoeffding’s
inequality [Hoe63] for bounding the volume that is t-away from this boundary). This
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allows the adversary to rule out so many possible w that, combined with the adver-
sarial knowledge of the affine line, many regions become empty, leaving key far from
uniform.
The result for fuzzy extractors is delicate. It uses the fact that p partitions the
space into nonoverlapping regions, which is implied by perfect correctness. Extending
this result to imperfect correctness seems challenging and is an interesting open prob-
lem. It also uses the fact that there are few points far from the boundary of every
region, which is implied by the geometry of the high-dimensional Hamming space.
This fact seems crucial: in contrast, in low-dimensional Euclidean space, which does
not have this property, a single fuzzy extractor can work for any distribution with
sufficient Hfuzzt,∞ . (Such a construction would use quantization or tiling, similar to, for
example, [CK03, LT03, CZC04, LC06, BDH+10, VTO+10]. Each sample from W
would map to the “tile” containing it, from which the output key would be extracted.
A randomly chosen quantizer would have the property that few samples lie near the
boundary, giving almost-perfect correctness; if perfect correctness is desired, we can
give up on security for those rare samples and simply use a special value of p to
indicate that one of them was the input.)
1.2.2 Related Settings
Other settings with close readings: Hfuzzt,∞ is sufficient The security defini-
tion of fuzzy extractors and secure sketches can be weakened to protect only against
computationally bounded adversaries [FMR13]. In this computational setting, fuzzy
extractors and secure sketches can be constructed for the family of all distributions
W with super-logarithmic Hfuzzt,∞ by using virtual grey-box obfuscation for all cir-
cuits [BCKP14]. The construction places into p the obfuscated program for testing
proximity to w and outputting the appropriate value if the test passes. In addition
to relying on strong assumptions for security (namely, the existence of semantically-
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secure multilinear maps), this construction is not of practical efficiency. Note that if
this construction is used for a secure sketch, W will remain unpredictable conditioned
on p, but will not have pseudoentropy (see Section 5.1.3 for details).
Furthermore, the functional definition of fuzzy extractors and secure sketches can
be weakened to permit interaction between the party having w and the party having w′
(we discuss this setting in Section 3.2). Such a weakening is useful for secure remote
authentication [BDK+05]. When both interaction and computational assumptions
are allowed, secure two-party computation can produce a key that will be secure
whenever the distribution W has fuzzy min-entropy. The two-party computation
protocol needs to be secure without assuming authenticated channels; it can be built
under the assumptions that collision-resistant hash functions and enhanced trapdoor
permutations exist [BCL+11].
Correlated rather than close readings A different model for the problem of
key derivation from noisy sources does not explicitly consider the distance between
w and w′, but rather views w and w′ as samples drawn from a correlated pair of
random variables. This model is considered in multiple works, including [Wyn75,
CK78, AC93, Mau93]; recent characterizations of when key derivation is possible in
this model include [RW05] and [TW14]. We discuss this model in Section 3.1.
1.3 Looking Beyond Sketch-then-Extract
Secure sketches have significantly stronger results in the information-theoretic setting
than fuzzy extractors. This is because secure sketches must precisely reproduce the
original reading w while fuzzy extractors only need to produce a consistent value. In
this section, we provide additional negative results on secure sketches, describe how
to avoid secure sketches, and then describe a fuzzy extractor achieving a condition
that has eluded secure sketches. We describe technical results in Chapter 5.
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Computational secure sketches are also limited We ask whether negative
results on secure sketches can be overcome by relaxing the definition to provide com-
putational security (in Section 5.1). Recall, a secure sketch produces a public value
ss used to reconstruct the original reading w. The traditional secrecy requirement
is that w has high min-entropy conditioned on ss. This allows the fuzzy extractor
of [DORS08] to form key by applying a randomness extractor [NZ93] to w, because
randomness extractors produce random strings from strings with conditional min-
entropy.
The most natural relaxation of the min-entropy requirement of the secure sketch is
to require HILL entropy [HILL99] (namely, that the distribution of w conditioned on
ss be indistinguishable from a high min-entropy distribution). Under this definition,
we could still use a randomness extractor to obtain key from w, because it would yield
a pseudorandom key. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that such a relaxation will yield
fruitful results: we prove in Theorem 5.1.3 that the entropy loss of such secure sketches
is subject to the same coding bounds as the ones that constrain information-theoretic
secure sketches.
Another possible relaxation is to require that the value w is unpredictable condi-
tioned on ss. This definition would also allow the use of a randomness extractor to
get a pseudorandom key, although it would have to be a special extractor—one that
has a reconstruction procedure (see [HLR07, Lemma 6]). We show a significantly
weaker negative result for unpredictability entropy: we prove in Theorem 5.1.8 that
the unpredictability is at most log the size of the metric space minus log the volume
of the ball of radius t. For nearly uniform sources of w over the Hamming metric, this
bound matches the best information-theoretic security sketches. However, for lower
entropy sources this bound is not meaningful. Indeed, the result of [BCKP14] can be
seen as constructing unpredictability secure sketches for all distributions with fuzzy
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min-entropy.
Constructing Fuzzy Extractors without Sketches Our negative results arise
because Rec function acts as an error-correcting code for points of indistinguishable
distributions. It is possible to avoid these negative results by outputting a fresh
random variable.7 Such an algorithm is called a fuzzy conductor [KR09]. Looking
ahead, we construct information-theoretic fuzzy conductors, fuzzy conductors that
have computational security, and fuzzy extractors with computational security. Our
constructions will exploit the structure of the physical source beyond its entropy. We
now describe a condition on practical sources that necessitates the use of some type
of structure of a physical source (beyond its entropy).
More errors than entropy Fuzzy extractors and secure sketches have an inherent
tension between security and correctness guarantees. Consider a distribution with
starting entropy m and desired error tolerance t. If t is high enough that there are
2m points in a ball of radius t, then there exists a distribution of w of min-entropy
m contained entirely in a single ball. This distribution has no fuzzy min-entropy
and thus cannot be securely used for key derivation. Thus, if the security guarantee
of a given fuzzy extractor holds for any source of a given min-entropy m and the
correctness guarantees holds for any t errors, then m must be greater than log |Bt|.8
If a source fails this condition, we will says that it has more errors than entropy.
Distributions with more errors than entropy may have fuzzy min-entropy.
7If some efficient algorithm can invert this fresh value and recover W , the bounds of
Corollary 5.1.5 and Theorem 5.1.8 both apply. This means that we need to consider constructions
that are hard to invert (either information-theoretically or computationally).
8Fuzzy min-entropy is also a necessary condition for the computational and interactive settings
(Proposition 4.1.2). Thus, even in these relaxed settings, to achieve security for all sources of a given
entropy m and error level t, m > log |Bt|. This further motivates our first lesson to incorporate the
structure of a distribution.
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A fuzzy extractor for more errors than entropy Current techniques for build-
ing secure sketches do not work for sources with more errors than entropy, because
they lose at least log |Bt| bits of entropy regardless of the source. The negative re-
sults above show these limitations are unlikely to be overcome by secure sketches that
retain pseudoentropy.
We provide the first construction of a fuzzy extractor that can be used for large
classes of sources that have more errors than entropy (Construction 5.2.2). Our con-
struction works for Hamming errors for strings w of length γ over some alphabet Z.
As argued above, our construction cannot work for all sources of a given entropy;
Our construction can correct a constant fraction of errors, but requires that a con-
stant fraction of the symbols contribute fresh entropy, even conditioned on previous
symbols (Definition 5.2.3). This type of source is a subset of all sources with fuzzy
min-entropy.
Our construction reduces the alphabet size by hashing each input symbol (which
comes from a large alphabet) into a much smaller set, so that the resulting hash value
has lower entropy deficiency. The intuition behind this approach is that it reduces
the size of Bt by reducing the alphabet size, but preserves a sufficient portion of the
input entropy. The resulting string no longer has more errors than entropy. We then
apply a standard fuzzy extractor to the resulting string.
1.4 Moving to Computational Security
In the previous two sections, we showed that fuzzy extractors can be improved by
providing security for families of distributions with additional structure (instead of all
distributions with a given entropy) and by giving up on sketch-then-extract. In this
section, we can provide further improvements by providing computational instead of
information theoretic security. We construct three fuzzy extractors with computa-
17
tional security with novel properties. The first construction uses random linear codes,
the second and third constructions use point obfuscation. For this reason, we split
their discussion to Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively. All construction in this
section are for the Hamming metric. We assume w of length γ over some alphabet
Z.
1.4.1 Minimizing entropy loss
By considering this computational secrecy requirement, we construct the first fuzzy
extractor (Construction 6.1.1), where key is as long as the entropy of the source w.
Our construction uses the code-offset construction [JW99],[DORS08, Section 5] used
in prior work, but with two crucial differences. First, key is not extracted from w
like in the sketch-and-extract approach; rather w “encrypts” key in a way that is
decryptable with the knowledge of some close w′ (this idea is similar to the way the
code-offset construction is presented in [JW99] as a “fuzzy commitment”). Second,
the code used is a random linear code, which allows us to use the Learning with
Errors (LWE) assumption due to Regev [Reg05, Reg10] and derive a longer key.
Specifically, we use the result of Do¨ttling and Mu¨ller-Quade [DMQ13], which shows
the hardness of decoding random linear codes when the error vector comes from the
uniform distribution, with each coordinate ranging over a small interval. This allows
us to use w as the error vector, assuming it is uniform. We also use a result of Akavia,
Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan [AGV09], which says that LWE has many hardcore
bits giving us a key.
Because we use a random linear code, our decoding is limited to reconciling a
logarithmic number of differences. Unfortunately, we cannot utilize the results that
improve the decoding radius through the use of trapdoors (such as [Reg05]), because in
a fuzzy extractor, there is no secret storage place for the trapdoor. If improved decod-
ing algorithms are obtained for random linear codes, they will improve error-tolerance
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of our construction. Given the hardness of decoding random linear codes [BMvT78],
we do not expect significant improvement in the error-tolerance of our construction
for general physical sources.
In Section 6.2, we are able to relax the assumption that w comes from the uniform
distribution, and instead allow w to come from a symbol-fixing source [KZ07] (each
dimension is either uniform or fixed). This relaxation follows from a result about the
hardness of LWE when samples have a fixed (and adversarially known) error vector,
which may be of independent interest (Theorem 6.2.2).
Improving Error Tolerance Construction 6.1.1 only tolerates a logarithmic num-
ber of errors. Most practical sources have substantially more errors. Subsequent to
our construction, Herder et al. improved the error-tolerance of this construction for
physical sources with an additional property [HRvD+14]. For some physical sources
it is possible to obtain a confidence vector with the subsequent reading w′. This
confidence vector indicates how likely each symbol of w′ is to contain an error. This
confidence information can greatly the error tolerance of Construction 6.1.1 (from
logarithmic number to a linear fraction of errors).9 Furthermore, Herder et al. show
that a ring oscillator physical unclonable function [SD07] produces such confidence
information. If confidence information is not available the construction of Herder
et al. reduces to our construction with logarithmic error tolerance. Finding other
physical sources with similar confidence information is an open problem.
1.4.2 Adding reusability
A desirable security property of fuzzy extractors, introduced by Boyen [Boy04], is
called reusability. This property is necessary if a user enrolls the same or correlated
values multiple times. For example, if the source is a biometric reading, the user may
9Herder et al. base their construction on the learning parity with noise problem [BKW03]. Their
approach can easily be extended to larger fields and the learning with errors problem.
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enroll the same biometric with different organizations. Each of them will get a slightly
different enrollment reading wi, and will run Gen(wi) to get keyi and a helper value
pi. Security for each keyi should hold even when an adversary is given all the values
p1, . . . , pq (and, in case some organizations turn out to compromised or adversarial, a
stronger security notion requires security for keyi even in the presence of keyj for j 6=
i). Many traditional fuzzy extractors are not reusable [Boy04, STP09, BA12, BA13].
The only previous construction of reusable fuzzy extractors [Boy04] requires very
particular relationships between wi values, which are unlikely to hold in any practical
source.
A reusable fuzzy extractor against strong correlation We construct a com-
putational fuzzy extractor with strong reusability. Security holds even if the multi-
ple readings wi used in Gen are arbitrarily correlated, as long as each wi individually
comes from an allowed distribution. The construction is secure for distributions where
sampling of symbols produces a high entropy output, such as those with k-wise in-
dependence among symbols for super-logarithmic k. We note that this construction
also handles sources with more errors than entropy (discussed in Section 1.3). This
construction requires that the fraction of errors is sub-constant. We note this con-
struction requires each symbol of the source to contribute fresh entropy.
Approach Our reusable construction is based on obfuscated digital lockers [CD08].
Digital lockers output a secret value only when given the correct input to “unlock” the
secret. An obfuscated digital locker does not provide information about the locked
value or how to unlock it. The main idea of the construction is to pick a random key
and lock key in a digital locker that is unlocked by a random subset of the symbols of
w. To tolerate errors in the input, this process is repeated several times, so that at
least one digital locker can be unlocked using w′. We use obfuscation in a way that
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does not leak partial information; this is crucial to arguing reusability.
1.4.3 Allowing correlated symbols
Our final construction addresses weaknesses in the previous construction. Construc-
tion 7.2.3 removes the need for fresh entropy in the symbols and allows a constant
fraction of symbols of errors, at the cost of requiring a large alphabet size (super-
polynomial in the security parameter). It is secure if symbols in w each have individ-
ual super-logarithmic min-entropy, even if they are arbitrarily correlated. Moreover, a
constant fraction of symbols in w may have little or no entropy, as long as knowledge
of their values does not reduce the entropy of the high-entropy symbols too much (see
Definition 7.1.6).
Approach Our construction that allows correlated symbols tolerates more errors
than the second because it uses digital lockers that are unlocked by single symbols
of w. Since we do not assume that every symbol has high individual entropy, hiding
all of key in every locker then becomes too risky, Instead, we hide a single bit per
locker. To tolerate errors, these bits come from an error correcting code. To ensure
an adversary who learns some bits doesn’t learn anything useful about key, we don’t
encode key in the error-correcting code, but rather extract key (using an information-
theoretic [NZ93] or computational [Kra10] extractor) from the decoded string.
The Required Notion of Obfuscation Constructions 7.1.1 and 7.2.3 use sim-
ulation secure obfuscation of digital lockers, however, we do not require full-fledged
virtual black-box obfuscation [BGI+01]. Instead, we rely on the relaxed notion of
virtual grey-box obfuscation [BC10]. We also require that the obfuscation remains
secure even when several digital lockers of correlated points are composed. Bitan-
ski and Canetti constructed composable digital lockers with virtual grey-box security
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under particular number-theoretic assumptions [BC10]. Recent work of Brzuska and
Mittelbach shows that if indistinguishability obfuscation exists then it is not possible
to build composable virtual black-box digital lockers [BM14]. Thus, our use of virtual
grey-box obfuscation is crucial.
Connection to General Obfuscation As described in Section 1.2.2, fuzzy extrac-
tors for all sources with fuzzy min-entropy can be trivially constructed from virtual
grey-box obfuscation for all circuits [BCKP14]. The security of their construction
is based on the strong assumption of semantically secure graded encodings [PST14].
The construction is based on multilinear encoding and is highly impractical. Our con-
structions use obfuscated digital lockers. Obfuscated digital lockers are instantiable
under significantly weaker assumptions and can be implemented quite efficiently. Ad-
ditionally, the known obfuscation for proximity point programs is not known to be
composable and therefore does not yield a reusable fuzzy extractor.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Let x ∈ X denote an element x in the support of X. Let x ← X be the process
of a sampling x from the distribution X. Un is a random variable with the uniform
distribution over {0, 1}n. Let SD(X, Y ) be the statistical distance between random
variables X, Y drawn from a set χ, defined as SD(X, Y ) = 1
2
∑
x∈χ |Pr(X = x) −
Pr(Y = x)|. We consider randomized distinguishers that output a single bit. Given
a circuit D, define the computational distance δD between X and Y as δD(X, Y ) =
|E[D(X)] − E[D(Y )]|. For a circuit D, we use |D| to denote its size. For a class
of distinguishers, Ds, each of size at most s, we write δDs = maxD∈Ds δD(X, Y ) =
|E[D(X)] − E[D(Y )]|. For a probability distribution X, let supp(X) denote the set
of points with nonzero probability. Let H0(X) denote the logarithm of the support
size of X, that is H0(X) = log | supp(X)|. We use an average case notion of remaining
support size H˜0(X|P ) = log(Ep∈P | supp(X|P = p)|). All logarithms without a base
are considered base 2, that is, log x = log2 x.
For a metric space (M, dis), the (closed) ball of radius t around x is the set of all
points within radius t, that is, Bt(x) = {y|dis(x, y) ≤ t}. If the size of a ball in a metric
space does not depend on x, we denote by |Bt| the size of a ball of radius t. We consider
the Hamming metric over vectors in Zγ, defined via dis(x, y) = {i|xi 6= yi}. For this
metric, |Bt| =
∑t
i=0
(
γ
i
)
(|Z| − 1)i. For a vector w over Fγ, let Wgt(w) = {i|wi 6= 0}.
Usually, we use capitalized letters for random variables and corresponding low-
ercase letters for their samples. We frequently use standard order notation (see
[CLRS01]).
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2.1 Entropy and Extraction
We begin introduction standard entropy and extraction notions.
2.1.1 Min-Entropy
We begin with the standard notion of min-entropy and proceed to computational
notions.
Definition 2.1.1. A distribution X has min-entropy at least m, denoted H∞(X) ≥ m
if
∀x ∈ X,Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−m.
We use the average case notion of min-entropy defined by [DORS08].
Definition 2.1.2 ([DORS08]). Let (X, Y ) be a pair of random variables. The average
min-entropy of X conditioned on Y is defined as
H˜∞(X|Y ) def= − log[E
Y
(2−H∞(X|Y ))] = − log
∑
y∈Y
Pr[Y = y]2−H∞(X|Y=y)
2.1.2 Randomness Extractors
A randomness extractor takes a distribution X of (average) min-entropy m, and with
the help of a uniform string called the seed, “extracts” the randomness contained in
X and outputs a string of length κ that is almost uniform even given the seed.1
Definition 2.1.3 ([NZ93]). Let M, χ be finite sets. A function ext :M→ {0, 1}κ
a (m˜, )-average case extractor if for all pairs of random variables X, Y over M, χ
such that H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ m˜, we have SD((ext(X,Ud), Ud, Y ), Uκ × Ud × Y ) ≤ .
2.2 Computational Tools
We now describe computational notions of entropy. Our computational notions of
entropy have two additional parameters: circuit size s and quality . Larger s and
1In all of our definitions of extractors we assume the extractor outputs its seed. We omit this
from the function definition but all security definitions take in the d-bit seed.
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smaller  mean “better” entropy.
2.2.1 Computational Entropy
We use the average case notion [HLR07] of HILL entropy [HILL99].
Definition 2.2.1. A joint distribution X|Y has conditional HILL entropy at least
m, denoted HHILL,s (X) ≥ m if there exists a distribution Z where H˜∞(Z|Y ) ≥ m, such
that δDs((X, Y ), (Z, Y )) ≤ .
HILL entropy is a commonly used computational notion of entropy. It was extended to
the conditional case by Hsiao, Lu, Reyzin [HLR07]. Here we recall a weaker definition
due to Gentry and Wichs [GW11] (the term relaxed HILL entropy was introduced
in [Rey11]).
Definition 2.2.2. Let (X, Y ) be a pair of random variables. W has relaxed HILL
entropy at least m conditioned on S, denoted HHILL-rlx,s (X|Y ) ≥ m if there exists a
joint distribution (X ′, Y ′), such that H˜∞(X ′|Y ′) ≥ m and δDs((X, Y ), (X ′, Y ′)) ≤ .
However, HILL entropy is a strong notion. We also consider a significantly weaker
version where the value of X is hard to guess given public state. We use the definition
of conditional unpredictability entropy [HLR07, Definition 7], which captures the
notion of “hard to guess” (we relax the definition slightly, similarly to the relaxation
of HILL entropy above).
Definition 2.2.3. Let (X, Y ) be a pair of random variables. X has relaxed unpre-
dictability entropy at least m conditioned on Y , denoted by Hunp-rlx,s (X|Y ) ≥ m, if
there exists a pair of distributions (X ′, Y ′) such that δDs((X, Y ), (X ′, Y ′)) ≤ , and
for all circuits I of size s,
Pr[I(Y ′) = X ′] ≤ 2−m.
2.2.2 Extracting from Computational Entropy
Extractors can be applied to distributions with HILL entropy to obtain pseudoran-
dom, rather than random, outputs: that is, outputs that are computationally indis-
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tinguishable from, rather than statistically close to, uniformly random strings. We
include a proof to provide intuition for manipulating computational entropy (a similar
version of this theorem appeared in [FR12]).
Theorem 2.2.4. Let ext :M×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}κ be a (m˜, ext)-extractor, computable
by circuits of size sext. Let X, Y be a distribution over χ with H
HILL-rlx
HILL,sHILL(X|Y ) ≥ m˜.
Then ∀D ∈ Ds′, where s′ ≈ sHILL − sext,
δD((ext(X,Ud), Y, Ud), Um × Y × Ud) ≤ ext + HILL .
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose not, that is, ∃D ∈ Ds′ such that
δD((ext(X,Ud), Y, Ud), (Uκ × Y × Ud)) > ext + HILL.
We use D to construct a distinguisher D′ to distinguish X, Y from all distributions
X ′, Y ′ where H˜∞(X ′|Y ′) ≥ m˜, violating the HILL-rlx entropy of X|Y . We define
D′ as follows: upon receiving input α ∈ M, β ∈ χ, D′ samples seed ← Ud, runs
η ← ext(α, seed) and then runs D(η, β, seed) on the result. Note that D′ ∈ Ds where
s ≈ s′ + sext = sHILL. Thus we have the following ∀X ′, Y ′, where H∞(X ′|Y ′) ≥ m˜:
δD
′
(X, Y ), (X ′, Y ′)) = δD((ext(X,Ud), Y, Ud), (ext(X ′, Ud), Y ′, Ud))
≥ δD((ext(X,Ud), Y, Ud), (Uκ × Y × Ud))
− δD((ext(X ′, Ud), Y ′, Uκ)× Uκ × Y ′ × Ud)
> ext + HILL − ext = HILL
Thus D′ is able to distinguish X|Y from all X ′|Y ′ with sufficient entropy. This is a
contradiction.
When working with computational entropy, there is no reason to use an information-
theoretic randomness extractor. A computational extractor [Kra10] is the adaption
of a randomness extractor to the computational setting. Any information-theoretic
randomness extractor is also a computational extractor; however, unlike information-
theoretic extractors, computational extractors can expand their output via pseudo-
random generators once a long-enough output is obtained. We adapt the definition
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of Krawczyk [Kra10] to the average case:
Definition 2.2.5. A function cext :M→ {0, 1}κ a (m˜, sec, ssec)-average-case com-
putational extractor if for all pairs of random variables X, Y (with X over M) such
that H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ m˜, we have δDssec ((cext(X;Ud), Ud, Y ), Uκ × Ud × Y ) ≤ sec.
Computational extractors also work when given HILL entropy. The proof is the same
as the proof of Theorem 2.2.4 and is omitted.
Extracting from unpredictability entropy Standard extractors cannot extract
from distributions with unpredictability entropy. This requires a special type of ex-
tractor with a reconstruction. The best known example of a reconstructive extractor
is the Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit [GL89].
Definition 2.2.6 (Reconstruction procedure). An (κ, )-reconstruction for a function
ext : M → {0, 1}κ is a pair of machines Compress and Decomp, where Compress :
χ → {0, 1}κ is a randomized Turing machine, and Decomp(·) : {0, 1}κ → M is a
randomized oracle Turing machine which runs in time polynomial in log |M|. Fur-
thermore, for every x and T , if |Pr[T (ext(x, Ud)) = 1]−Pr[T (Um×Ud) = 1]| > , then
Pr[DecompT (CompressT (x)) = x] > 1/2 (the probability is over the random choices of
Compress and Decomp).
Lemma 2.2.7. [HLR07, Lemma 6] Let X, Y be random variables with Hunp,s (X|Y ) ≥
m˜, and let ext be an extractor with a (k−log 1

, )-reconstruction (Compress,Decomp).
Then
δDs′ ((ext(X,Ud), Y, Ud), (Uκ × Y × Ud)) ≤ 5,
where s′ = s/(|Compress|+ |Decomp|).
2.3 Coding Theory
Definition 2.3.1. The t-neighborhood of c, denoted Neight(c), is the set of all points
distance t from c. That is Neight(c) = {c′|dis(c, c′) = t}.
2.3.1 Shannon Codes
We use the definition of a Shannon code [SWBH49]:
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Definition 2.3.2. Let C be a set over space M. We say that C is an (t, δ)-Shannon
code if there exists a procedure Rec such that for all t′ ≤ t and for all c ∈ C, Pr[c′ ←
Neight′(c) ∧ Rec(c′) 6= c] ≤ δ. To distinguish it from the average-error Shannon code
defined below, we will sometimes call it a maximal-error Shannon code.
This is a slightly stronger formulation than usual, in that for every size t′ < t we
require the code to correct t′ random errors.2 Shannon codes work for all codewords.
We can also consider a formulation that works for an “average” codeword.
Definition 2.3.3. Let C be a distribution over space M. We say that C is an (t, )-
average error Shannon code if there exists an efficient procedure Rec such that for all
t′ ≤ t Prc←C [Rec(Neight′(c)) 6= c] ≤ .
An average error Shannon code is one whose average probability of error is bounded
by . See [CT06, Pages 192-194] for definitions of average and maximal error prob-
ability. An average-error Shannon code is convertible to a maximal-error Shannon
code with a small loss. We use the following pruning argument from [CT06, Pages
202-204]:
Lemma 2.3.4. Let C be a (t, )-average error Shannon code with recovery procedure
Rec such that H∞(C) ≥ m. There is a set C ′ with |C ′| ≥ 2m−1 that is a (t, 2)-(maximal
error) Shannon code with recovery procedure Rec.
Proof. Let C be the (t, )-average error Shannon code with recovery procedure Rec
such that H∞(C) ≥ m. Then for all t′ ≤ t∑
c∈C
Pr[C = c] Pr[c′ ← Neigh(c, t′) ∧ Rec(c′) 6= c] ≤ .
For c denote by c = Pr[c
′ ← Neigh(c, t′)∧Rec(c′) 6= c]. Then by Markov’s inequality:
Pr
c∈C
[c ≤ 2 E
c←C
[c]] = Pr
c∈C
[c ≤ 2] ≥ 1
2
2In the standard formulation, the code must correct a random error of size up to t, which may
not imply that it can correct a random error of a much smaller size t′, because the volume of the
ball of size t′ may be negligible compared to the volume of the ball of size t. For codes that are
monotone (if decoding succeeds on a set of errors, it succeeds on all subsets), these formulations
are equivalent. However, we will work with an arbitrary recover functionality that is not necessarily
monotone.
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Let C ′ denote the of set all c ∈ C where c ≤ 2. Note that Prc←C [c ∈ C ′] ≥ 1/2.
Since H∞(C) ≥ m, we know |C ′| ≥ 2m−1 (otherwise Prc←C [c ∈ C ′] =
∑
c∈C′ Pr[C = c]
would be less than 2m−1 1
2m
= 1/2). This completes the proof of the Lemma 2.3.4.
2.3.2 Hamming Codes
Definition 2.3.5 (Minimum distance). Let C be a set. The minimum distance of C
is minc,c′∈C dis(c, c′).
Definition 2.3.6 (Error-correcting code). A set C is an (Zγ, |C|, d)-error-correcting
code if its minimum distance is at least d. The elements c ∈ C are known as code-
words.
If a message c is transmitted and at most t = bd−1
2
c of the symbols of c are modified,
it is possible to uniquely recover the transmitted message c. A code is efficient if
there exist polynomial time algorithms that sample c← C and Dec(c∗) that finds the
unique c ∈ C such that dis(c, c∗) ≤ t if one exists. Many error-correcting codes have
additional properties that facilitate encoding and decoding.
Linear error-correcting codes Let Z = Fq for some field Fq.
Definition 2.3.7. A code C is a (Fγq ,Fkq , d)-linear code if is a k-dimensional linear
subspace of Fγq with minimum distance d.
Linear codes have two associated matrices G and H, known as the generating matrix
and the parity check matrix respectively.
Definition 2.3.8 (Generating Matrix). For any (Fγq ,Fkq , d)-linear code C there exists
a matrix G ∈ Fγ×kq where span(G) = C.
Sampling a random x ∈ Fkq and computing Gx is an efficient encoding function for
C. Recall that the kernel, or ker, of a matrix is the set of all vectors that map to the
0 vector.
Definition 2.3.9 (Parity Check Matrix). For any (Fγq ,Fkq , d)-linear code C there
exists a matrix H ∈ F(γ−k)×γq such that ker(H) = C.
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Fix some c ∈ C, an important property of H is that for any c∗ such that dis(c, c∗) ≤ t,
the value Hc∗ is unique. We call Hc∗ the syndrome of c∗. Indeed, decoding usually
consists three steps:
• Compute s = Hc∗.
• Map Hc∗ to an error vector e ∈ Fγq where Wgt(e) ≤ t.
• Subtract e from c∗ to obtain c.
2.3.3 Random Linear Codes
We will use the q-ary entropy function, denoted Hq(x) and defined as Hq(x) =
x logq(q − 1) − x logq x − (1 − x) logq(1 − x). Note that H2(x) = −x log x − (1 −
x) log(1− x). In the region [0, 1
2
] for any value q′ ≥ q, Hq′(x) ≤ Hq(x). The following
theorem is standard in coding theory:
Theorem 2.3.10. [Gur10, Theorem 8] For prime q, ρ ∈ [0, 1−1/q), 0 <  < 1−Hq(ρ)
and sufficiently large γ, the following holds for µ = d(1−Hq(ρ)− )γe . If A ∈ Fγ×µq
is drawn uniformly at random, then the linear code with A as a generator matrix has
rate at least (1 − Hq(ρ) − ) and relative distance at least ρ with probability at least
1− e−Ω(γ).
We use the following claim (techniques from Cooper [Coo00]):
Claim 2.3.11. Let q ≥ 2 be a prime. Let α, β be integers and let let S $← Fα×(α+β)q
be uniformly generated. Then Pr[rank(S) = α] > 1− q−β.
Proof. Let pi be the probability that the i-th row is linearly dependent on the previous
i − 1 rows. By the union bound, the probability that α rows are linearly dependent
is bounded by
∑α
i=1 pi. Since i − 1 rows can span a space of size at most qi−1, the
probability pi that a randomly chosen ith row is in that space is at most q
i−1/qα+β.
So
Pr[rank(S) < α] =
α∑
i=1
qi−1
qα+β
=
qα − 1
q − 1
1
qα+β
< q−β.
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2.4 Obfuscation
Our constructions will use obfuscation for two types of circuits: point functions and
digital lockers. The family of point functions In = {Iw}w∈{0,1}n defined as follows:
Iw(x) :

1 x = w
0 otherwise
.
and the class of digital lockers is In = {Iw,key}w∈{0,1}n,key∈{0,1}κ defined as follows:
Iw,key(x) :

key x = w
⊥ otherwise
.
The required notion of obfuscation is virtual grey-box (VGB) introduced in [BC10].
This notion is weaker then the standard notion of virtual black-box ([BGI+01]), as it
allows the simulator to run in unbounded time while making at a polynomial number
of oracle queries to the function.
We require that the obfuscation is composable and secure with respect to auxiliary
input. Composable auxiliary-input VGB obfuscators for point functions and digital
lockers are constructed in [BC10, Theorem 6.1] from the Strong Vector Decision
Diffie-Hellman assumption, which is a generalization of the strong DDH assumption
of [Can97] for tuples of points. They can also be constructed by assuming strong
properties of cryptographic hash functions [Can97].
Definition 2.4.1 (composable obfuscation VGB obfuscation with auxiliary input
[BC10]). A PPT algorithm O is an `-composable VGB obfuscator for In (resp. In+κ)
with auxiliary-input if the following conditions are met:
1. Functionality: for every n and I ∈ In, O(I) is a circuit that computes the same
function as I.
2. Virtual grey-box: For every PPT adversary A and polynomial p, there exists a
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(possibly inefficient) simulator S and a polynomial q such that for all sufficiently
large n, any sequence of circuits I1, . . . , I` ∈ In, (where ` = poly(n)) and for
all auxiliary inputs z ∈ {0, 1}∗:
| Pr
A,O
[A(z,O(I1), . . . ,O(I`)) = 1]− Pr
S
[S(I
1,...,I`)[q(n)](z, 1|I
1|+|I`||) = 1]| < 1
p(n)
,
where (I1, . . . , I`)[q(n)] is an oracle that answers at most q(n) queries, and
where every query of the form (i, x) is answered by I i(x).
For notational convenience, when we use point function obfuscation, we denote
the oracle provided to the simulator as Iw(·, ·) where w = w1, ..., wγ is the vector
of obfuscated points. When we use digital lockers we denote the oracle provided to
the simulator as Iw,key(·, ·) where w is the vector of obfuscated points and key is the
hidden value (we will hide the same value in each obfuscation).
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Chapter 3
Key Derivation from Noisy Sources
In this chapter, we discuss prior approaches to key derivation from noisy sources. The
term fuzzy extractors was introduced by Dodis et al. [DORS08]. There was substantial
work on key derivation from noisy sources prior to the work of Dodis et al. In the
discussion until now, we assumed a single user wished to generate key from a noisy
source (with initial reading w) and be able to regenerate key from a nearby reading w′.
In the single user setting, this task must be accomplished non-interactively, generating
key and any necessary helper information p when w is observed. At a later time key
can be regenerated from w′ and p.
In this section, we explore alternative models for key derivation from noisy sources.
We first consider a more general problem where users wish to derive keys from ar-
bitrarily correlated random variables W and W ′ (Section 3.1). Bounded distance is
one possible type of correlation between repeated readings, however not all types of
correlation can be expressed as a metric. We then return to the bounded distance
setting where two users hold w and w′ respectively and engage in an interactive pro-
tocol to derive key protocol (Section 3.2). Finally, we consider the non-interactive
setting where a single user wishes to derive key and p, and regenerate key from w′
and p (Section 3.3). In all models, there are two fundamental tasks: information-
reconciliation and privacy amplification [BBR88]. Information-reconciliation ensures
that related w and w′ are mapped to the same key (often this is done by first correcting
w′ to w). Privacy amplification ensures that key is uniformly distributed conditioned
on the adversary’s view.
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3.1 Key Derivation from Correlated Random Variables
In the introduction, we considered two readings w and w′ of a single physical source.
We assumed the two readings were close according to some metric dis. The two
readings w and w′ can be modeled as a draw of correlated random variables where for
all (w,w′)← (W,W ′), dis(w,w′) ≤ t.1 Bounded distance is just one possible way that
random variables can be correlated. Another line of work considers the problem of
key derivation from arbitrarily correlated random variables [Mau93]. In this model,
two parties Alice and Bob are able to draw from correlated random variables W and
W ′ respectively. The goal of Alice and Bob is to agree on key by discussion over
a public channel using W and W ′. There is a (passive) eavesdropper Eve that can
observes messages sent between Alice and Bob.
Maurer shows two results. First, the length of key is bounded by the mutual
information between W and W ′ [Mau93, Theorem 1]. Second, if the two parties can
make i.i.d. draws from W and W ′, then it is possible to achieve a secret key rate
approaching the mutual information [Mau93, Theorem 2]. (The secret key rate is
the average length of the secret key across independent executions of the protocol.)
When authenticating using physical sources, for parties to make i.i.d. draws from
W,W ′ they must have multiple instances of the physical source. The use of repeated
draws from W and W ′ is crucial for a secret key rate that is proportional to an
average-case information notion.2 In this setting, mutual information between W
and W ′ is a necessary and sufficient condition for key derivation.
Renner and Wolf [RW05] ask what length key is possible from a single draw of W
and W ′ using non-interactive protocols. They first consider information-reconciliation
and privacy amplification separately. They show that H∞(W ) is a necessary and
1In the definition of fuzzy extractors (Definition 3.3.1), correctness is provided for all w′ within
distance t. That is, w′ is assumed to be worst case and is not modeled as a random variable.
2If only one draw is allowed, even If W = W ′, min-entropy of W is an upper bound on the
achievable secret key length.
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sufficient condition for privacy amplification.3 Second, they show that the length of
p must grow with the worst case number of possible outcomes for W conditioned on
W ′.4 That is, the length of the public value
|p| ≥ max
w′∈W
log |{w|Pr[W = w|W ′ = w′] > 0}|.
Furthermore, they show there exists a protocol with this length p using optimal
encoding functions. Intuitively, the public information must describe which possible
outcome for W actually occurred. This result describes the maximal length of p
and does not argue how p effects security. It may be possible to construct a p that
reduces the entropy of w by less than log |p|. In Chapter 4, we will construct schemes
with variable length p, providing information-reconciliation for distributions where
the bounds of Renner and Wolf provide no security guarantees.
Lastly, the work of Renner and Wolf shows characterize when key derivation is
possible from correlated random variables [RW05, Theorem 3]. We compare this
characterization to fuzzy min-entropy in Chapter 4.
Most work on key derivation from correlated random variable setting is highly
non-constructive. Restricting to correlation captured by a distance metric allows for
ideas from coding theory and more efficient constructions.
3.2 The Interactive Setting
The work of Bennett, Brassard, and Robert [BBR88] introduced the problem of key
agreement from nearby values. Two parties Alice and Bob which hold W and W ′
respectively. For any outcome of the two random variables (w,w′) ← (W,W ′),
3The results of Renner and Wolf use smooth notions of entropy. A random variable has smooth
entropy if it is statistically close to a distribution with true entropy. We describe their results in the
terminology of non smooth entropy.
4This result also uses a smooth notion of entropy. We describe the non smooth version for
simplicity.
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dis(w,w′) ≤ t. Bounded distance between W and W ′ implies mutual informa-
tion between W and W ′. As in the correlated random variable case, information-
reconciliation and privacy amplification are the two fundamental tasks. Min-entropy
of W remains a necessary condition for privacy amplification. The goal of Alice and
Bob is to create key using this information and a public channel. There is good reason
to expect that interactive information-reconciliation can outperform non-interactive
information-reconciliation.
We do not attempt to survey the interactive setting. We present the Cascade
protocol to demonstrate the power of interactivity [BS94]. In this protocol, Alice and
Bob hold w ∈ {0, 1}γ and w′ ∈ {0, 1}γ respectively. We give a high level synopsis of
the protocol:
1. Pass 1: Alice and Bob choose a length parameter α. The strings w and w′ are
split into length α blocks, v1, ..., vγ/α.
2. Pass 1: Alice sends the parity of each block to Bob. For blocks where the parity
differs, Alice and Bob use binary search to identify which bit(s) have errors (by
repeatedly sending parity of subblocks). This identifies and eliminates any odd
number of errors between blocks.
3. Passes 2 and up: Alice and Bob choose a length parameter α. They also choose
a random function from f : [1, ..., γ] → [1, ..., γ/α]. Blocks are formed by all
bits that have the same output f , that is vj = {i|f(i) = j}. Alice sends parity
of each block to Bob.
4. Passes 2 and up: Alice and Bob use binary search to correct odd number of
errors in blocks whose parity does not match.
5. Passes 2 and up: Alice and Bob use binary search on the smallest blocks vj to
see if any errors exist in that block. If so, Alice and Bob find blocks in previous
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passes that contained the position in error. These blocks must have an even
number of errors. Use binary search to find errors in those blocks.
This protocol involves several rounds and Alice and Bob send multiple messages. It
is unclear how to translate the ideas of the Cascade (and other similar) protocols to
the non-interactive setting.
3.3 Fuzzy Extractors
In this section, we define fuzzy extractors and secure sketches. Definitions and lemmas
are drawn from the work of Dodis et al. [DORS08, Sections 2.5–4.1] with modifica-
tions. First we allow for error, as discussed in [DORS08, Section 8]. Second, we
consider an arbitrary family W of distributions instead of families containing all dis-
tributions of a given min-entropy. Let M be a metric space with distance function
dis.
Definition 3.3.1. An (M,W , κ, t, )-fuzzy extractor with error δ is a pair of ran-
domized procedures, “generate” (Gen) and “reproduce” (Rep). Gen on input w ∈ M
outputs an extracted string key ∈ {0, 1}κ and a helper string p ∈ {0, 1}∗. Rep takes
w′ ∈M and p ∈ {0, 1}∗ as inputs. (Gen,Rep) have the following properties:
1. Correctness: if dis(w,w′) ≤ t and (key, p) ← Gen(w), then Pr[Rep(w′, p) =
key] ≥ 1− δ (note that correctness holds for any w′ with probability 1− δ over
the coins on Gen and Rep, but w′ cannot be a function of p).
2. Security: for any distribution W ∈ W, if (Key, P )← Gen(W ),
SD((Key, P ), (Uκ, P )) ≤ .
The standard construction is sketch-and-extract: the uniform key is extracted from
w (using a randomness extractor [NZ93]) and error-tolerance is obtained by using
a secure sketch [DORS08, Lemma 4.1]. Secure sketches produce a string ss that
minimally decreases the entropy of w, while mapping nearby w′ to w:
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Definition 3.3.2. An (M,W , m˜, t)-secure sketch with error δ is a pair of randomized
procedures, “sketch” (SS) and “recover” (Rec). SS on input w ∈ M returns a bit
string ss ∈ {0, 1}∗. Rec takes an element w′ ∈ M and ss ∈ {0, 1}∗. (SS,Rec) have
the following properties:
1. Correctness: ∀w,w′ ∈M if dis(w,w′) ≤ t then Pr[Rec(w′, SS(w)) = w] ≥ 1− δ
(as before, correctness holds for any w′ with probability 1− δ over the coins of
SS and Rec, but not if w′ is a function of SS(w)).
2. Security: for any distribution W ∈ W, H˜∞(W |SS(W )) ≥ m˜.
The Case of Known Distribution If in the above definitions we take W to be a
one-element set containing a single distribution W , then the fuzzy extractor/secure
sketch is said to be constructed for a known distribution. In this case, we need to
require correctness only for w that have nonzero probability5.
We have no requirement that the algorithms are compact or efficient, and so
the distribution can be fully known to them. Finding a natural model of specifying
distributions that allows for efficient (yet generic) known distribution constructions
of sketches and extractors is an interesting problem.
From Secure Sketches to Fuzzy Extractors A fuzzy extractor can be produced
from a secure sketch and an average case randomness extractor :
Lemma 3.3.3. Assume (SS,Rec) is an (M,W , m˜, t)-secure sketch with error δ,
and let ext : M → {0, 1}κ be a (m˜, )-average case extractor. Then the following
(Gen,Rep) is an (M,W , κ, t, )-fuzzy extractor with error δ:
• Gen(w) : generate seed ← {0, 1}d, set p = (SS(w), seed), key = ext(w; seed),
and output (key, p).
• Rep(w′, (ss, seed)) : recover w = Rec(w′, ss) and output key = ext(w; seed).
5We can extend correctness to all of M by defining Gen/SS to output the point w as part of
p/ss on zero-probability inputs, which will ensure that Rep/Rec can always be correct; this does not
affect security.
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3.3.1 Previous approaches
As stated above, fuzzy extractors perform information-reconciliation and privacy am-
plification non-interactively. Secure sketches perform non-interactive information-
reconciliation. In this section, we provide a brief overview of standard construc-
tions. We focus on secure sketches as most known fuzzy extractors are formed using
a secure sketch followed by a randomness extractor. Throughout this dissertation,
we focus on the Hamming metric (many of our negative results hold for arbitrary
metric spaces). Let Z be some alphabet and let w,w′ be strings over Zγ, define
dis(w,w′) = {i|wi 6= w′i}. We use Hamming codes as described in Section 2.3.2.
The code-offset construction Juels and Wattenberg [JW99] constructed an ob-
ject called a fuzzy commitment scheme. The goal of a fuzzy commitment scheme
is to allow a user to decommit if they know a close value (while retaining standard
hiding properties).6 This goal is very related to a secure sketch. Let h be some hash
function and let C be an error correcting code with decoding function Dec.
Commit
1. Input: w.
2. Sample c← C.
3. Compute com = h(c), c− w.
Open
1. Input: (w′, y, δ)
2. Compute c′ = δ + w′.
3. Decode c∗ = Dec(c′).
4. If h(c∗) = y output 1.
5. Else output 0.
This construction was the precursor to the code-offset sketch. The code-offset
sketch stores a public value ss = c − w that is a “one-time pad” but with c that
6We do not describe cryptographic commitment here. It was defined by Brassard, Chaum, and
Cre´peau [BCC88].
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contains redundancy.
Construction 3.3.4. Let C be an efficient (Fγq , |C|, d)-code. Define SS,Rec as fol-
lows:
Gen(w)
1. Sample c← C.
2. Compute ss = c− w.
Rec(ss, w′)
1. Compute c′ = δ + w′.
2. Decode c∗ = Dec(c′).
3. Output w∗ = c∗ − ss.
Then (SS,Rec) is a (Fγq ,m,m− (γ − log |C|) log q, bd−12 c)-secure sketch.
By using linear codes the construction can be derandomized. The syndrome of a
linear code is a secure sketch:
Construction 3.3.5. Let H be the parity check matrix of a (Fγq ,Fkq , d)-linear code.
Then SS(w) = Hw,Rec(ss, w′) = w′ + Dec(ss) is a (Fγq ,m,m− (γ − k) log q, bd−12 c)-
secure sketch.
3.3.2 Computational Fuzzy Extractors
Definition 3.3.6 (Computational Fuzzy Extractor). Let W be a family of proba-
bility distributions over M. A pair of randomized procedures “generate” (Gen) and
“reproduce” (Rep) is a (M,W , κ, t)-computational fuzzy extractor that is (, s)-hard
with error δ if Gen and Rep satisfy Definition 3.3.1 with the security property replaced
with:
• For any distribution W ∈ W, the string Key is pseudorandom conditioned on
P , that is δDs((Key, P ), (Uκ, P )) ≤ .
Any efficient fuzzy extractor is also a computational fuzzy extractor. We now de-
fine a weaker object that outputs computational entropy (instead of a pseudorandom
key). We call this object a computational fuzzy conductor. It is the computational
analogue of a fuzzy conductor (introduced by Kanukurthi and Reyzin [KR09]).
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Definition 3.3.7. A pair of randomized procedures “generate” (Gen) and “reproduce”
(Rep) is an (M,W , m˜, t)-computational fuzzy conductor that is (, s)-hard with error
δ if Gen and Rep satisfy Definition 3.3.6, except the last condition is replaced with the
following weaker condition:
• for any distribution W ∈ W, the string r has high HILL entropy conditioned on
P . That is HHILL,s (R|P ) ≥ m˜.
A computational fuzzy conductor (Definition 3.3.7) can be transformed to a com-
putational fuzzy extractor (Definition 3.3.6) using a computational extractor (Defi-
nition 2.2.5).
Lemma 3.3.8. Let (Gen′, Rep′) be a (M,W , m˜, t)-computational fuzzy conductor that
is (cond, scond)-hard with error δ and outputs in {0, 1}γ. Let cext : {0, 1}γ → {0, 1}κ
be a (m˜, ext, sext)-average case computational extractor. Define (Gen,Rep) as:
• Gen(w; seed) (where seed ∈ {0, 1}d): run (r′, p′) = Gen′(w) and output r =
cext(r′; seed), p = (p′, seed).
• Rep(w′, (p′, seed)) : run r′ = Rep′(w′; p′) and output r = cext(r′; seed).
Then (Gen,Rep) is a (M,W , κ, t)-computational fuzzy extractor that is (cond+ext, s)-
hard with error δ where s = min{scond − |cext| − d, sext}.
Proof. It suffices to show if there is some distinguisher D of size s where
δD((cext(W ;Ud), Ud, P ), (Uκ, Ud, P )) > cond + ext
then there is an distinguisher D′ of size scond such that for all Y with H˜∞(Y |P ′) ≥ m˜,
δD
′
((W,P ′), (Y, P ′)) ≥ cond.
Let D be such a distinguisher. That is,
δD((cext(W,Ud), Ud, P ), (Uκ, Ud, P )) > ext + cond.
DefineD′ as follows. On input (y, p′) sample seed← Ud, compute key← cext(y; seed),
set p = (p′, seed) and output D(key, p). Note that D′ is of size approximately
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s+ |cext|+ d ≤ scond. Then we have the following:
δD
′
((W,P ′), (Y, P ′)) = δD((cext(W,Ud), P ), cext(Y, Ud), P )
≥ δD′((cext(W,Ud), P ), (Uκ, P ))
− δD′((Uκ × P ), (cext(Y, Ud), P ))
> cond + ext − ext = cond.
Where the last line follows by noting that D is of size at most sext. Thus D
′ distin-
guishes W from all Y with sufficient entropy. This is a contradiction.
3.3.3 Reusable Computational Fuzzy Extractors
An additional desirable feature of fuzzy extractors is reusability [Boy04]. It is the
ability to support multiple independent enrollments of the same value, allowing users
to reuse the same biometric or physical unclonable function, for example, with mul-
tiple noncommunicating providers. More precisely, the algorithm Gen may be run
multiple times on correlated readings w1, ..., wq of a given source. Each time, Gen will
produce a different pair of values (key1, p1), ..., (keyq, pq). Security for each extracted
string keyi should hold even in the presence of all the helper strings p1, . . . , pq (the
reproduction procedure Rep at the i-th provider still obtains only a single w′i close
to wi and uses a single helper string pi). Because the providers may not trust each
other, a stronger security feature (which we satisfy) ensures that each keyi is secure
even when all keyj for j 6= i are also given to the adversary.
Constructions of reusable fuzzy extractors depend on the types of correlations
allowed among w1, . . . , wq. Boyen [Boy04] showed how to do so when each wi is a
shift of w1 by a value that is oblivious to the value of w1 itself (formally, wi is a result
of a transitive isometry applied to w1). Boyen also showed that even for this weak
class of correlations, any secure sketch must lose at least log |Bt| entropy [Boy04,
Theorem 11].
We modify the definition of Boyen [Boy04, Definition 6] for the computational
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setting. We then compare the two definitions.
Definition 3.3.9 (Reusable Fuzzy Extractors). Let W be a family of distributions
over M. Let (Gen,Rep) be a (M,W , κ, t)-computational fuzzy extractor that is
(sec, ssec)-hard with error δ. Fix some W1 ∈ W. Let (f2, .., fq), D be a split adversary.
Define the following game for all j = 1, ..., q:
• Sampling The challenger samples w1 ← W1, u← {0, 1}κ.
• Perturbation For i = 2, ..., q: the challenger computes (keyi, pi) ← Gen(wi).
Set wi+1 = fi(w1, p1, ..., pi).
• Distinguishing The advantage of D is
Adv(D)
def
= Pr[D(key1, ..., keyj−1, keyj, keyj+1, ..., keyq, p1, ..., pq) = 1]
− Pr[D(key1, ..., keyj−1, u, keyj+1, ..., keyq, p1, ..., pq) = 1].
(Gen,Rep) is (q, sec, ssec, f2, ..., fq)-reusable if for all D ∈ Dssec the advantage is at
most sec.
The definition is parameterized by f2, ..., fq. This adversary implicitly defines
distributionsW2, ...,Wq (which depend onW1 and the public values P1, ...Pi). Security
seems hopeless if fuzzy extractor is not secure on each of these distributions on their
own. This is the only requirement we make on these functions. We call these types
of functions admissible:
Definition 3.3.10. Let (Gen,Rep) be a (M,W , κ, t)-computational fuzzy extractor
that is (sec, ssec)-hard with error δ. In the reusability game above, a set of functions
f2, ..., fq is admissible if for all W1 ∈ W for all w1 ∈ W1 and ∀p1, ..., pq that are the
public outputs of Gen the distribution Wi,w1,p1,...,pi−1 = fi(w1, p1, ..., pi−1) is a member
of W.
Comparison with the Definition of [Boy04] The goal of a reusable fuzzy ex-
tractor is to allow enrollment of a source across multiple services. A service i sees an
reading of the source wi. Boyen considers two versions of reusable fuzzy extractors,
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first where the adversary sees p1, ..., pq (outsider security [Boy04, Definition 6]) and
tries to learn about the values w1, ..., wq or key1, ..., keyq. Second, where the adversary
controls some subset of the servers and can generate keys on arbitrary p′i (insider
security [Boy04, Definition 7]). This allows the adversary to learn a subset of keys
ri (by performing key generation on the valid pi). This definition makes sense when
servers are compromised (after enrollment) and act maliciously. In both definitions,
the adversary creates a perturbation function fi after seeing p1, ..., pi−1 (and generated
keys for outsider security) and the challenger generates wi = fi(w1). The definition
is parameterized by the class of allowed perturbation functions.
Boyen constructs a outsider reusable cryptographic fuzzy extractor for unbounded
q when the perturbation family is a transitive isometric permutation groups. Boyen
transforms this construction to insider security using random oracles.
Insider security strengthens outsider security in two ways. First, it allows the
adversary to see some subset of keys, second it allows the adversary to perform key
generation on arbitrary pi. This mixes two properties of a fuzzy extractor: reusability
and robustness [DKRS06]. Robust fuzzy extractors provide security against modified
p. In this work, we show reusability when keyi are observed but do not handle the
issue of robustness. That is, we assume keys may be exposed but servers keep honest
state. Our definition lies between outsider and insider security.
We adapt the definition of Boyen to the computational setting (Definition 3.3.9).
The definition of Boyen considers a single adversary. We split the adversary into
two parts, one of which is information-theoretic and another that is computationally
bounded. The functions f2, ..., fq can be thought of as a single adversary that sees
all prior state. However, to provide meaningful security in the computational setting,
we cannot have communication between f2, ..., fq and D.
7 Because these two adver-
7An alternative would be to have a single computationally bounded adversary. Construction 7.1.1
satisfies this alternative adaption as well.
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saries do not communicate we strengthen the definition by allowing the perturbation
functions, fi, to see the original sample w1. This was not allowed in the definition of
Boyen as it would make security impossible.
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Chapter 4
Measuring the Strength of a Noisy Distribution
In this chapter, we show how to improve fuzzy extractors by incorporating additional
structure of the source distribution W . We begin by definition fuzzy min-entropy
which describes a noisy distribution’s suitability for key derivation (Section 4.1).
We then show how to construct fuzzy extractors if a distribution is exactly known
(Section 4.2). However, we show that distributional uncertainty comes at a cost. We
show if a distribution W is only known to come from a family of distributions W ,
then it may be impossible to construct a fuzzy extractor (Section 4.3).
4.1 Fuzzy Min-Entropy: a Necessary Condition
The value p allows everyone, including the adversary, to find the output of Rep(·, p)
on any input w′. Ideally, p should not provide any useful information beyond this
ability, and the outputs of Rep on inputs that are too distant from w should provide
no useful information, either. In this ideal scenario, the adversary is limited to trying
to guess a w′ that is t-close to w. Letting w′ be the center of the maximum-weight
ball in W would be optimal for the adversary. We therefore measure the quality of a
source by (the negative logarithm of) this weight.
Definition 4.1.1. The t-fuzzy min-entropy of a distribution W in a metric space
(M, dis) is:
Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = − log
max
w′
∑
w∈W |dis(w,w′)≤t
Pr[W = w]

Fuzzy min-entropy is a necessary condition for security:
Proposition 4.1.2. Let W be a distribution over (M, dis) and let n = log |M|. If
Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = Θ(log n) there is no (M,W, κ, t)-fuzzy extractor with error δ = ngl(n)
for κ = ω(log n).
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Proof. Let W be a distribution where Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = Θ(log n). This means that there
exists a point w′ ∈ M such that Prw∈W [dis(w,w′) ≤ t] ≥ 1/poly(n). Consider the
following distinguisher D:
• Input key, p.
• If Rep(w′, p) = key, output 1.
• Else output 0.
Clearly, Pr[D(Key, P ) = 1] ≥ 1/poly(n)− δ, while Pr[D(Uκ, P ) = 1] = 1/2−κ. Thus,
when κ = ω(log n):
δD((Key, P ), (Uκ, P )) ≥ 1
poly(n)
− δ − 1
2−κ
= 1/poly(n).
Note that D only provides an input and looks at the output, thus it extends to an
interactive protocol. Also, D is of size max |M|+ |Rep| where max |M| is the longest
description of an item in the metric space. Thus, D is also a distinguisher in the
computational setting.
Generalizing to correlated random variables Instead of considering w,w′ that
have bounded distance, we treat W,W ′ as a pair of correlated random variables.
Previous results in this setting are discussed in Section 3.1. Fuzzy min-entropy can
be generalized to this setting. Fuzzy extractors consider the worst case w′. When
considing correlated readings, it is natural to treat W ′ as a random variable:1
Definition 4.1.3. Let (W,W ′) be a pair of correlated random variables. The corre-
lated fuzzy min-entropy of W,W ′ is:
Hcorr(W,W ′) = − log
 max
w′∈supp(W ′)
∑
w∈W |Pr[W=w|W ′=w′]>0
Pr[W = w]
 .
1Fuzzy extractors are defined to require high probability of correctness for all pairs w,w′. In the
correlated setting, it may make sense to provide an average-case guarantee, where the probability
of correctness is also over the draw of w,w′. Renner and Wolf use a smoothed notion of entropy
that removes the δ fraction of the probability mass of W = w|W ′ = w′ with the most points to
improve parameters under such a definition. In this work, we consider worst case correctness and
use unsmoothed entropy.
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In Definition 4.1.1, the sum is implicitly over W = w|W ′ = w′ since we assume any
w′ within distance t is possible. For now, we consider sufficiency of Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) for key
derivation from noisy sources (Definition 4.1.1). We then consider the implications
of our results on the correlated reading setting (Definition 4.1.3).
4.2 Sufficiency of Hfuzzt,∞ When the Algorithms Know the Dis-
tribution
In this section, we consider fuzzy extractors that precisely know the input distri-
bution W . We call this setting the known-distribution setting (see discussion after
Definition 3.3). We show it is possible to build known-distribution secure sketches (and
thus fuzzy extractors through Lemma 3.3.3) whenever Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = ω(log n). We first
consider flat distributions and show that hashing maintains fuzzy min-entropy and
suffices to disambiguate points. We then turn to arbitrary distributions.
4.2.1 Flat Distributions
A distribution is flat if all points in its support have the same probability.
Definition 4.2.1. A distribution W is flat if for all w0, w1 ∈ supp(W ), Pr[W =
w0] = Pr[W = w1].
Denote the largest number of points in a ball of radius t in the support of W as
βt = maxw′∈M |{w|w ∈ supp(W ) ∧ dis(w,w′) ≤ t}|. For flat distributions, the weight
of this maximum-probability ball (which determines Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) by Definition 4.1.1) is
proportional to the number of points in it. More precisely,
Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = − log
(
max
w′∈M
|{w|w ∈ supp(W ) ∧ dis(w,w′) ≤ t}| · Pr[W = w]
)
= − log
(
max
w′∈M
|{w|w ∈ supp(W ) ∧ dis(w,w′) ≤ t}| · 2−H∞(W )
)
= H∞(W )− log βt. (4.1)
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We use universal hashes to construct secure sketches for flat distributions. Skoric et
al. constructed secure sketches from universal hashes to correct a polynomial number
of error patterns [SˇTGP09].
Definition 4.2.2 ([CW79]). Let F : K ×M → R be a function. We say that F is
universal if for all distinct x1, x2 ∈M:
Pr
K←K
[F (K, x1) = F (K, x2)] =
1
|R| .
Construction 4.2.3. Let F : K ×M → R be a universal hash function. Let W be
a distribution. Define SSW ,RecW as:
SSW
1. Input: w.
2. Sample K ← K.
3. Set p = F (K,w), K.
RecW
1. Input: (w′, p = y,K)
2. Let W ∗ = {w ∈ supp(W )|dis(w,w′) ≤ t}.
3. For w∗ ∈ W ∗, if F (K,w∗) = y,
output w∗.
4. Output ⊥.
Lemma 4.2.4. Let W be a flat distribution with H∞(W ) ≥ m. Then Construction
4.2.3 is a (M, {W},m − log |R|, t)-known distribution secure sketch with error δ ≤
βt−1
|R| .
Proof. We first argue security. Fix some W ∈ W . Since K and W are independent
H˜∞(W |K) = H∞(W ) = m. Then by [DORS08, Lemma 2.2b], H˜∞(W |K, F (K,W )) ≥
H∞(W )− log |F (W ,W )| ≥ m− log |R|.
We now argue correctness. Fix some w,w′. Let W ∗ denote the set of elements in
W within distance t of w′. The size of W ∗ is at most βt. Since w,w′ are independent
of SS this set is independent of the choice of K. The algorithm Rec will never output
⊥ as the correct w will match the hash. The probability that another element w∗
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collides is:
Pr[∃w∗ ∈ W ∗|w∗ 6= w ∧ F (K,w∗) = F (K,w)] ≤
∑
w∗∈W ∗|w∗ 6=w
Pr[F (K,w∗) = F (K,w)]
=
∑
w∗∈W ∗|w∗ 6=w
1
|R| ≤
βt − 1
|R|
The inequality proceeds by union bound. The first equality proceeds by the universal-
ity of F and the second inequality proceeds by noting the number of wrong neighbors
is bounded by βt − 1. This completes the proof.
Corollary 4.2.5. Let n = log |M|. If |R| ≥ |βt| · nω(1) then Construction 4.2.3 is
correct with overwhelming probability. That is, setting log |R| = log βt + ω(log n)
suffices.
Construction 4.2.3 writes down enough information to disambiguate any ball of points.
The remaining entropy for this construction is H˜∞(W |SS(W )) = H∞(W ) − log βt −
ω(log n). For a flat distribution this is within a super-logarithmic factor of optimal (see
Equation (4.1)). By choosing δ based on Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) we build (SS,Rec) such that
H˜∞(W |SS(W )) = ω(log n).
4.2.2 Arbitrary Distributions
The worst-case hashing approach does not work for arbitrary sources. The reason is
that some balls may have many points but low total weight. For example, let W be a
distribution consisting of the following balls. Denote by B1t a ball with 2
H∞(W ) points
with probability Pr[W ∈ B1t ] = 2−H∞(W ). Let B2t , ..., B2−H∞(W )t be balls with one point
each with probability Pr[W ∈ Bit] = 2−H∞(W ). Then the hashing algorithm needs to
write down H∞(W ) bits to achieve correctness on B1t . However, with probability
1− 2−H∞(W ) the initial reading is outside of B1t , and the hash completely reveals the
point.
Dealing with non-flat distributions requires a new strategy. Many solutions for
manipulating high entropy distributions leverage a solution for flat distributions and
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use the fact that high entropy distributions are convex combinations of flat distri-
butions. However, a distribution with high fuzzy min-entropy may be formed from
component distributions with little or no fuzzy min-entropy. It is unclear how to
leverage the convex combination property in this setting.
The main obstacle in the arbitrary setting is distinguishing between a setting
where a ball has a few high probability points and a large number of low probability
points. To overcome this problem, we write the probability of w ∈ W in the sketch
output. To ensure this information does not completely reveal w we write down
blog Pr[W = w]c. We then use a universal hash whose output length is proportional
to the number of close points of the same probability as w. This construction divides
the distribution W into probability levels. Each level is nearly flat.
Construction 4.2.6. Let M be a metric space and let n = log |M|. Let W be a
distribution with H∞(W ) = m. Let ` ∈ Z+ be a parameter. Let Li = (2−(i+1), 2−i] for
i = m, ...,m + `. Let Fi : Ki ×M → Ri be a parameterized family of universal hash
functions. Define SSW ,RecW as:
SSW
1. Input: w.
2. If Pr[W = w] ≤ 2−(m+`). Set p =
0, w.
3. Else
(a) Find i such that Pr[W = w] ∈
Li.
(b) Sample K ← Ki.
(c) Set ss = 1, i, Fi(K,w), K.
RecW
1. Input: (w′, ss)
2. If ss0 = 1, output ss1,...,|y|.
3. Else
(a) Parse (i, y,K) = ss1,...,|y|.
(b) W ∗ = {w ∈ supp(W )|
dis(w,w′) ≤ t,
Pr[W = w] ∈ Li}.
(c) For w∗ ∈ W ∗,
if Fi(K,w
∗) = z, output w∗.
(d) Output ⊥.
We extend our notation for the maximum likelihood ball to the leveled case. Define
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βt,i as the maximum number of points in a ball in level i. That is,
βt,i = max
w′∈M
|{w|w ∈ supp(W ) ∧ dis(w,w′) ≤ t ∧ Pr[W = w] ∈ Li}| .
Theorem 4.2.7. Let W be a distribution over M where n = logM. Let δ > 0 be an
function of n. Let Fi : Ki×M→ Ri be a parameterized family of universal hash func-
tions where |Ri| = (βt,i − 1)/δ. When ` = n Construction 4.2.6 is a (M, {W}, m˜, t)-
known distribution secure sketch with error δ for m˜ = Hfuzzt,∞ (W )− log n− log 1/δ− 3.
Proof. Throughout the proof we assume that ` = n is the number of levels. The proof
can be carried out for an arbitrary ` but it leads to a complicated theorem statement.
Correctness: Fix some w,w′. If Pr[W = w] ≤ 2−(m+`) = 2−(m+n), then w is simply
transmitted to Rec and correctness is clear. When Pr[W = w] > 2−(m+n) let L∗i be
the level of Pr[W = w].
Let W ∗ denote the set of elements of W in Li within distance t of w′. The
size of W ∗ is at most βt,i. The choice of w,w′ is independent of SS, so this set is
independent of Ki (it does effect the value of i but not the particular outcome from
Ki). The probability that another element w∗ matches the hash is:
Pr[∃w∗ ∈ W ∗|w∗ 6= w ∧ F (K,w∗) = F (K,w)] ≤
∑
w∗∈W ∗|w∗ 6=w
Pr[F (K,w∗) = F (K,w)]
=
∑
w∗∈W ∗|w∗ 6=w
1
|Ri| ≤
βt,i − 1
|Ri| = δ
The inequality is by union bound. The first equality follows from the universality of
F . The second inequality follows since the number of neighbors is bounded by βt,i.
Ideal Adversary with access to Level Information: To aid in the argument in
security, we show the level information on its own is not too harmful.
The best strategy for an adversary that receives i as is to guess a point that has
the most nearby weight in that level. The adversary chooses
w∗ = arg max
w′∈M
Pr
w∈W |2−(i+1)<Pr[W=w]≤2−i∧dis(w,w∗)
[W = w].
The success of this adversary is at least 2−(i+1)βt,i as there at βt,i nearby points in
that layer each with probability at least 2−(i+1). There are n outcomes for i. The
overall success of such an adversary is at most n better than an adversary without
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such input (by [DORS08, Lemma 2.2]). That is,
Ei|m≤i≤m+n2−(i+1)βt,i
≤ E
i|m≤i≤n+m
max
w∗∈W
∑
w∈W |2−(i+1)<Pr[W=w]≤2−i∧dis(w,w∗)≤t
Pr[W = w]

≤ n
max
w∗∈W
∑
w∈W |dis(w,w∗)≤t
Pr[W = w]

= n2−H
fuzz
t,∞(W ) (4.2)
Security: We now argue security. First note that the total weight of points whose
probability is less than 2−(n+m) is at most 2−m (there are at most 2n points in the
distribution). Let 1low be the indicator random variable for Pr[W = w] ≤ 2−(n+m).
Then
H˜∞(W |SS(W )) = − log
(
Pr[1low = 1] ∗ 1 + Pr[1low = 0]2−H˜∞(W |SS(W )∧1low=0)
)
− log
(
2−m + (1− 2−m)2−H˜∞(W |SS(W )∧1low=0)
)
For the remainder of the proof, we seek a bound on
2−H˜∞(W |SS(W )∧1low=0 = max
w∈W |2−(n+m)<Pr[W=w]
Pr[W = w|SS(W )].
We separate out this quantity into levels:
maxw∈W |Pr[W=w]>2−(m+n) (Pr[W = w|SS(W )])
= E
i|m≤i≤m+n
(
max
w∈W |Pr[W=w]∈Li
Pr[W = w|SS(W ), i]
)
= E
i|m≤i≤m+n
(
max
w∈W |Pr[W=w]∈Li
Pr[W = w] · 2|SS(W )|i|
)
≤ E
i|m≤i≤m+n
(
max
w∈W |Pr[W=w]∈Li
Pr[W = w] · 2H0(SS(W )|i)
)
≤ E
i|m≤i≤m+n
(
2−i ∗ βt,i/δ
) ≤ Ei|m≤i≤m+n (2−(i+1) · βt,i)
2δ
=
n2−H
fuzz
t,∞(W )
2δ
.
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Where the last line follows by Equation (4.2). Combining both cases we have:
H˜∞(W |SS(W )) = − log
(
2−m +
(1− 2−m)(n)2−Hfuzzt,∞(W )
2δ
)
≥ − log min{2−m, (1− 2
−m)n2−H
fuzz
t,∞(W )
2δ
})− 1
≥ Hfuzzt,∞ (W )− log n+ log δ − log(1− 2−m)− 2
≥ Hfuzzt,∞ (W )− log n+ log δ − 3
Where the third line follows from the second because Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) ≤ H∞(W ) = m. The
last line follows from the fourth because if m ≥ 1 then log(1− 2−m) ≤ 1 and if m < 1
the entire bound is vacuous as Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) < 1.
Corollary 4.2.8. Let M be a metric space where n = log |M|. For any distribution
W over M with Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = ω(log n), there exists a (M, {W}, m˜, t)-known distribu-
tion secure sketch with m˜ = ω(log n) and δ = ngl(n). (Extendible to a fuzzy extractor
using Lemma 3.3.3.)
Connection to the characterization of [RW05] Renner and Wolf characterize
when it is possible to derive keys from correlated random variables [RW05, Theorem
3]. They consider all possible (randomized) transforms T, T ′ of W,W ′ into a new pair
of variables V, V ′. They show that
|key| ≤ sup
(V,V ′)←(T (W ),T ′(W ))
(
H∞(V |T ′)− log max
v′∈V ′
|{v|Pr[V = v|T ′ ∧ V ′ = v′] > 0}|
)
.
Furthermore, they show that there is a transformation that achieves a key of nearly
this length. The result is nonconstructive as there is no guidance on how to find the
transforms T, T ′. Since there is no known bound on the length of T, T ′ it is not clear
how to search the transform space even with unlimited time.
Construction 4.2.6 can be used to derive keys from correlated random variables.
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The main change is to define
W ∗ = {w|Pr[W = w|W ′ = w′] > 0 ∧ Pr[W = w] ∈ Li}.
Our result shows if one is satisfied with obtaining a strong key when possible (our
protocol has losses of 2 log 1/ + log n + log 1/δ), then a protocol is possible (and
explicitly constructible) in the original space.
4.3 Impossibility of Secure Sketches for a Family with Hfuzzt,∞
In the previous section, we showed the sufficiency of Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) for known distribution
algorithms. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to assume that W is completely known.
Traditionally, algorithms deal with this uncertainty by providing security for a family
of distributions W .
In this section, we show uncertainty of W comes at a real cost. The security game
of a fuzzy extractor can be thought of as a three stage process: 1) the challenger
specifies (SS,Rec), 2) the adversary sees (SS,Rec) and specifies W ∈ W 3) the adver-
sary wins if H˜∞(W |SS(W )) < m˜. We prove impossibility in a game that is harder for
the adversary to win: 1) the challenger specifies (SS,Rec) 2) the adversary samples a
random distribution from W ←W 3) the adversary wins if H˜∞(W |SS(W )) < m˜.
Let V be the process of uniformly sampling W ←W and then sampling w ← W .
Let the random variable Z indicate which W was sampled. The view of the challenger
is V , while the view of the adversary is a distribution V |Z. Our results rule out
security for an average member of W . It may be possible to improve parameters by
ruling out only a worst case W . In Chapter A, we show that providing security for
a family W is equivalent to providing security for all distributions over that family.
We now show a family of distributions W that does not admit a secure sketch. Our
negative results in this chapter are specific to the Hamming metric.
55
Theorem 4.3.1. Let n be a security parameter. There exists a family of distributions
W over Zγ such that for each element W ∈ W, Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = ω(log n), and yet for
any (M,W , m˜, t)-secure sketch (SS,Rec) with error δ < 1/4 and distance γ > t ≥ 4,
the remaining entropy m˜ < 2.
Furthermore, this is true on average. Let V be process of uniformly sampling
W ←W and sampling w ← W , and let Z indicate which W is sampled. Then
H˜∞(V |SS(V ), Z) < 2.
Proof. We prove the stronger average case statement. We first describe a family W .
Let F be some field of size q = ω(poly(n)). Let W be the set of all distributions of
the form
W =

~1
a2
...
aγ
W1 +

0
b2
...
bγ

where W1 is uniform and Wi = aiW1 + bi for 2 ≤ i ≤ γ and ai, bi ∈ F, ai 6= 0. This
type of distribution is an affine line in space Fγ. Define V as the process of uniformly
choosing W ← W and then sampling from w ← W . The adversary sees SS(V ) and
Z. Z is the description of the line Z = a2, b2, ..., aγ, bγ. The algorithms SS,Rec never
see Z. Fix some 4 ≤ t < γ. We show the following:
• Proposition 4.3.2: for allW ∈ W , Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = ω(log n). That is, ∀z,Hfuzzt,∞ (V |Z =
z) = ω(log n).
• Proposition 4.3.3: the distribution V is uniform.
• Lemma 4.3.4: for any secure sketch on V , the support size of V |SS(V ) decreases
significantly. Here we show the minimum distance of V |SS(V ) is at least t.
• Lemma 4.3.5: for most lines Z, the intersection of the support of V |Z and
V |SS(V ) is small. That is, H˜0(V |SS(V ), Z) < 2.
The proof of Theorem 4.3.1 uses Shannon codes (Definition 2.3.2). We now prove
item in the above outline.
Proposition 4.3.2. For each W ∈ W, Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = ω(log n).
Proof. Consider some W ∈ W . The value w1 is uniform in a field of size ω(poly(n)),
so H∞(W ) = ω(log n). We now show that for any w,w′ ∈ W , dis(w,w′) = γ > t.
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This shows that Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = H∞(W ). Fix some w,w
′ ∈ W . Clearly, w1 6= w′1, for
any i, wi = aiw1 + bi and w
′
i = aiw
′
1 + bi. Since ai 6= 0, aiw1 6= aiw′1 and thus
aiw1 + bi 6= aiw′1 + bi. That is, dis(w,w′) = γ.
Proposition 4.3.3. V is the uniform distribution over Fγ.
Proof. Consider some w ∈ V . Then w was drawn from some intermediate distribution
W with coefficients a2, b2, ..., aγ, bγ. The value w1 is uniformly random and wi are
uniformly random since b2, ..., bγ are uniformly random.
Lemma 4.3.4. Fix some SS,Rec algorithm with error δ < 1/4, then H˜0(V |SS(V )) ≤
(γ − t+ 1) log q + 1.
Proof. We assume that Rec is deterministic in our analysis. Any randomness neces-
sary for the Rec algorithm can be provided by SS. This is the same as considering
Rep that outputs any coin it flips. Since w,w′ are independent of p this does not
effect correctness. Security is defined based on the output of Rec so outputting the
coins of Rep does not effect security. By the definition of correctness for (SS,Rec),
∀w,w′, Pr
ss←SS(w)
[Rec(w′, ss) 6= w] < 1/4.
Fix some w. By Markov’s inequality, there exists a set Ass such that Pr[ss ∈ Ass] ≥
1/2 and ∀ss ∈ Ass,
{w′|dis(w′, w) ≤ t ∧ Rec(w′, p) 6= w} ≤ 2δ < 1/2.
Consider some ss∗ ∈ Ass. We now show that H0(V |SS(V ) = ss∗) ≤ (γ−t+1) log q.
For the sketched value w, {w′|dis(w,w′) ≤ t ∧ Rec(w′, p) 6= w] ≤ 2δ.
For every value in V |SS(V ) = ss∗ this is also true. This makes the support of
V |SS(V ) = ss∗ a (t, 2δ)-Shannon code (see Definition 2.3.2). This implies that for all
w1, w2 ∈ V |SS(V ) = ss∗, dis(w1, w2) ≥ t (since 2δ < 1/2). That is V |SS(V ) = ss∗ is
a set with minimum distance at least t.
By the Singleton bound, this implies that H0(V |SS(V ) = ss∗) ≤ (γ − t + 1)q.
Averaging over SS(V ) = ss∗ one has that H˜0(V |P ) ≤ (γ − t+ 1) log q + 1.
Lemma 4.3.5. H˜∞(V |SS(V ), Z) < 2.
Proof. Recall that Z consists of 2γ coefficients and there are (q − 1)γ−1qγ−1 equally
likely values for Z. As described above, the view of SS,Rec is a uniform distribution
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V . The only information seen by SS algorithm is in the point V = v. The length
of this point is γ log q. Conditioned on this information there are still many possible
values for Z. That is,
∀v,H0(Z|V = v) = log
(
(q − 1)γ−1qγ−1
qγ
)
= log
(
(q − 1)γ−1/q) .
Consider two possible z1, z2 that are possible values of Z (having seen v). The distri-
butions V |Z = z1 and V |Z = z2 intersect at one point (namely v).
We now show for any sketch algorithm there are few possible values of V |Z in
the support of V |SS(V ). The distributions V |Z = z1 and V |Z = z2 for possible
z1, z2 (having seen v) overlap only at the point v. This means for any v
∗ ∈ V |SS(V )
(other than the true v) there is at most one z such that v∗ ∈ V |SS(V ), Z = z.
The optimum strategy is to include these values uniformly from different Z values.
We show this across different sketch values. Consider some fixed sketch value s and
let hs = H0(V |SS(V ) = s). Recall that
H˜0(V |SS(V )) = log E
s∈SS(V )
2H0(V |SS(V )=s) = log E
s∈SS(V )
2hs
Conditioned on seeing the point V there are (q − 1)γ−1/q possible values for Z with
disjoint support outside of the sketched point. Consider these possible values for Z
as containers to be filled with the 2hss items (possible values of V |SS(V ) = ss). Each
container receives automatically receives one free point (all the distributions share v).
The average number of items in each container is maximized when the containers are
filled equally. That is, the average number of items in each container is bounded by
the number of items divided by the number of container. That is,
H˜0(V |Z, SS(V ) = ss) ≤ log
(
# items + # containers
# containers
)
= log
(
2hssq
(q − 1)γ−1 + 1
)
Then averaging over the possible values of s, we have the following as long as t ≥
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4 (using Lemma 4.3.6, which appears below):
H˜0(V |Z, SS(V )) = log E
s∈SS(V )
2H˜0(V |SS(V )=ss,(Z|SS(V )=ss))
= log E
s∈SS(V )
(
2hsq
(q − 1)γ−1 + 1
)
≤ max
{
log
(
q
(q − 1)γ−1 Es∈SS(V ) 2
hs
)
+ 1, 1
}
.
Where the inequality follows because log x + 1 ≤ max{1 + log x, 1} for x ≥ 0. The
left operand to max is bounded by 2 (bounding the max by 2):
log
(
q
(q − 1)γ−1 Es∈SS(V ) 2
hs
)
+ 1
= log q − (γ − 1) log(q − 1) + log
(
E
s∈SS(V )
2hs
)
+ 1
= log q − (γ − 1) log(q − 1) + H˜0(V |SS(V )) + 1
≤ log q − (γ − 1) log(q − 1) + (γ − t+ 1) log q + 2
≤ (γ − t+ 2) log q − (γ − 1) log(q − 1) + 2
< (γ − t+ 2) log q − (γ − 2) log q + 2 (by Lem 4.3.6)
≤ (4− t) log q + 2 < 2 .
Lemma 4.3.6. For any real numbers α ≤ η with η ≥ e + 1 (in particular, η ≥ 4
suffices), the following holds: α log(η − 1) > (α− 1) log η.
Proof. Because η − 1 is positive, and 1 + x < ex for positive x,
1 +
1
η − 1 < e
1
η−1 .
Therefore, (
1 +
1
η − 1
)α−1
< e
α−1
η−1 ≤ e < η − 1
(since α ≤ η). Multiplying both sides by (η − 1)α−1, we obtain
ηα−1 < (η − 1)α .
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Taking the logarithm of both sides yields the statement of the lemma.
Note: There is a tradeoff between the size of F and the error tolerance required for
the counter example. By increasing t it is possible to show a counter example for a
smaller F.
4.4 Impossibility of Fuzzy Extractors for a Family with Hfuzzt,∞
In the previous section, we showed a family of distributions that does not admit a
secure sketch. We provide a similar result for fuzzy extractors.
Theorem 4.4.1. Let n be a security parameter. There exists a family of distribu-
tions W over {0, 1}n satisfying the following conditions. For each element W ∈ W,
Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = ω(log n). Let κ ≥ 2 and t = ω(n1/2 log n). Any (M,W , κ, t, )-fuzzy
extractor with error δ = 0 has  > 1/8− ngl(n).
Furthermore, this is true on average. Let V be process of uniformly sampling W ←
W and sampling w ← W and let Z indicate which W is sampled. Let (Key, P ) ←
Gen(V ). Then,
SD((Key, P, Z), (Uκ, P, Z)) > 1/8− ngl(n) .
Proof Outline. We prove the stronger average case statement. Let ν = ω(log n) and
ν = o(n1/2/ log n). Let t = 4νn1/2 and note that n/ν > t.
Our counterexample uses a slightly different family of distributions W than the
counterexample for secure sketches. We will work over a binary alphabet (we used a
large alphabet in our counterexample for secure sketches). A property of the binary
Hamming space is that a large fraction of any set of bounded size is the near “bound-
ary” of that set. This will be crucial in our proof. We will embed the larger alphabet
we used into the binary Hamming metric. Let x1, ..., xν ∈ {0, 1}ν . Let F denote the
field of size 2ν . Let a2, ..., an/ν ∈ F such that ai 6= 0 and let b2, ..., bn/ν ∈ F. Interpret
x1, ..., xν as a element x ∈ F and let
w =

~1
a2
...
an/ν
x+

0
b2
...
bn/ν
 .
60
The multiplication is in F. Define a distribution W as the uniform distribution over
values of x for a particular value of a2, ..., an/ν , b2, ..., bn/ν . Let W be the set of all
such W .
Define V as the process of uniformly choosing W ← W and then sampling from
w ← W . The adversary sees SS(V ) and Z, where Z is the description of the line
Z = a2, ..., an/ν , b2, ..., bn/ν .
We now present an outline of the proof (formal statements and proofs follow):
• Proposition 4.4.2: for allW ∈ W , Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = ω(log n). That is, ∀z,Hfuzzt,∞ (V |Z =
z) = ω(log n).
• Proposition 4.4.3: the distribution V is uniform.
• Lemma 4.4.4: In expectation across Z, a large subset of keys that are not
possible. In more detail,
– Half the keys have at most 2n−κ pre images in the metric space (this is at
most half the metric space). Denote this set as Rsml.
– Consider some key ∈ Rsml. Consider the set of Vkey = {w|Rep(w, p) =
key}. All points in V |SS(V ) are distance t from a boundary of Vkey (the
functionality of Rep guarantees that for the true w all nearby points map
to the same key). We show that most of Vkey is near a boundary. A result
of Frankel and Fu¨redi says that the boundary of a region is minimized by
a ball containing the same number of points [FF81]. Hoeffding’s inequality
says that most of a ball lies near its boundary [Hoe63]. Together these two
results imply that Vkey is small.
– As before, there are many possible values for z1, z2 for the side informa-
tion Z (and these possible values are equally likely). Furthermore, the
distributions V |Z = z1 and V |Z = z2 have disjoint support outside of v.
– For most values of possible Z, the intersection between the viable pre
images of V |Z and Vkey contains at most one point (the received point v).
Checking if V |Z ∩ Vkey is nonempty is an effective distinguisher.
Proposition 4.4.2. For each W ∈ W, Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = ω(log n).
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Proof. Consider some fixed W ∈ W . The bits w1,...,ν are uniform, so H∞(W ) =
ω(log n). Recall that t = o(n/ν). Fix some w,w′ ∈ W . Denote by x, x′ the values
that produce w,w′ respectively. Clearly, x 6= x′. Thus, for any i, aix+ bi 6= aix′ + bi.
This implies that wiν+1,....,(i+1)ν 6= w′iν+1,...,(i+1)ν . That is, at least one of the bits in
each block differs between w and w′, and so dis(w,w′) ≥ n/ν. Since no two values
in the support of W lie in the same ball of radius t, we have Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = H∞(W ) =
ω(log n).
Proposition 4.4.3. V is the uniform distribution over Fγ.
Proof. Consider some w ∈ V over {0, 1}n. Then w ← W with coefficients a2, ..., aγ
and b2, ..., bγ. The value w1,...,ν = x is uniformly random and wiν+1,...,(i+1)ν are uni-
formly random since b2, ..., bγ are random.
Lemma 4.4.4. Fix some (Gen,Rep) algorithm with κ ≥ 2. There exists an in-
formation theoretic distinguisher between (R,P, Z) and (Uκ, P, Z) with advantage
 = 1/8− ngl(n).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, we assume that Rep is deterministic. Denote
by (Key, P ) ← Gen(V ). By Markov’s inequality, there exists a set Ap such that
Pr[p ∈ Ap] ≥ 1/2 and ∀p ∈ Ap,
(Key|P = p, P = p) ≈2 (Uκ, P = p).
Consider some p∗ ∈ Ap. The distribution Key|P = p∗ is the set of possible keys.
The distribution Key|P = p∗ induces a partition on the metric space. That is, for
every w ∈ M, there exists a unique value key such that Rep(w, p∗) = key. Denote
this partition by Qp∗,key = {w|Rep(w, p∗) = key}.
There exists a set Rsml where |Rsml| ≥ 2κ−1 such that for all key ∈ Rsml, |Qp∗,r| ≤
M/2κ = 2n−κ. If not, then ∪key|Qp∗,key| > |M|. For the remainder of the proof we
restrict ourselves to elements in Rsml. Only points that are distance t from points
outside of Qp∗,r are viable points in the metric space. These are the interior of Qp∗,r:
Inter(Qp∗,key) = {w|Rep(w, p∗) = key ∧ ∀w′, dis(w,w′) ≤ t ∧ Rep(w′, p∗) = key},
We will use the term deficient ball2:
2In most statements of the isoperimetric inequality, this type of set is simply called a ball. We
use the term deficient ball for emphasis.
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Definition 4.4.5. A set S is a η-deficient ball if there exists a point x such that
Bη−1(x) ⊆ S ⊆ Bη(x).
Consider some key∗ ∈ Rsml. We now show that the interior of each Qp∗,key∗ is
small:
Lemma 4.4.6. |Inter(Qp∗,key∗)| ≤ 2n−4ν.
Proof. By the isoperimetric inequality on the Hamming space (we use a version due
to [FF81, Theorem 1], the original result is due to Harper [Har66]), there exists a η-
deficient ball Sp∗,key∗ centered at 0 and a set D such that |Sp∗,key∗ | = |Inter(Qp∗,key∗)|,
|D| = |Q{p∗,key∗| and ∀s ∈ Sp∗,key∗ , d ∈ D, dis(s, d) ≥ t (alternatively, the distance
between the sets is t). Furthermore, note that Sp∗,key∗ ∪D is a deficient ball (and its
radius is η + t). We now find bound the size of Sp∗,key∗ .
Recall that |Sp∗,key∗ ∪D| = |Qp∗,key∗| ≤ 2n−κ ≤ |M|/2. Since this set contains less
than half the points in the metric space we know its radius at most n/2. This means
that |Sp∗,key∗| is a deficient sphere of radius at most n/2− t. Let X denote a uniform
string on {0, 1}n. We use Hoeffding’s inequality [Hoe63]:
|Sp∗,key∗ | ≤ {x|dis(x, 0) ≤ n− t} = 2n Pr
X←{0,1}n
[Wgt(X) ≤ (1/2− t/n)n]
≤ 2ne−n((t/n)2) = 2ne−4ν ≤ 2n−4ν
We have shown that |Inter(Qp∗,key∗)| ≤ 2n−4ν . To complete the proof it suffices
to show that for most values of the auxiliary information Z there are many parts
Qp∗,key∗ that do not receive any points. Recall that Z consists of 2n/ν coefficients
and there are (2n/ν − 1)ν−12n−ν equally likely values for Z. As described above, the
view of Gen,Rep is a uniform distribution V . We know show there are many possible
values for Z|P = p∗. The only information about Z is contained in the point V = v.
The length of this point is 2n. Conditioned on this information there are still many
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possible values for Z. That is,
∀v,H0(Z|V = v) = log
(
(2n/ν − 1)ν−12n−ν
2n
)
= log
(2n/ν − 1)ν−1
2ν
> log
(2n/ν)ν−2
2ν
(by Lemma 4.3.6)
= log
2(n−2ν))
2ν
= n− 3ν.
Consider two possible z1, z2 that are possible values of Z. The distributions V |Z = z1
and V |Z = z2 intersect at one point (namely v).
This means that the Gen algorithm may include points for possible Z values into
parts Qp∗,key∗ (other than v) and these values are disjoint. The optimum strategy
is to include these values uniformly from different Z values. Consider the set of
all preimages of Rsml denoted Qsml = ∪key∈Rsml Inter(Qkey,p∗). Note that Qsml ≤
2n−4ν |Rsml|. We now show that the intersection between Qkey,p∗ is small for most
possible values z. As before each container (the values of z) receives one item for
free (the point v).
E
z
|Qsml ∩ (V |P = p∗ ∧ Z = z)| ≤
(
# items + # containers
# containers
)
≤ 2
n−4ν |Rsml|
2n−3ν
+ 1
=
|Rsml|
2ν
+ 1
In expectation across Z,
|Rsml|
2ν
+ 1
|Rsml| ≤
1
2ν
+
1
|Rsml|
fraction of Rsml receive any support. We now present a distinguisher Dp∗ for a
particular p∗:
1. On input x, z.
2. Compute V |P = p∗ ∧ Z = z and Qp∗,x.
3. If (Qp∗,x ∩ V |P = p∗ ∧ Z = z) = ∅ output b = 0.
4. Else output b = 1.
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The distinguisher D(x, p, z) is formed by calling Dp(x, z) when p ∈ Ap and out-
putting a random bit otherwise. The advantage of D is
Pr[D(Key, P, Z) = 1]− Pr[D(U, P, Z) = 1]
= (Pr[D(Key, P, Z) = 1|P ∈ Ap]
− Pr[D(U, P, Z) = 1|P ∈ Ap]) Pr[P ∈ Ap]
≥
∑
p∗∈Ap
Pr[P = p∗] (1− Pr[Dp∗(U,Z) = 1])
≥
∑
p∗∈Ap
Pr[P = p∗](1−
Pr[Dp∗(U,Z) = 1|U ∈ Rsml] Pr[U ∈ Rsml])
−
∑
p∗∈Ap
Pr[P = p∗] Pr[U 6∈ Rsml]
≥
∑
p∗∈Ap
Pr[P = p∗]
(
1−
((
1
|Rsml| +
1
2ν
)
Pr[U ∈ Rsml]
))
−
∑
p∗∈Ap
(Pr[P = p∗] Pr[U 6∈ Rsml])
≥
∑
p∗∈Ap
Pr[P = p∗]
(
1− 1
2ν
− 1
2
Pr[U ∈ Rsml]− Pr[U 6∈ Rsml]
)
≥
∑
p∗∈Ap
Pr[P = p∗]
(
1− 1
2ν
− 1
2
Pr[U ∈ Rsml]− Pr[U 6∈ Rsml]
)
≥
∑
p∗∈Ap
Pr[P = p∗]
(
1− 1
2ν
− 1 + 1
2
Pr[U ∈ Rsml]
)
≥
∑
p∗∈Ap
Pr[P = p∗] (1/4− ngl(n)) ≥ 1
8
− ngl(n).
The sixth line follows since Rsml ≥ 2κ−1 ≥ 2. The eighth line follows because Pr[U ∈
Rsml] ≥ 1/2. The last inequality proceeds because Pr[P ∈ Ap] ≥ 1/2. This completes
the proof of Lemma 4.4.4.
Note: As stated in Section 1.2.2, using strong computational assumptions it is possi-
ble to avoid this result. Furthermore, for the specific family used in the secure sketch,
we construct computational fuzzy extractors for this family of distributions when F
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is large enough under weaker assumptions in Construction 7.2.3. The construction is
stated with imperfect correctness. A construction with perfect correctness is obtained
by using a code that corrects t bidirectional errors instead of a code that corrects t
unidirectional errors.
Comparison with Theorem 4.3.1 The parameters in this result are weaker than
those in Theorem 4.3.1. This result requires: 1) higher error tolerance t = ω(n1/2 log n)
2) the fuzzy extractor must have perfect correctness. The secure sketch counter ex-
ample needs t = 4 and allows the Rec to be wrong almost 1/4 of the time.
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Chapter 5
Looking Beyond Sketch-then-Extract
As described in the introduction, secure sketches are subject to considerably stronger
negative results than fuzzy extractors. In this chapter, we first show that compu-
tational versions of secure sketches are also subject to strong negative results. We
then show how to construct a fuzzy extractor (without using a secure sketch), that
supports sources with more errors than entropy.
5.1 Impossibility of Computational Secure Sketches
In this section, we consider whether it is possible in build a secure sketch that retains
significantly more computational than information-theoretic entropy. We consider
two different notions for computational entropy, and for both of them show that
corresponding secure sketches are subject to upper bounds on the residual entropy.
In particular, we show how to transform any sketch retaining HILL entropy into an
information-theoretic sketch that retains a similar amount of min-entropy. Thus, it
seems that relaxing security of sketches from information-theoretic to computational
does not help.
In conjunction with previous results on upper bounds for the information-theoretic
entropy of a secure sketch, this motivates us to build fuzzy extractors that do not
incorporate secure sketches.
5.1.1 Bounds on Secure Sketches using HILL entropy
HILL entropy is a commonly used computational notion of entropy (Definition 2.2.1).
Intuitively, HILL entropy is as good as average min-entropy for all computationally-
bounded observers. Thus, redefining secure sketches using HILL entropy is a natural
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relaxation of the original information-theoretic definition; in particular, the sketch-
and-extract construction in Lemma 3.3.3 would yield pseudorandom outputs if the
secure sketch ensured high HILL entropy. We will consider secure sketches that retain
relaxed HILL entropy (Definition 2.2.2).
Definition 5.1.1. We say that (SS,Rec) is a HILL-entropy (M,m, m˜, t) secure
sketch that is (, ssec)-hard with error δ if it satisfies Definition 3.3.2, with the se-
curity requirement replaced by HHILL-rlx,ssec (W |SS(W )) ≥ m˜.
Unfortunately, we will show below that such a secure sketch implies an error
correcting code with approximately 2m˜ points that can correct t random errors (see
[DORS08, Lemma C.1] for a similar bound on information-theoretic secure sketches).
For the Hamming metric, our result essentially matches the bound on information-
theoretic secure sketches of [DORS08, Proposition 8.2]. In fact, we show that, for
the Hamming metric, HILL-entropy secure sketches imply information-theoretic ones
with similar parameters, and, therefore, the HILL relaxation gives no advantage.
The intuition for building error-correcting codes from HILL-entropy secure sketches
is as follows. In order to have HHILL-rlx,ssec (W |SS(W )) ≥ m˜, there must be a distribu-
tion X, Y such that H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ m˜ and (X, Y ) is computationally indistinguishable
from (W, SS(W )). Sample a sketch s ← SS(W ). We know that SS followed by Rec
likely succeeds on W |s (i.e., Rec(w′, s) = w with high probability for w ← W |s and
w′ ← Bt(w)). Consider the following experiment: 1) sample y ← Y , 2) draw x← X|y
and 3) x′ ← Bt(x). By indistinguishability, Rec(x′, y) = x with high probability. This
means we can construct a large set C from the support of X|y. C will be an error
correcting code and Rec an efficient decoder. We can then use standard arguments
to turn this code into an information theoretic sketch.
To make this intuition precise, we need an additional technical condition: sampling
a random neighbor of a point is efficient.
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Definition 5.1.2. We say a metric space (M, dis) is (sneigh, t)-neighborhood sam-
plable if there exists a randomized circuit Neigh of size sneigh that for all t
′ ≤ t,
Neight′(w) outputs a random point at distance t
′ of w.
We use the definition of a maximal and average error Shannon codes (Definitions
2.3.2 and 2.3.3). Recall, when we use the term Shannon code, we mean a maximal
error Shannon code. A sketch that retains m˜-bits of relaxed HILL entropy implies a
maximal error Shannon code with nearly 2m˜ points.
Theorem 5.1.3. Let (M, dis) be a metric space that is (sneigh, t)-neighborhood sam-
plable. Let (SS,Rec) be an HILL-entropy (M,m, m˜, t)-secure sketch that is (, ssec)-
secure with error δ. Let srec denote the size of the circuit that computes Rec. If
ssec ≥ (t(sneigh + srec)), then there exists a value s and a set C with |C| ≥ 2m˜−2 that
is a (t, 4(+ tδ))-Shannon code with recovery procedure Rec(·, s).
Proof. Let W be a distribution of min-entropy m. Let (X, Y ) be a joint distribution
such that H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ m˜ and
δDssec ((W, SS(W )), (X, Y )) ≤  ,
where ssec ≥ t(sneigh + srec). One such (X, Y ) must exist by the definition of relaxed
HILL entropy. Define D as:
1. Input w ∈M, z ∈ {0, 1}∗, t.
2. For all 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t:
w′ ← Neight′(w).
If Rec(w′, z) 6= w output 0.
3. Output 1.
By correctness of the sketch Pr[D(W, SS(W )) = 1] ≥ 1− tδ. Since
δD((W, SS(W )), (X, Y )) ≤ ,
we know Pr[D(X, Y ) = 1] ≥ 1− − tδ. Let Xy denote the random variable X|Y = y.
By Markov’s inequality, there exists a set SY such that Pr[Y ∈ SY ] ≥ 1/2 and for all
y ∈ SY , Pr[D(Xy, y) = 1] ≥ 1− 2(+ tδ).
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Because H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ m˜, we know that Ey←Y maxx Pr[Xy = x] ≤ 2−m˜. Applying
Markov’s inequality to the random variable maxx Pr[Xy = x], there exists a set S
′
Y
such that Pr[y ∈ S ′Y ] > 1/2, and for all y ∈ S ′Y , H∞(Xy) ≥ m˜−1 (we can use the strict
version of Markov’s inequality here, because the random variable maxx Pr[Xy = x] is
positive). Fix one value y ∈ SY ∩ S ′Y (which exists because the sum of probabilities
of SY and S
′
Y is greater than 1). Thus, for all such that t
′, 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t,
Pr
x←Xy
[x′ ← Neigh(x, t′) ∧ Rec(x′, z) = x] ≥ 1− 2(+ tδ).
Thus, Xy is a (t, 2( + tδ))-average error Shannon code with recovery Rec(·, y) and
2m˜−1 points. The statement of the theorem follows by application of Lemma 2.3.4.
For the Hamming metric, any Shannon code (as defined in Definition 2.3.2) can be
converted into an information-theoretic secure sketch (as described in [DORS08, Sec-
tion 8.2] and references therein). The idea is to use the code offset construction, and
convert worst-case errors to random errors by randomizing the order of the symbols
of w first, via a randomly chosen permutation pi (which becomes part of the sketch
and is applied to w′ during Rec). The formal statement of this result can be expressed
in the following Lemma (which is implicit in [DORS08, Section 8.2]).
Lemma 5.1.4. For an alphabet Z, let C be a (t, δ) Shannon code over Zγ. Then
there exists a (Zγ,m,m − (γ log |Z| − log |C|), t) secure sketch with error δ for the
Hamming metric on Zγ.
Combining Theorem 5.1.3 and Lemma 5.1.4 gives us the negative result for the
Hamming metric: a HILL-entropy secure sketch (for the uniform distribution) implies
an information-theoretic one with similar parameters:
Corollary 5.1.5. Let Z be an alphabet. Let (SS′,Rec′) be an (, ssec)-HILL-entropy
(Zγ, γ log |Z|, m˜, t)-secure sketch with error δ for the Hamming metric over Zγ, with
Rec′ of circuit size srec. If ssec ≥ t(srec+γ log |Z|), then there exists a (Zγ, γ log |Z|, m˜−
2, t) (information-theoretic) secure sketch with error 4(+ tδ).
Note In Corollary 5.1.5, the resulting (SS,Rec) is not guaranteed to be efficient be-
cause the proof of Theorem 5.1.3 is not constructive.
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Corollary 5.1.5 extends to non-uniform distributions: if there exists a distribution
whose HILL sketch retains m˜ bits of entropy, then for all distributions W , there is an
information theoretic sketch that retains H∞(W )− (γ log |Z|−m˜)−2 bits of entropy.
5.1.2 Bounds on Secure Sketches using Unpredictability Entropy
In the previous section, we showed that any sketch that retained HILL entropy could
be transformed into an information theoretic sketch. However, HILL entropy is a
strong notion. In this section, we therefore ask whether it is useful to consider a
sketch that satisfies a minimal requirement: the value of the input is computationally
hard to guess given the sketch. We use the notion of relaxed unpredictability entropy
(Definition 2.2.3) which captures the notion of “hard to guess.”
Definition 5.1.6. (SS,Rec) are an unpredictability-entropy (M,m, m˜, t) secure sketch
that is (, ssec)-hard with error δ if it satisfies Definition 3.3.2, with the security re-
quirement replaced by Hunp-rlx,ssec (W |SS(W )) ≥ m˜.
Combining such a secure sketch with a reconstructive extractor yields a compu-
tational fuzzy extractor (Lemma 2.2.7). The conditional unpredictability entropy m˜
must decrease as t increases. We will prove the result for any metric space that is
both neighborhood samplable (Definition 5.1.2) and where picking a random point in
the space is easy.
Definition 5.1.7. A metric space space (M, dis) is ssam-efficiently-samplable if there
exists a randomized circuit Sample of size ssam that outputs a uniformly random point
in M.
Theorem 5.1.8. Let W be a distribution over a metric space (M, dis) that is ssam
samplable and (sneigh, t) neighborhood samplable. Furthermore, assume that the num-
ber of points within distance t in M is at least some fixed value Bt(·). Let (SS,Rec)
be an unpredictability-entropy (M,H∞(W ), m˜, t) secure sketch that is (, ssec)-secure
with error δ. If ssec ≥ max{t(|Rec| + sneigh), |Rec| + ssam}, then m˜ ≤ log |M| −
log |Bt(·)|+ log(1− − tδ).
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Proof. Let (X, Y ) be two random variables such that δDssec ((W, SS(W )), (X, Y )) ≤ .
It suffices to show that ∃I of size ssec such that Pr[I(Y ) = X] ≥ |M|(1−−tδ)/|Bt(·)|.
Let Bt(x) denote the random variable representing a random neighbor of distance
at most t from x (note that Bt may not be efficiently samplable, because we are
assuming only that a neighbor a fixed distance is efficiently samplable). We begin by
showing that Rec must recover points of X.
Claim 5.1.9.
Pr[Rec(Bt(X), Y ) = X] =
Pr[(x, y)← (X, Y ) ∧ x′ ← Bt(x) ∧ Rec(x′, y) = x] ≥ 1− − tδ.
Proof. Suppose that Pr[Rec(Bt(X), Y ) = X] < 1− − tδ. We construct the following
distinguisher D ∈ Dssec (the distinguisher design is slightly complicated by the fact
that we don’t know at which particular distance t′ the recover procedure is most likely
to fail, so we have to try all distances):
• Input w ∈M, s ∈ {0, 1}∗.
• For all 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t:
w′ ← Neigh(w, t′).
If Rec(w′, z) 6= w output 0.
• Output 1.
First note that |D| = t(|Rec| + sneigh). Since (SS,Rec) has error δ we know that
∀w,w′ ∈M where dis(w,w′) ≤ t
Pr[s← SS(w) ∧ Rec(w′, s) = w] ≥ 1− δ.
This implies that for all 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t, Pr[Rec(Neigh(W, t′), SS(W )) = W )] ≥ 1 − δ and
thus Pr[D(W, SS(W )) = 1] ≥ 1 − tδ. If Pr[Rec(Bt(X), Y ) = X] < 1 −  − tδ there
must exist at least one 1 ≤ t′ ≤ t for which Pr[Rec(Neigh(X, t′), Y ) = X] < 1− − tδ.
Then
Pr[D(W, SS(W )) = 1]− Pr[D(X, Y ) = 1] ≥ (1− tδ)− Pr[Rec(Neigh(X, t′), Y ) = X]
> (1− tδ)− (1− tδ − ) > .
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This is a contradiction and the statement of the claim follows.
We now return to the proof of Theorem 5.1.8. Now define I as follows:
• Input y ∈ {0, 1}∗.
• Sample x′ ← Sample.
• Output Rec(x′, y).
Note that |I| = |Rec|+ ssam. We now show that I predicts X:
Pr[I(Y ) = X] =
=
∑
x,y∈M
Pr[(X, Y ) = (x, y)] Pr[I(y) = x]
=
∑
x,y∈M
Pr[(X, Y ) = (x, y)]
∑
x′∈M
Pr[Sample = x′] Pr[Rec(x′, y) = x]
≥
∑
x,y∈M
Pr[(X, Y ) = (x, y)]
∑
x′|dis(x′,x)≤t
Pr[Sample = x′] Pr[Rec(x′, y) = x]
≥
∑
x,y∈M
Pr[(X, Y ) = (x, y)]
∑
x′|dis(x′,x)≤t
|Bt(·)|Pr[Bt(x) = x′] Pr[Rec(x′, y) = x]
|M|
≥ |Bt(·)||M| (1− − tδ)
(the last step follows by Claim 5.1.9).
Note: If the input is uniform, the entropy loss is about log |Bt(·)|. An alternative in-
terpretation of this theorem is that fuzzy min-entropy is at most γ log |Z|− log |Bt(·)|.
As mentioned at the beginning of Section 5.1, the same entropy loss can be
achieved with information-theoretic secure sketches on the uniform distribution by
using the randomized code-offset construction. One interpretation of this result is
that unpredictability secure sketches are not useful on high entropy distributions.
5.1.3 Implications of negative results
In this chapter, we show that secure sketches that provide pseudoentropy suffer
from similar lower bounds as information-theoretic secure sketches. In Chapter 4 we
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showed a family of distributions that cannot be sketched. This result extends to the
computational setting. By Theorem 4.3.1 and the contrapositive of Corollary 5.1.5,
no sketch can retain HILL entropy for the same family of distributions:
Corollary 5.1.10. Let n be a security parameter and let M = |F|γ. There exists a
family of distributions W over M such that for each element W ∈ W, Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) =
ω(log n) and for any (M,W , m˜, t)-HILL secure sketch (SS,Rec) that is (ssec, sec)-
hard and error δ. If ssec ≥ t(|Rec| + γ log |F|), t ≥ 4, and sec + tδ < 1/16, then
m˜ < 4.
Secure sketches that provide computational unpredictability are implied the virtual-
grey box obfuscation of all polynomial time circuits [BCKP14]. Our negative result
bounds unpredictability away from the size of the metric space. Extraction from un-
predictability entropy can be done using an extractor with a reconstruction property
(Lemma 2.2.7); however, a virtual-grey box obfuscator for all polynomial size circuits
can simply hide a randomly generated key, and therefore extraction is not necessary
to obtain a fuzzy extractor.
Avoiding bounds Both of lower bounds arise because Rec must function as an
error-correcting code for many points of any indistinguishable distribution. It may
be possible to avoid these bounds if Rec outputs a fresh random variable1. Such an
algorithm is called a computational fuzzy conductor (Definition 3.3.7). Some of our
constructions will be computational fuzzy conductors while some will have pseudo-
random outputs and thus be computational fuzzy extractors (Definition 3.3.6).
5.2 Supporting more errors than entropy
In the previous section, we showed that computational versions of secure sketches are
subject to upper bounds on output entropy. We now show to build constructing fuzzy
1If some efficient algorithm can take the output of Rec and efficiently transform it back to the
source W , the bounds of Corollary 5.1.5 and Theorem 5.1.8 both apply. This means that we need to
consider constructions that are hard to invert (either information-theoretically or computationally).
74
extractors that do not contain a secure sketch (achieving properties that have eluded
secure sketches). In particular, we show an information-theoretic fuzzy extractor that
supports more errors than entropy. We describe this condition in Section 1.3.
The construction first condenses entropy from each block of the source and then
applies a different fuzzy extractor to the condensed blocks. We’ll denote the fuzzy
extractor on the smaller alphabet as (Gen′,Rep′). A condenser is like a random-
ness extractor but the output is allowed to be slightly entropy deficient. Con-
densers are known with smaller entropy loss than possible for randomness extrac-
tors (e.g. [DPW14]).
Definition 5.2.1. A function cond : Z → Y is a (m, m˜, )-randomness condenser if
whenever H∞(W ) ≥ m, then there exists a distribution Y with H˜∞(Y |seed) ≥ m˜ and
(cond(W, seed), seed) ≈ (Y, seed).
The main idea of the construction is that errors are “corrected” on the large
alphabet (before condensing) while the entropy loss for the error correction is incurred
on a smaller alphabet (after condensing).
Construction 5.2.2. Let Z be an alphabet and let W = W1, ...,Wγ be a distribution
over Zγ. We describe Gen,Rep as follows:
Gen
1. Input: w = w1, ..., wγ
2. For j = 1, ..., γ:
(i) Sample seedi ← {0, 1}d.
(ii) Set vi = cond(wi, seedi).
3. Set (key, p′)← Gen′(v1, ..., vγ).
4. Set p = (p′, seed1, ..., seedγ).
5. Output (key, p).
Rep
1. Input: (w′, p = (p′, ~seed))
2. For j = 1, ..., γ:
(i) Set v′i = cond(w
′
i, seedi).
3. Output key = Rep′(v′, p′).
75
For Construction 5.2.2 to be secure we need most blocks to contribute some entropy
to the output. We call this notion a partial block source.
Definition 5.2.3. A distribution W = W1, ...,Wγ is an (α, β)-partial block source if
there exists a set of indices J where |J | ≥ γ − β such that the following holds:
∀j ∈ J,∀w1, ..., wj−1 ∈ W1, ...,Wj−1,H∞(Wj|W1 = w1, ...,Wj−1 = wj−1) ≥ α.
Definition 5.2.3 is a weakening of block sources (introduced by Chor and Goldre-
ich [CG88]), as only some blocks are required to have entropy conditioned on the
past. The choice of conditioning on the past is arbitrary: a more general sufficient
condition is that there exists some ordering of indices where most items have entropy
conditioned on all previous items in this ordering (for example, a “partial” reverse
block source [Vad03]). This construction is secure and it supports distributions with
more errors than entropy.
Lemma 5.2.4. Let W be the family of (α = Ω(1), β ≤ γ(1 − Θ(1)))-partial block
sources over Zγ and let cond : Z×{0, 1}d → Y be a (α, α˜, cond)-randomness conduc-
tor. Define V as the family of all distributions with min-entropy at least α˜(γ−β) and
let (Gen′,Rep′) be (Yγ,V , κ, t, fext)-fuzzy extractor with error δ.2 Then (Gen,Rep) is
a (Zγ,W , κ, t, γcond + fext)-fuzzy extractor with error δ.
Proof of Lemma 5.2.4. Let W ∈ W . It suffices to argue correctness and security. We
first argue correctness. When wi = w
′
i, then cond(wi, seedi) = cond(w
′
i, seedi) and
thus vi = v
′
i. Thus, for all w,w
′ where dis(w,w′) ≤ t, then dis(v, v′) ≤ t. Then by
correctness of (Gen′,Rep′), Pr[(r, p)← Gen′(v) ∧ r′ ← Rep(v′, p) ∧ r′ = r] ≥ 1− δ.
We now argue security. Denote by seed the random variable consisting of all γ
seeds and V the entire string of generated V1, ..., Vγ. To show that
Key|P, seed ≈γcond+fext U |P, seed,
it suffices to show that H˜∞(V |seed) is γcond close to a distribution with average
min-entropy α˜(γ − β). The lemma then follows by the security of (Gen′,Rep′).
2We actually need (Gen′,Rep′) to be an average case fuzzy extractor (see [DORS08, Definition 4]
and the accompanying discussion). Most known constructions of fuzzy extractors are average-case
fuzzy extractors. For simplicity we refer to Gen′,Rep′ as simply a fuzzy extractor.
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We now argue that there exists a distribution Y where H˜∞(Y |seed) ≥ α˜(γ − β)
and (V, seed1, ..., seedγ) ≈ (Y, seed1, .., seedγ). First note since W is (α, β)-partial
block distribution that there exists a set of indices J where |J | ≥ γ−β such that the
following holds:
∀j ∈ J,∀w1, ..., wj−1 ∈ W1, ...,Wj−1,H∞(Wj|W1 = w1, ...,Wj−1 = wj−1) ≥ α.
Then consider the first element of j1 ∈ J , ∀w1, ..., wj1−1 ∈ W1, ...,Wj1−1,
H∞(Wj1|W1 = w1, ...,Wj1−1 = wj1−1) ≥ α.
Thus, there exists a distribution Yj1 with H˜∞(Yj1|seedj1) ≥ α˜ such that
(cond(Wj1 , seedj1), seedj1 ,W1, ...,Wj1−1) ≈cond (Yj1 , seedj1 ,W1, ...,Wj1−1)
and since (seed1, ..., seedj1) are independent of these values
(cond(Wj1 , seedj1),Wj1−1, ...,W1, seedj1 , ..., seed1)
≈cond (Yj1 ,Wj1−1, ...,W1, seedj1 , , ..., seed1)
let Zj1
def
= (Yj1 , cond(Wj1−1, seedj1−1), ..., cond(W1, seed1)) and note that
H˜∞(Zj1|seed1, ..., seedj1) ≥ α′.
Applying a deterministic function does not increase statistical distance and thus,
(cond(Wj1 , seedj1), cond(Wj1−1, seedj1−1), ..., cond(W1, seed1), seedj1 , ..., seed1)
≈γcond (Zj1 , seedj1 , ..., seed1)
By a hybrid argument there exists a distribution Z with H˜∞(Z|seed) ≥ α˜(γ − β)
where
(cond(Wγ, seedγ), ..., cond(W1, seed1), seedγ, ..., seed1) ≈γcond (Z, seedγ, ..., seed1).
This completes the proof.
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More errors than entropy In this section we show that Construction 5.2.2 sup-
ports partial block sources with more errors than entropy. The structure of a partial
block source implies that H∞(W ) ≥ α(γ − β) = Θ(γ). We assume that H∞(W ) =
Θ(γ). The condenser of Dodis et al [DPW14] has a constant entropy loss, so α− α˜ =
Θ(1). This means that the input entropy to (Gen′,Rep′) is Θ(γ). We assume that
the new alphabet Y is of constant size. Standard fuzzy extractors on constant size
alphabets correct a constant fraction of errors at a entropy loss of Θ(γ), yielding
κ = Θ(γ). Thus, our construction is secure for distributions with more errors than
entropy whenever |Z| = ω(1). More formally:
# Errors−Entropy = log |Bt|−H∞(W ) ≥ t log |Z|−Θ(γ)− = Θ(γ) log |Z|−Θ(γ) > 0
That is, there exists a super-constant alphabet size for which Construction 5.2.2 is
secure with more errors than entropy.
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Chapter 6
Moving to Computational Security
For the remainder of this work we switch to fuzzy extractors that provide computa-
tional security (Definition 3.3.6). We begin by showing a fuzzy extractor whose output
key is as long as the starting entropy. This is impossible in the information-theoretic
setting (unless all points of the distribution are far apart and Hfuzzt,∞ (W ) = H∞(W )).
6.1 Computational Fuzzy Extractor based on LWE
In this section, a computational fuzzy extractor based on the learning with errors
assumption. Security of our construction depends on the source W . We first consider
a uniform source W ; we consider other distributions in Section 6.2. Our construction
uses the code-offset construction (described in Construction 3.3.4) instantiated with
a random linear code over a finite field Fq. Let Decodet be an algorithm that decodes
a random linear code with at most t errors (we will present such an algorithm later,
in Section 6.1.2).
Construction 6.1.1. Let n be a security parameter and let γ ≥ n. Let q be a prime.
Define Gen,Rep as follows:
Gen
1. Input: w ← W (where W is some
distribution over Fγq ).
2. Sample A ∈ Fγ×nq ,x ∈ Fnq uniformly.
3. Compute p = (A,Ax + w),
key = x1,...,n/2.
4. Output (key, p).
Rep
1. Input: (w′, p).
2. Parse p as (A, c);
let b = c− w′.
3. Let x = Decodet(A,b)
4. Output key = x1,...,n/2.
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Intuitively, security comes from the computational hardness of decoding random
linear codes with a high number of errors (introduced by w). In fact, we know that
decoding a random linear code is NP-hard [BMvT78]; however, this statement is not
sufficient for our security goal, which is to show δDssec ((X1,...,n/2, P ), (Un/2 log q, P )) ≤ .
Furthermore, this construction is only useful if Decodet can be efficiently implemented.
The rest of this section is devoted to making these intuitive statements precise.
We describe the LWE problem and the security of our construction in Section 6.1.1.
We describe one possible polynomial-time Decodet (which corrects more errors than
is possible by exhaustive search) in Section 6.1.2. In Section 6.1.3, we describe pa-
rameter settings that allow us to extract as many bits as the input entropy, resulting
in a lossless construction. In Section 6.1.4, we compare Construction 6.1.1 to us-
ing a sketch-and-extract approach (Lemma 3.3.3) instantiated with a computational
extractor.
6.1.1 Security of Construction 6.1.1
The LWE problem was introduced by Regev [Reg05, Reg10] as a generalization of
“learning parity with noise.” For a complete description of the LWE problem and
related lattices problems (which we do not define here) see [Reg05]. We now recall
the decisional version of the problem.
Definition 6.1.2 (Decisional LWE). Let n be a security parameter. Let γ = γ(n) =
poly(n) be an integer and q = q(n) = poly(n) be a prime1. Let A be the uniform dis-
tribution over Fγ×nq , X be the uniform distribution over Fnq and χ be an arbitrary dis-
tribution on Fγq . The decisional version of the LWE problem, denoted dist-LWEn,γ,q,χ,
is to distinguish the distribution (A,AX + χ) from the uniform distribution over
(Fγ×nq ,Fγq ).
We say that dist-LWEn,γ,q,χ is (, ssec)-secure if no (probabilistic) distinguisher of
size ssec can distinguish the LWE instances from uniform except with probability . If
1Unlike in common formulations of LWE, where q can be any integer, we need q to be prime for
decoding.
80
for any ssec = poly(n), there exists  = ngl(n) such that dist-LWEn,γ,q,χ is (, ssec)-
secure, then we say it is secure.
Regev [Reg05] and Peikert [Pei09] show that dist-LWEn,γ,q,χ is secure when the
distribution χ of errors is Gaussian, as follows. Let Ψ¯ρ be the discretized Gaussian
distribution with variance (ρq)2/2pi, where ρ ∈ (0, 1) with ρq > 2√n. If GAPSVP
and SIVP are hard to approximate (on lattices of dimension n) within polynomial
factors for quantum algorithms, then dist-LWEn,γ,q,Ψ¯mρ is secure. (A recent result of
Brakerski et al. [BLP+13] shows security of LWE based on hardness of approximating
lattices problems for classical algorithms. We have not considered how this result can
be integrated into our analysis.)
The above formulation of LWE requires the error term to come from the discretized
Gaussian distribution, which makes it difficult to use it for constructing fuzzy extrac-
tors (because using w and w′ to sample Gaussian distributions will increase the dis-
tance between the error terms and/or reduce their entropy). Recent work of Do¨ttling
and Mu¨ller-Quade [DMQ13] shows the security of LWE, under the same assumptions,
when errors come from the uniform distribution over a small interval2. This allows
us to directly encode w as the error term in an LWE problem by splitting it into γ
blocks. The size of these blocks is dictated by the following result of Do¨ttling and
Mu¨ller-Quade:
Lemma 6.1.3. [DMQ13, Corollary 1] Let n be a security parameter. Let q =
q(n) = poly(n) be a prime and γ = γ(n) = poly(n) be an integer with γ ≥ 3n. Let
σ ∈ (0, 1) be an arbitrarily small constant and let ρ = ρ(n) ∈ (0, 1/10) be such that
ρq ≥ 2n1/2+σγ. If the approximate decision-version of the shortest vector problem
(GAPSVP) and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) are hard within
a factor of O˜(n1+σγ/ρ) for quantum algorithms in the worst case, then, for χ the
uniform distribution over [−ρq, ρq]γ, dist-LWEn,γ,q,χ is secure.
2Micciancio and Peikert provide a similar formulation in [MP13]. The result Do¨ttling and Mu¨ller-
Quade provides better parameters for our setting.
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To extract pseudorandom bits, we use a result of Akavia, Goldwasser, and Vaikun-
tanathan [AGV09] to show that X has simultaneously many hardcore bits. The result
says that if dist-LWE(n−k,γ,q,χ) is secure then any k variables of X in a dist-LWE(n,γ,q,χ)
instance are hardcore. We state their result for a general error distribution (noting
that their proof does not depend on the error distribution):
Lemma 6.1.4. [AGV09, Lemma 2] If dist-LWE(n−k,γ,q,χ) is (, ssec) secure, then
δDssec′ ((X1,...,k,A,AX + χ), (Uk log q,A,AX + χ)) ≤  ,
where A denotes the uniform distribution over Fm×nq , X denotes the uniform distri-
bution over Fnq , X1,...,k denote the first k coordinates of x, and s′sec ≈ ssec − n3.
The security of Construction 6.1.1 follows from Lemmas 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 when
parameters are set appropriately (see Theorem 6.1.8), because we use the hardcore
bits of X as our key.
6.1.2 Efficiency of Construction 6.1.1
Construction 6.1.1 is useful only if Decodet can be efficiently implemented. We need
a decoding algorithm for a random linear code with t errors that runs in polynomial
time. We present a simple Decodet that runs in polynomial time and can correct
Θ(log n) errors (note that this corresponds to a super-polynomial number of possible
error patterns). This algorithm is a proof of concept, and neither the algorithm nor
its analysis have been optimized for constants. An improved decoding algorithm
can replace our algorithm, which will increase our correcting capability and improve
Construction 6.1.1.
Construction 6.1.5. We consider a setting of (n, γ, q, χ) where γ ≥ 3n. We describe
Decodet:
1. Input A,b = Ax + w − w′
2. Randomly select rows without replacement i1, ..., i2n ← [1, γ].
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3. Restrict A,b to rows i1, ..., i2n; denote these Ai1,...,i2n ,bi1,...,i2n.
4. Find n rows of Ai1,...,i2n that are linearly independent.
If no such rows exist, output ⊥ and stop.
5. Denote by A′,b′ the restriction of Ai1,...,i2n ,bi1,...,i2n (respectively) to these rows.
Compute x′ = (A′)−1b′.
6. If b−Ax′ has more than t nonzero coordinates, go to step (2).
7. Output x′.
Each step is computable in time O(n3). For Decodet to be efficient, we need t to
be small enough so that with probability at least 1
poly(n)
, none of the 2n rows selected
in step 2 have errors (i.e., so that w and w′ agree on those rows). If this happens, and
Ai1,...,i2n has rank n (which is highly likely), then x
′ = x, and the algorithm terminates.
However, we also need to ensure correctness: we need to make sure that if x′ 6= x,
we detect it in step 6. This detection will happen if b−Ax′ = A(x− x′) + (w−w′)
has more than t nonzero coordinates. It suffices to ensure that A(x−x′) has at least
2t+ 1 nonzero coordinates (because at most t of those can be zeroed out by w−w′),
which happens whenever the code generated by A has distance 2t+ 1.
Remark: Fuzzy extractor definitions make no guarantee about Rep behavior
when the distance between w and w′ is larger than t. Our Decode algorithm will
never output an incorrect key (with high probability over the coins of Gen) but may
not terminate. It may be preferable to output the wrong key or ⊥ when dis(w,w′) > t.
Setting t = Θ( γ
n
log n) is sufficient to ensure efficiency when dis(w,w′) ≤ t. Ran-
dom linear codes have distance at least Θ( γ
n
log n) with probability 1 − e−Ω(n) (the
exact statement is in Corollary 6.1.7), so this also ensures correctness. The formal
statement is below:
Lemma 6.1.6 (Efficiency of Decodet when t ≤ d(γ/n− 2) log n). Let d be a positive
constant and assume that dis(W,W ′) ≤ t where t ≤ d( γ
n
− 2) log n. Then Decodet
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runs in expected time O(n4d+3) operations in Fq (this expectation is over the choice
of random coins of Decodet, regardless of the input, as long as dis(w,w
′) ≤ t). It
outputs X with probability 1−e−Ω(n) (this probability is over the choice of the random
matrix A and random choices made by Decodet).
Proof. We first show that our code has high distance with overwhelming probability.
In our construction γ = poly(n) ≥ 2n and δ = O(log n/n). This setting of parameters
satisfies Theorem 2.3.10:
Lemma 6.1.7. Let n be a parameter and let γ = poly(n) ≥ 2n. Let q be a prime and
τ = Θ( γ
n
log n). For large enough values of n, when A ∈ Fγ×nq is drawn uniformly,
the code generated by A has distance at least τ with probability at least 1− e−Ω(γ) ≥
1− e−Ω(n).
Proof. Let c be some constant. Let δ = τ/γ = c logn
n
. We show the corollary for the
case when γ = 2n (increasing the size of γ only increases the relative distance). It
suffices to show that for sufficiently large n, there exists  > 0 where 1−Hq( c lognn )− =
1/2 or equivalently that Hq(
c logn
m
) < 1/2 as then setting  = 1/2−Hq( c lognn ) satisfies
Theorem 2.3.10. For sufficiently large n:
• c logn
n
< 1/2, so we can work with the binary entropy function H2.
• c logn
n
< .1 < 1/2 and thus Hq(
c logn
n
) < Hq(.1).
Putting these statements together, for large enough n, Hq(
c logn
n
) < Hq(.1) < H2(.1) <
1/2 as desired. This completes the proof.
Note that Decodet will stop if w and w
′ agree on all the rows selected in Step 2
(it may also stop for other reasons—namely, in step 4; but we do not use this fact to
bound the expected running time). The probability of each selected row having an
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error is at most t
γ−i where i is the number of rows already selected. That is,
Pr[i1, ..., i2n have no errors] ≥
2n−1∏
i=0
(
1− t
γ − i
)
≥
2n−1∏
i=0
(
1− d
(
γ
n
− 2) log n
γ − i
)
≥
2n−1∏
i=0
(
1− d log n
n
(
γ − 2n
γ − i
))
≥
2n−1∏
i=0
(
1− d log n
n
)
=
(
1− d log n
n
)2n
=
((
1− d log n
n
) n
d logn
)2d logn
≥ 1
42d logn
=
1
n4d
.
(The second-to-last step holds as long as n ≥ 2d log n.) Because at each iteration,
we select 2n rows independently at random, the expected number of iterations is at
most n4d; each iteration takes O(n3) operations in Fq, which gives us the expected
running time bound.
The probability that Decodet outputs ⊥ is bounded by
Pr[Decodet →⊥] ≤
∞∑
j=1
Pr[Decodet →⊥ in j-th iteration of step 4]
=
∞∑
j=1
Pr[Decodet reaches j iterations ∧ rank(Ai1,...,i2n) < n]
≤
∞∑
j=1
Pr[i1, ..., i2n had errors j − 1 times ∧ rank(Ai1,...,i2n) < n]
=
∞∑
j=1
Pr[i1, ..., i2n had errors j − 1 times] · Pr[rank(Ai1,...,i2n) < n]
≤
∞∑
j=1
(
1− 1
n4d
)j−1
· q−n
= n4de−Ω(n) = e−Ω(n) .
The third line from the bottom follows from the fact that the locations of the errors
are assumed to be independent of the sketch, and therefore independent of the matrix
A. The second line from the bottom follows from Claim 2.3.11 when β = n; note
that, because we use the union bound and evaluate the probability separately for
each value of j, we can treat Ai1,...,i2n as a randomly chosen 2n× n matrix, ignoring
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the fact that these matrices are correlated.
We claim that if the code generated by A has distance at least 2t+1, then Decodet
will output ⊥ or the correct x′ = x. Indeed, suppose x′ 6= x. Since A(x− x′) has at
least 2t + 1 nonzero coordinates by the minimum distance of the code generated by
A, and at most t of those can be zeroed out by the addition of w − w′, such an x′
will not pass Step 6.
The probability that the code generated by A has distance lower than 2t+ 1 is at
most e−Ω(n) (see Corollary 6.1.7), the probability of outputting ⊥ is also e−Ω(n) (com-
puted above). This gives the correctness bound for Decodet.
6.1.3 Lossless Computational Fuzzy Extractor
We now state a setting of parameters that yields a lossless construction. The intuition
is as follows. We are splitting our source into γ blocks each of size log ρq (from
Lemma 6.1.3) for a total input entropy of γ log ρq. Key is derived from hardcore
bits of X: X1,...,k and is of size k log q (from Lemma 6.1.4). Thus, to achieve a
lossless construction we need k log q = γ log ρq. In other words, in order to decode
a meaningful number of errors, the vector w is of higher dimension than the vector
X, but each coordinate of w is sampled using fewer bits than each coordinate of X.
Thus, by increasing the size of q (while keeping ρq fixed) we can set k log q = γ log ρq,
yielding a |key| = |W |. The formal statement is below.
Theorem 6.1.8. Let n be a security parameter and let the number of errors t = c log n
for some positive constant c. Let d be a positive constant (giving us a tradeoff between
running time of Rep and |w|). Consider the Hamming metric over the alphabet Z =
[−2b−1, 2b−1], where b = log 2(c/d+2)n2 = O(log n). Let W be uniform overM = Zγ,
where γ = (c/d+ 2)n = O(n). If GAPSVP and SIVP are hard to approximate
within polynomial factors using quantum algorithms, then there is a setting of q =
poly(n) such that for any polynomial ssec = poly(n) there exists  = ngl(n) such
that the following holds: Construction 6.1.1 is a (M,W, γ log |Z|, t)-computational
fuzzy extractor that is (, ssec)-hard with error δ = e
−Ω(n). The generate procedure
Gen takes O(n2) operations over Fq, and the reproduce procedure Rep takes expected
time O(n4d+3) operations over Fq.
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Proof. Security follows by combining Lemmas 6.1.3 and 6.1.4; efficiency follows by
Lemma 6.1.6. For a more detailed explanation of the various parameters and con-
straints see Section 6.4.
6.1.4 Comparison with computational extractor-based constructions
An alternative approach to building a computational fuzzy extractor is to use a com-
putational extractor (e.g., [Kra10, BDK+11, DSGKMk12]) in place of the information-
theoretic extractor in the sketch-and-extract construction. We will call this approach
sketch-and-comp-extract. (A simple example of a computational extractor is a pseu-
dorandom generator applied to the output of an information-theoretic extractor; note
that LWE-based pseudorandom generators exist [AIK06].)
This approach (specifically, its analysis via Lemma 3.3.3) works as long as the
amount of entropy m˜ of w conditioned on the sketch s remains high enough to run a
computational extractor. However, as discussed in the introduction, secure sketches
are subject to strong lower bounds. For many practical sources, there are no known
constructions of secure sketches.
In contrast, our approach does not require the entropy of w conditioned on
p = (A,AX+w) to be high enough for a computational extractor. Instead, we require
that w is not computationally recoverable given p. This requirement is weaker—in
particular, in our construction, w may have no information-theoretic entropy condi-
tioned on p.
Unfortunately, the above construction comes with strong limitations on the error
tolerance and supported sources. Herder et al. [HRvD+14] subsequently improved
the error-tolerance for some sources using confidence information (discussion in the
introduction). In Chapter 7, we show practical constructions based on point obfus-
cation. These constructions do not use sketch-then-comp-extract. In the next section,
we show that Construction 6.1.1 is secure for more sources than just uniform W .
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6.2 Moving to Nonuniform Sources
In this section, we show that Construction 6.1.1 is secure for a particular class of
distributions called symbol-fixing. First we define a symbol fixing source (from [KZ07,
Definition 2.3]):
Definition 6.2.1. Let W = (W1, ...,Wγ+α) be a distribution where each Wi takes
values over an alphabet Z. We say that it is a (γ + α, γ, |Z|) symbol fixing source if
for α indices i1, . . . , iα, the symbols Wiα are fixed, and the remaining m symbols are
chosen uniformly at random. Note that H∞(W ) = γ log |Z|.
Symbol-fixing sources are a very structured class of distributions. However, ex-
tending Construction 6.1.1 to such a class is not obvious. Although symbol-fixing
sources are deterministically extractible [KZ07], we cannot first run a deterministic
extractor before using Construction 6.1.1. This is because we need to preserve dis-
tance between w and w′ and an extractor must not preserve distance between input
points. We present an alternative approach, showing security of LWE directly with
symbol-fixing sources.
The following theorem states the main technical result of this section, which is
of potential interest outside our specific setting. The result is that dist-LWE with
symbol-fixing sources is implied by standard dist-LWE (but for n and m reduced by
the amount of fixed symbols).
Theorem 6.2.2. Let n be a security parameter, γ, α be polynomial in n, and q =
poly(n) be a prime and β ∈ Z+ be such that q−β = ngl(n). Let U denote the uniform
distribution over Zγ for an alphabet Z ⊂ Fq, and let W denote an (γ+α, γ, |Z|) sym-
bol fixing source over Zγ+α. If dist-LWEn,γ,q,U is secure, then dist-LWEn+α+β,γ+α,q,W
is also secure.
Theorem 6.2.2 also holds for an arbitrary error distribution (not just uniform
error) in the following sense. Let χ′ be an arbitrary error distribution. Define χ as
the distribution where γ dimensions are sampled according to χ′ and the remaining
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dimensions have some fixed error. Then, security of dist-LWEn,γ,q,χ′ implies security
of dist-LWEn+α+β,γ+α,q,χ. We show this stronger version of the theorem in Section 6.3.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Providing a single sample with no
error “fixes” at most a single variable. Thus, if there are significantly more variables
than samples with no error, search LWE should still be hard. We are able to show
a stronger result that dist-LWE is still hard. The nontrivial part of the reduction
is using the additional α + β variables to “explain” a random value for the last α
samples, without knowing the other variables. The β parameter is the slack needed
to ensure that the “free” variables have influence on the last α samples. A similar
theorem for the case of a single fixed dimension was shown in concurrent work by
Brakerski et al. [BLP+13, Lemma 4.3]. The proof techniques of Brakerski et al. can
be extended to our setting with multiple fixed dimensions, improving the parameters
of Theorem 6.2.2 (specifically, removing the need for β).
Theorem 6.2.2 allows us to construct a lossless computational fuzzy extractor from
block-fixing sources:
Theorem 6.2.3. Let n be a security parameter and let t = c log n for some posi-
tive constant c. Let d ≤ c be a positive constant and consider the Hamming metric
over the alphabet Z = [−2b−1, 2b−1], where b ≈ log 2(c/d + 2)n2 = O(log n). Let
M = Zγ+α where γ = (c/d + 2)n = O(n) and α ≤ n/3. Let W be the class of
all (γ + α, γ, |Z|)-symbol fixing sources. If GAPSVP and SIVP are hard to approxi-
mate within polynomial factors using quantum algorithms, then there is a setting of
q = poly(n) such that for any polynomial ssec = poly(n) there exists  = ngl(n) such
that the following holds: Construction 6.1.1 is a (M,W , γ log |Z|, t)-computational
fuzzy extractor that is (, ssec)-hard with error δ = e
−Ω(n). The generate procedure
Gen takes O(n2) operations over Fq, and the reproduce procedure Rep takes expected
time O(n4d+3 log n) operations over Fq.
Proof. Security follows by Lemmas 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 and Theorem 6.2.2 . Efficiency fol-
lows by Lemma 6.1.6. For a more detailed explanation of parameters see Section 6.4.1.
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6.3 Proof of Theorem 6.2.2
Proof. We assume that all of the fixed blocks are located at the end and their fixed
value is 0. If the blocks are fixed to some other value, the reduction is essentially the
same. In the reduction, the distinguisher is allowed to depend on the source and can
know the positions of the fixed blocks and their values. For a matrix A we will denote
the i-th row by ai. For a set T of column indices, we denote by AT the restriction
of the matrix A to the columns contained in T . Similarly, for a vector x we denote
by xT the restriction of x to the variables contained in T . We use similar notation
for the complement of T , denoted T c. For a matrix or vector we use T to denote the
transpose. We use i as a index into matrix rows and the error vector and j as an
index into columns and the solution vector.
Let n be a security parameter, γ, q, α = poly(n). Let β be such that q−β = ngl(n).
All operations are computed modulo q, and we omit “ mod q” notation. Let χ′ be
some error distribution over Fmq and let χ over Fm+nq be defined by sampling χ′ to
obtain values on dimensions 1, ...,m and then appending α 0s.
Let D be a distinguisher that breaks dist-LWE(γ+α),(n+α+β),q,χ with advantage  >
1/poly(n). Let A denote the uniform distribution over F(γ+α)×(n+α+β)q , X denote the
uniform distribution over F(n+α+β)q , and U denote the uniform distribution over Fγ+αq
. Then
|Pr[D(A,AX + χ) = 1]− Pr[D(A, U) = 1]| > .
We build a distinguisher that breaks dist-LWEγ,n,q,χ. Let A
′ denote the uniform
distribution over Fγ×nq , X ′ denote the uniform distribution over Fnq , and U ′ denote
the uniform distribution over Fγq . We will build a distinguisher D′ of polynomial size
for which
|Pr[D′(A′,A′X ′ + χ′) = 1]− Pr[D′(A′, U ′) = 1]| > (− ngl(n))(1− ngl(n)) ≈ .
(6.1)
D′ will make a single call to D, so we focus on how to prepare a random block-fixing
instance for D from the random instance that D′ is given. The code for D′ is given
in Figure 6·1.
The distinguisher D′ has an advantage when S is of rank α. This occurs with
overwhelming probability:
Claim 6.3.1. Let S
$← Fα×(α+β)q be randomly generated. Then Pr[rank(S) = α] ≥
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1. Input A′,b′, where A′ $← Fγ×nq and b′ is either uniform over Fγq or b′ =
A′x′ + e′ for e′ $← χ′ and uniform x′ $← Fnq .
2. Choose R
$← Fα×nq uniformly at random. Initialize Q ∈ Fγ×(α+β)q to be the
zero matrix.
3. Let b∗ = (b′, b∗γ+1, . . . , b
∗
γ+α), for uniformly chosen (b
∗
γ+1, . . . , b
∗
γ+α)
$← Fαq .
4. Choose S
$← Fα×(α+β)q uniformly at random.
If rank(S) < α, stop and output a random bit.
5. Find a set of α linearly independent columns in S. Let T be the set of
indices of these columns.
6. For all 1 ≤ j ≤ α + β, j /∈ T :
Choose xn+j
$← Fq uniformly at random.
For i = 1, ..., γ:
Choose Qi,j
$← Fq uniformly at random.
Set b∗i = b
∗
i + Qi,jxn+j.
7. Initialize A∗ =
(
A′ Q
R S
)
.
8. For i = 1, ..., γ:
Choose a row vector pii ← F1×αq uniformly at random.
Set ai ← a∗i + pii(R||S)
Set bi ← b∗i + pii(b∗γ+1, ..., b∗γ+α)T
9. For i = γ + 1, . . . , γ + α:
Set ai ← a∗i
Set bi = b
∗
i .
10. Output D(A,b).
Figure 6·1: A PPT D′ that distinguishes LWE using distinguisher for
LWE w/ block fixing source
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1− ngl(n).
Proof. Direct result of Claim 2.3.11 because q−β = ngl(n).
The probability that a random S is not full rank is ngl(n) so the distinguisher D
must still have an advantage when the matrix S is full rank. That is,
|Pr[D(A,AX + χ) = 1|rank(S) = α]−Pr[D(A, U) = 1|rank(S) = α]| > − ngl(n).
It suffices to show that D′ prepares a good instance for D conditioned on S being
full rank. We show this in the following three claims:
1. If A′ is a random matrix then A is a random matrix subject to the condition
that rank(S) = α.
2. If b′ = A′x′ + e′ for uniform A′ and x′, then ∃x (uniformly distributed and
independent of A and e′) such that b = Ax + e, where ei = e′i for 1 ≤ i ≤ γ
and ei = 0 otherwise.
3. If the conditional distribution b′ |A′ is uniform, then the conditional distribu-
tion b |A is also uniform.
Claim 6.3.2. The matrix A is distributed as a uniformly random choice from the set
of all matrices whose bottom-right α× (α + β) submatrix S satisfies rank(S) = α.
Proof. The bottom α rows of A (namely, R|S) are randomly generated (conditioned
on rank(S) = α). The top left γ × n quadrant of A is also random, because it is
produced as a sum of a uniformly random A′ with some values that are uncorrelated
with A′. The submatrix of the top-right γ × (α + β) quadrant corresponding to
QT c (recall this is the restriction of Q to the columns not in T ) is also random,
because it is initialized with random values to which some uncorrelated values are
then added. It is important to note that all these values are independent of pii values.
Thus, we restrict attention to the γ × α submatrix of A that corresponds to QT
in A∗ (note that these values are 0 in A∗). Consider a particular row i. That row
is computed as piiST . Since ST is a full rank square matrix and pii is uniformly and
independently generated, that row is also uniform and independent of other entries
in A.
Claim 6.3.3. If D′ is provided with input distributed as A′,b′ = A′x′ + e′ then
b = Ax + e, where
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• ei = e′i for 1 ≤ i ≤ γ,
• ei = 0 for γ < i ≤ γ + α,
• xj = x′j for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
• and xj is uniform and independent of A and e′ for n < j ≤ n+ α + β,
Proof. Partially define x as xj = x
′
j if 1 ≤ j ≤ n and xj as the value generated in
step 6 for j > n and j 6∈ T . Define the remaining variables xT as the solution to the
following system of equations.
STxT =
b∗γ+1...
b∗γ+α
−Rx′ − ST cxT c (6.2)
A solution xT exists as ST is full rank. Moreover, it is uniform and independent of A
and e, because b∗γ+1, . . . , b
∗
γ+α are uniform and independent of A and e.
We now show that b∗ = A∗x + e. All entries in matrix Q corresponding to
variables in T are set to zero. Thus, the values of xT do not affect b∗i for 1 ≤ i ≤ γ.
The values of xT c are manually set, and Qi,jxj is added to the corresponding b
∗
i .
Thus, for 1 ≤ i ≤ γ, we have b∗ = A∗x + e. For γ < i, this constraint is also satisfied
by the values of xT set in Equation 6.2.
Thus, it remains to show that step 8 preserves this solution. We now show that
for all rows 1 ≤ i ≤ γ, if b∗i = a∗ix + ei then bi = aix + ei. Recall the other rows are
not modified. We have the following for 1 ≤ i ≤ γ:
aix + ei = (a
∗
i + pii(R||S)) x + ei
= a∗ix + ei + pii(R||S)x
= b∗i + pii(R||S)x
Recall that bi = b
∗
i + pii(b
∗
γ+1, ..., b
∗
γ+k). We consider the product (R||S)x. It suffices
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to show that (R||S)x = (b∗γ+1, ..., b∗γ+α),
(R||S)x = R
x1...
xn
+ ST cxT c + STxT
= R
x1...
xn
+ ST cxT c +
b∗γ+1...
b∗γ+α
−R
x1...
xn
− ST cxT c
=
b∗γ+1...
b∗γ+α

This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 6.3.4. If the conditional distribution b′ |A′ is uniform, then b |A is also
uniform.
Proof. Since R,S, and Q are chosen independently of b′, the distribution b′ |A∗ is
uniform. Let b∗ be the vector generated after step 6. Its first γ coordinates are
computed by adding the uniform vector b′ to values that are independent of b∗,
and its remaining α coordinates b∗γ+1, . . . , b
∗
γ+α are chosen uniformly. Thus b
∗ |A∗ is
uniform.
Let Π represent the matrix formed by pii. It is independent of b
∗ and A∗, so
b∗ | (A∗,Π) is uniform. Let Π′ =
(
Iγ Π
0 Iα
)
. Note that b = Π′b∗. Since b∗ | (A∗,Π)
is uniform, and Π′ is invertible, b | (A∗,Π) must also be uniform. Since A is a
deterministic function of A∗ and Π (assuming Step 5 is deterministic—if not, we can
fix the coins used), the distribution b |A is the same as b | (A∗,Π) and is thus also
uniform.
Finally, the reduction runs in polynomial time and together Claims 6.3.2, 6.3.3,
and 6.3.4 show that when rank(S) = α the distinguisher D′ properly prepares the
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instance thus,
|Pr[D′(A,AX + χ) = 1]− Pr[D′(A, U) = 1]|
= (|Pr [D′(A′,u′) = 1|rank(S) = α]
− Pr [D′(A′,b′ = A′x + e) = 1|rank(S) = α] |) Pr[rank(S) = α]
= (|Pr[D(A,AX + χ) = 1|rank(S) = α]
− Pr[D(A, U) = 1|rank(S) = α]|) Pr[rank(S) = α]
≥ (− ngl(n))(1− ngl(n)) ≈ 
Where the second line follows because we can detect when rank(S) < α and output a
random bit in this case. Thus, Equation (6.1) is satisfied, this completes the proof.
6.4 Parameter Settings for Construction 6.1.1
In this section, we explain the different parameters that go into our construction.
In Theorem 6.1.8 we give a lossless fuzzy extractor from a security parameter n and
an error t. In this section, we discuss constraints imposed by 1) efficient decoding
2) maintaining security of the LWE instance and 3) ensuring no entropy loss of the
construction. We begin by reviewing the parameters that make up our construction:
• |W |: The length of the source.
• t: Number of errors that can be supported.
• n: LWE security parameter (i.e., number of field elements in X), which must
be greater than some minimum value n0 for security.
• q: The size of the field.
• ρ: The fraction of the field needed for error sampling.
• γ: The length of the string w in symbols.
• k: The number of hardcore bits in X (from Lemma 6.1.4).
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We will split the source |W | into γ blocks each of size 2ρq + 1 (that is, |W | =
γ log(2ρq + 1)). We will ignore the parameter |W | and focus on t, n, q, ρ, and γ. As
stated above we have three constraints:
• Maintain security of LWE. If we assume GAPSVP and SIVP are hard to ap-
proximate within polynomial factors then Lemma 6.1.3 says that we get security
for all n greater than some minimum n0 and q = poly(n) and ρq ≥ 2n1/2+σγ =
poly(n). The only reason to increase ρq over this minimum amount (other than
security) is if the number of errors in W decreases with a slightly larger block
size. We ignore this effect and assume that ρq = 2n1/2+σγ.
• Maintain efficient decoding of Construction 6.1.5. Using Lemma 6.1.6, this
means that t ≤ d log n(γ/n− 2).
• Minimize entropy loss of the construction. We will output X1,...,k so the entropy
loss of the construction is |W | − |X1,...,k|. We want the entropy loss to be zero,
that is, |W | = |X1,...,k|. Substituting, one has γ log 2ρq + 1 = k log q.
Collecting constraints we can support any setting where t, n, q, ρ, γ, k satisfy the fol-
lowing constraints (for constants d, f):
n0 < n− k
t ≤ d log n
(γ
n
− 2
)
q = nf
ρq = 2n1/2+σγ
γ log(2ρq + 1) = k log q
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Substituting q = nf and ρq = 2n1/2+σγ yields the following system of equations:
n0 < n− k
t ≤ d log n
(γ
n
− 2
)
γ log(4n1/2+σγ + 1) = k log nf
This is the most general form of our construction, we can support any n, t, γ that
satisfy these equations for constants d, f . However, the last equation may have no
solution for f constant. Putting the last equation in terms of f one has:
n0 < n− k
t ≤ d log n
(γ
n
− 2
)
f =
γ
k
log 4n1/2+σγ + 1
log n
To ensure f is a constant, we set t = c log n for some constant c and that k = n/g
for some constant g > 1. Finally we assume that γ is the minimum value such that
t ≤ d log n(γ/n − 2) (that is, there are only as many dimensions as necessary for
decoding using Lemma 6.1.6):
n0 < n− k
γ =
(c/d+ 2)n log n
log n
= (
c
d
+ 2)n
f =
γ
k
log 4n1/2+σγ + 1
log n
=
g(c+ 2d)
d
log(4(c+2d)
d
n3/2+σ + 1)
log n
97
Note that f is at a constant in n. Assuming n − k = n(1 − 1/g) > n0 and letting
t = c log n we get the following setting:
γ = (
c
d
+ 2)n
q = nf = n
γ
k
log(4n1/2+σγ+1)
logn = poly(n)
ρq = 2n1/2+σγ = 2(
c
d
+ 2)n3/2+σ
Note, that f > γ
k
≥ γ
n
≥ (c/d+2)n
n
≥ 3 as long as d < c (this also ensures that
γ ≥ 3n, as required for Lemma 6.1.6 to hold). Since ρq = 2n1/2+ργ = O(n5/2) in our
setting ρ = O(n−1/2). Thus, for large enough settings of parameters ρ is less than
1/10 as required by Lemma 6.1.3.
Furthermore, we get decoding using O(n4d+3) Fq operations. We can output a k
fraction of X and the bits will be pseudorandom (conditioned on A,AX +W ). The
parameter g allows is a tradeoff between the number of dimensions needed for security
and the size of the field q. In Theorem 6.1.8, we set g = 2 and output the first half
of X. Setting 1 < g < 2 achieves an increase in output length (over the input length
of W ). We also (arbitrarily) set σ = 1/2 to simplify the statement of Theorem 6.1.8,
making ρq = 2(c/d+ 2)n2.
6.4.1 Parameter Settings for Theorem 6.2.3
We repeat parameter settings for block fixing sources. We now have γ + α as the
number of samples, while n + α + ω(1) is the number of variables. We can support
any setting where t, n, q, ρ, γ, k, α satisfy the following constraints (for β = ω(1) and
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constants d, f):
n0 < n− k − α− β
t ≤ d log n
(γ
n
− 2
)
q = nf
ρq = 2n1/2+σγ
γ log(2ρq + 1) = k log q
Substituting q = nf and ρq = 2n1/2+σγ yields the following system of equations:
n0 < n− k − α− β
t ≤ d log n
(γ
n
− 2
)
γ log(4n1/2+σγ + 1) = k log nf
As before we can support any setting any n, t, γ, α that satisfy these equations for
β = ω(1) and constants d, f . However, the last equation may have no solution for f
constant. Putting the last equation in terms of f one has:
n0 < n− k − α− β
t ≤ d log n
(γ
n
− 2
)
f =
γ
k
log(4n1/2+σγ + 1)
log n
To ensure f is a constant, we set t = c log n for some constant c and that k, α = n/3
and β = log n. Finally we assume that γ is the minimum value such that t ≤
d log n(γ/n−2) (that is, there are only as many dimensions as necessary for decoding
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using Lemma 6.1.6):
n0 < n/3− log n
γ =
(c/d+ 2)n log n
log n
= (
c
d
+ 2)n
f =
γ
k
log(4n1/2+σγ + 1)
log n
=
(
3(
c
d
+ 2)
) log(4( c
d
+ 2)n3/2+σ + 1)
log n
= O(1)
Assuming n/3− log(n) > n0 and letting t = c log n we get the following setting:
γ = (
c
d
+ 2)n
q = nf = n
γ
n
log(4n1/2+σγ+1)
logn = poly(n)
ρq = 2n1/2+σγ = 2(
c
d
+ 2)n3/2+σ
As before we arbitrarily set σ = 1/2, giving ρq = 2( c
d
+ 2)n2. Also, if c < d then
we get efficient decoding and ρ = o(1) satisfying the condition of Lemma 6.1.3.
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Chapter 7
Computational Fuzzy Extractors from Point Obfuscation
In Chapter 6, we showed it was possible to construct a computational fuzzy extractor
whose output key length was as long as the starting entropy. In this chapter, we show
practical constructions of computational fuzzy extractors with additional properties.
Both constructions are based on point obfuscation and can support more errors than
entropy. In this section, we do not concentrate on the length of key as computational
techniques we use can expand the key. We instead focus on supporting a wide classes
of sources.
7.1 A reusable computational fuzzy extractor
In Construction 5.2.2, we showed a fuzzy extractor for a family of distributions with
more errors than entropy. Using computational techniques we are able to retain many
of the advantages of Construction 5.2.2 and achieve a reusable fuzzy extractor.
The construction samples a random subset of blocks Wj1 , ...,Wjη and obfuscates
the concatenation of these blocks. Denote this concatenated value by V1. This process
is repeated to produce V1, ..., V` where at least one Vi should be correct to “unlock”
the correct key. Let Sampleγ,η(·) be an algorithm that outputs a random subset of
{1, ..., γ} of size η given let rsam bits of randomness.
Construction 7.1.1 (Sample-then-Obfuscate). Let Z be an alphabet, and let W =
W1, ...,Wγ be a source where each Wj is over Z. Let η be a parameter, and O be an
obfuscator for the family of digital lockers with κ-bit outputs. Define Gen,Rep as:
101
Gen
1. Input: w = w1, ..., wγ
2. Sample key
$← {0, 1}κ.
3. For i = 1, ..., `:
(i) Select λi
$← {0, 1}rsam.
(ii) Set ji,1, ..., ji,η ← Sampleγ,η(λi)
(iii) Set vi = wji,1 , ..., wji,η .
(iv) Set ρi = O(Ivi,r).
(v) Set pi = ρi, λi.
4. Output (key, p), where p = p1 . . . p`.
Rep
1. Input: (w′ = w′1, ..., w
′
γ, p)
2. For i = 1, ..., `:
(i) Parse pi as ρi, λi.
(ii) ji,1, ..., ji,η ← Sampleγ,η(λi).
(iii) Set v′i = w
′
ji,1
, ..., w′ji,η .
(iv) Set ρi(v
′
i) = ri.
If keyi 6=⊥ output keyi.
3. Output ⊥.
The use of a computational primitive (obfuscation of digital lockers) allows us to
sample multiple times, because we need to argue only about individual entropy of Vi,
as opposed to the information-theoretic setting, where it would be necessary to argue
about the entropy of the joint variable V . This is the property that allows reusability.
This construction uses a na¨ıve sampler that takes truly random samples, but
the public randomness may be substantially decreased by using more sophisticated
samplers. (See Goldreich [Gol97] for an introduction to samplers.)
Theorem 7.1.2. Let Z be an alphabet. Let n be a security parameter. Let W be the
family of (α = Ω(1), β ≤ γ(1−Θ(1)))-partial block sources over Zγ where γ = Ω(n).
Let η be such that η = ω(log n) and η = o(γ), and let c > 1 be a constant and ` be
such that ` = nc. Let O be an `-composable VGB obfuscator for digital lockers (with
κ bit outputs) with auxiliary inputs. Then for every ssec = poly(n) there exists
some sec = ngl(n) such that Construction 7.1.1 is a (Zγ,W , κ, t)-computational
fuzzy extractor that is (sec, ssec)-hard with error δ for
t ≤ −(c− 1)
2
(γ − η) log n
η
= o(γ)
δ = e−n
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7.1.1 Security of Construction 7.1.1
In this section we show security of Construction 7.1.1. With overwhelming proba-
bility, at each of the ` iterations, the sampler will choose enough coordinates of W
that have high entropy, making Vi have sufficient entropy. Once each of the V1, ..., V`
have high entropy the obfuscations are unlikely to return a value other than ⊥ to an
adversary. We begin by showing that each Vi is statistically close to a high entropy
distribution. Let Λ represent the random variable of all the coins used by Sample and
λ = λ1 . . . λ` be some particular outcome.
Lemma 7.1.3. Let all variables be as in Theorem 7.1.2. There exists sam = O(e
−η) =
ngl(n) and α′ = αη(γ − β − η)/γ = ω(log n) such that for each i,
Pr
λ←Λ
[H∞(Vi|Λ = λ) ≥ α′] ≥ 1− sam.
Proof. Consider some fixed i. Recall that there a set J of size γ−β = Θ(γ) such that
each w and block j ∈ J , H∞(Wj|W1 = w1, ...,Wj−1 = wj−1,Wj+1 = wj+1, ...,Wγ =
wγ) ≥ α. Since this is a worst case guarantee, the entropy of Vi can be deduced
from the number of symbols in Vi that come from J . Namely, Denote by X =
|{ji,1, ..., ji,η} ∩ J |.
Claim 7.1.4.
H∞(Vi|Λ = λ) ≥ αX.
Proof. Denote by j1, ..., jη the indices selected by the randomness λi. We begin by
noting that
H∞(Vi|Λ = λ) = − log max
v∈Vi
Pr[Vi = v|Λ = λ]
= − log max
wj1 ,...,wjη
Pr[Wj1 = wj1 ∧ · · · ∧Wjηwjη ].
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Then
max
wj1 ,...,wjη
Pr[Wj1 = wj1 ∧ · · · ∧Wjη = wjη ]
= max
wj1 ,...,wjη
η∏
k=1
Pr[Wjk = wjk |Wjk−1 = wjk−1 ∧ ... ∧Wj1 = wj1 ]
≤
η∏
k=1
max
wj1 ,...,wjη
Pr[Wjk = wjk |Wjk−1 = wjk−1 ∧ ... ∧Wj1 = wj1 ]
≤
η∏
k=1
max
w1,...,wγ
Pr[Wjk = wjk |W1 = w1 ∧ ... ∧Wjk−1 = wjk−1]
Taking the negative logarithm of both sides we have that
H∞(Vi|Λ = λ) ≥
η∑
k=1
min
w1,...,wγ
H∞(Wjk |W1 = w1 ∧ ... ∧Wjk−1 = wjk−1)
≥
∑
jk∈J
α = αX
This completes the proof of Claim 7.1.4.
We note that X is distributed according to the hypergeometric distribution, and that
E[X] = η(γ−β)/γ. Using the tail bounds from [Chv79, Ska13], we can conclude that
Pr[X ≤ E[X]/2] ≤ e−2((γ−β)/2γ)2η = O(e−η). Thus, setting α′ = αη(γ−β)
2γ
and applying
Claim 7.1.4, we conclude that
Pr[H∞(Vi) ≥ α′] ≥ 1−O(e−η).
This completes the proof of Lemma 7.1.3.
We can then argue that all Vi simultaneously have individual entropy with good
probability (by union bound):
Corollary 7.1.5. Let sam and α
′ be as in Lemma 7.1.3, and all the other variables
be as in Theorem 7.1.2. Then Prλ←Λ[∀i,H∞(Vi|Λ = λ) ≥ α′] ≥ 1− `sam.
Once all Vi all simultaneously have good entropy, the adversary only sees ⊥ as
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an output from the obfuscations (with overwhelming probability). If the adversary
only sees ⊥ from the obfuscations, they have no information about key. This is each
output V1, ..., V` is hard to guess. We call this type of distribution block unguessable
source:1
Definition 7.1.6. Let Iv(·, ·) be an oracle that returns
Iv(j, v
′
j) =
1 vj = v′j0 otherwise.
A source V = V1|...|Vγ is a (q, α, β)-unguessable block source if there exists a set
J ⊂ {1, ..., γ} of size at least γ − β such that for any unbounded adversary S with
oracle access to Iv making at most q queries
∀j ∈ J, H˜∞(Vj|V iew(SIV (·,·))) ≥ α.
This is made formal in the following corollary:
Corollary 7.1.7. Let sam, α
′ be as in Lemma 7.1.3, and all the other variables be as
in Theorem 7.1.2. Take any q = poly(n). For α′′ = α′ − 1 − log(q + 1) = ω(log n),
with probability 1 − `sam over the choice of Λ = λ, the distribution V |Λ = λ is a
(q, α′′, 0)-unguessable block source.
Finally, we can show the construction is secure if the inputs form a unguessable
block source.
Lemma 7.1.8. Let all the variables be as in Theorem 7.1.2. For every ssec = poly(n)
there exists sec = ngl(n) such that δ
Dssec ((Key, P ), (Uκ, P )) < sec.
Proof. Let O be a `-composable VGB obfuscator with auxiliary input for digital
lockers over Z2 . Let V be a (q, α′′ = ω(log n), 0)-unguessable block source. Our
goal is to show that for all ssec = poly(n) there exists sec = ngl(n) such that
δDssec ((R,P ), (U, P )) ≤ sec.
1In this definition we allow there to be a set of weak blocks. Construction 7.2.3 is secure for
sources that satisfy this weaker definition.
2In this proof we only consider the case where the sampling has produced a block unguessable
source. The negligible portion of the time when this does not happen in included in the security of
Theorem 7.1.2
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Suppose not, that is suppose there is some ssec = poly(n) such that exists sec =
poly(n) and δDssec ((Key, P ), (U, P )) > sec. Let D be such a distinguisher of size at
most ssec. That is,
|E[D(Key, P )]− E[D(U, P )] > sec = 1/poly(n).
Define the oracle Iv1,...,v`,r(·, ·) as follows:
Iv1,...,v`,key(x, i) =
key vi = x⊥ otherwise.
By the security of obfuscation (Definition 2.4.1), there exists a unbounded time sim-
ulator S (making at most q queries) such that
|E[D(Key, P1, ..., P`)]− E[SIv1,...,v`,r(·,·)(Key, 1` log |Z|)]| ≤ sec/3. (7.1)
We now prove S cannot distinguish between Key and U .
Lemma 7.1.9. SD(SIv1,...,v`,r(·,·)(Key, 1` log |Z|), SIv1,...,v`,r(·,·)(U, 1` log |Z|)) ≤ `2−α′′.
Proof. It suffices to show that for any two values in {0, 1}κ, the statistical distance is
at most `2−α
′′
.
Lemma 7.1.10. Let key be true value encoded in I and let u ∈ {0, 1}κ. Then,
SD(SIv1,...,v`,key(·,·)(key, 1` log |Z|), SIv1,...,v`,r(·,·)(u, 1` log |Z|)) ≤ `2−α′′ .
Proof. Recall that for all j, H˜∞(Vj|V iew(S)) ≥ α′′. The only information about the
correct value of r is contained in the query responses. When all responses are ⊥ the
view of S is identical when presented with key or u. We now show that for any value
of key all queries return ⊥ with probability 1 − 2−α′′ . Suppose not, that is suppose,
the probability of at least one nonzero response is > 2−(α
′′).
When there is a response other than ⊥ for some j this means that there is no
remaining min-entropy in Vj. If this occurs with over 2
−α′′ probability this violates the
block unguessability of V (Definition 7.1.6). By the union bound over the indices j the
total probability of a response other than ⊥ is at most `2−α′′ . Thus, for all key, u the
statistical distance is at most `2−α
′′
. This concludes the proof of Lemma 7.1.10.
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By averaging over all points in {0, 1}κ we conclude that
SD(SIv1,...,v`,rX(·,·)(Key, 1` log |Z|), SIv1,...,v`,r(·,·)(U, 1` log |Z|)) < `2−α
′′
.
This completes the proof of Lemma 7.1.9.
Now by the security of obfuscation we have that
|E[D(Key, P1, ..., P`)]− E[SIv1,...,v`,r(·,·)(Key, 1` log |Z|)]| ≤ sec/3. (7.2)
Combining Equations 7.1 and 7.2 and Lemma 7.1.9, we have
δD((Key, P ), (U, P )) ≤ |E[D(Key, P1, ..., P`)]− E[SIv1,...,v`,r(·,·)(Key, 1` log |Z|)]|
+ |E[SIv1,...,v`,r(·,·)(Key, 1` log |Z|)]− E[SIv1,...,v`,r(·,·)(U, 1` log |Z|)]|
+ |E[SIv1,...,v`,r(·,·)(U, 1` log |Z|)]− E[D(U, P1, ..., P`)]|
≤ sec/3 + `2−α′′ + sec/3
≤ 2sec/3 + ngl(n) < sec.
This is a contradiction and completes the proof of Lemma 7.1.8.
7.1.2 Correctness of Construction 7.1.1
We encode the entire key in each obfuscation. For correctness, at least one of the
repeated readings must be correct with overwhelming probability. Let Vi represent one
of the initial readings and V ′i represent a repeated reading. For showing correctness
we must show that Pr[∀i, Vi 6= V ′i ] < ngl(n).
Lemma 7.1.11. Let all the variables be as in Theorem 7.1.2. Then Pr[∀i, vi 6= v′i] <
ngl(n), where the probability is over the coins of Gen.
Proof. Recall that dis(w,w′) ≤ t and that the locations of the errors is independent of
the selected locations. Denote by µ = − (c−1) logn
2
. Since η = ω(log n), we will assume
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η ≥ 2µ. We begin by computing the probability that a single vi = v′i.
Pr[vi = v
′
i] = Pr[w and w
′ agree on positions ji,1, ..., ji,η]
≥
η−1∏
j=0
(
1− t
γ − j
)
≥
η−1∏
j=0
(
1− µ(γ − η)/η
η − j
)
≥
η−1∏
j=0
(
1− µ
η
(
γ − η
γ − j
))
≥
η−1∏
j=0
(
1− µ
η
)
=
(
1− µ
η
)η
=
((
1− µ
η
)η/µ)µ
≥
(
1
2
)2µ
≥
(
1
2
)(c−1) logn
=
1
nc−1
.
We then have the probability that all vi 6= v′i as:
Pr[∀i, vi 6= v′i] = (1− Pr[vi = v′i])`
=
(
1− 1
nc−1
)`
=
((
1− 1
nc−1
)nc−1)`/nc−1
≤
(
1
e
)nc/nc−1
=
1
en
.
This completes the proof of Lemma 7.1.11.
7.1.3 Reusability of Construction 7.1.1
The reusability of Construction 7.1.1 follows from the security of the VGB obfuscator
with auxiliary input. We consider a bounded q = poly(n) number of reuses. For
some fixed i ∈ {1, ..., q} we will treat the remaining keys as auxiliary input to the
adversary, and the simulator still performs comparably to a distinguisher with access
to the obfuscations. Thus, given sufficiently strong reusability we achieve the following
result:
Theorem 7.1.12. Let q = poly(n), and let all the variables be as in Theorem 7.1.2,
except that O be an ` × q-composable VGB obfuscator for digital lockers (with κ bit
outputs) with auxiliary inputs. For any admissible f2, ..., fq, for all ssec = poly(n)
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there exists some sec = ngl(n) such that (Gen,Rep) is (q, sec, ssec, f2, ..., fq)-reusable
fuzzy extractor.
Proof. The only modification to the proof is in Lemma 7.1.8 with the other keys
Key1, ...,Keyi−1,Keyi+1, ...,Keyq treated as additional auxiliary input to the adver-
sary/simulator. The simulator in the definition of composable obfuscation is required
to function for arbitrary circuits in the family even if the choice of these circuits de-
pends on the previous obfuscations. Thus allows reading wi to be chosen depending
on public values p1, ..., pi−1.
More errors than entropy? We now show Construction 7.1.1 supports partial
block sources with more errors than entropy. The structure of the partial block
source implies that H∞(W ) ≥ α(γ − β) = Θ(γ). We assume that H∞(W ) = Θ(γ).
We are able to correct o(γ) errors. This yields:
# Errors− Entropy = log |Bt| − H∞(W ) ≥ t log |Z| −Θ(γ) = o(γ) log |Z| −Θ(γ)
That is, there exists a super-constant alphabet size for which Construction 7.1.1 is
secure with more errors than entropy.
Notes: Construction 7.1.1 works for an arbitrary size alphabet; however, for a
constant size alphabet, the required entropy is greater than the number of corrected
error patterns. However, Construction 7.1.1 is reusability for an arbitrary size alpha-
bet.
In the analysis of Construction 7.1.1 we restricted our attention to partial block
sources, to allow for an easy comparison with Construction 5.2.2. However, in fact
Construction 7.1.1 is secure for any source where sampling produces a high entropy
string (entropy ω(log n)) with overwhelming probability. For example, it is secure for
sources with symbols that are ω(log n)/ log |Z|-wise independent.
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7.2 Allowing Correlated Symbols
In the previous section, we presented a reusable computational fuzzy extractor that
supported sources with more errors than entropy. Unfortunately, both Construc-
tions 5.2.2 and 7.1.1 required each symbol to contribute “fresh” entropy. In this
section, we present a computational construction that allows for correlation between
symbols while still supporting more errors than entropy and correcting a constant
fraction of errors. This construction is inspired by the construction of digital lockers
from point obfuscation by Canetti and Dakdouk [CD08]. Instead of having large parts
of the string w unlock key, we have individual symbols unlock bits of the output. The
construction that follows is a computational fuzzy conductor (Definition 3.3.7) not a
computational fuzzy extractor (Definition 3.3.6, so we call its output c to distinguish
from key.
Before presenting the construction we provide some definitions from error cor-
recting codes. We use error-correct codes over {0, 1}γ which correct up to t bit
flips from 0 to 1 but no bit flips from 1 to 0 (this is the Hamming analog of the
Z-channel [TABB02]).3
Definition 7.2.1. Let e, c ∈ {0, 1}γ be vectors. Let x = Err(c, e) be defined as follows
xi =
1 ci = 1 ∨ ei = 10 otherwise.
Definition 7.2.2. A set C (over {0, 1}γ) is a (t, δcode)-Z code if there exists an effi-
3Any code that corrects t Hamming errors also corrects t 0 → 1 errors, but more efficient codes
exist for this type of error [TABB02]. Codes with 2Θ(γ) codewords and t = Θ(γ) over the binary al-
phabet exist for Hamming errors and suffice for our purposes (first constructed by Justensen [Jus72]).
These codes also yield a constant error tolerance for 0 → 1 bit flips. The class of errors we sup-
port in our source (t Hamming errors over a large alphabet) and the class of errors for which we
need codes (t 0 → 1 errors) are different. Use of a code that corrects t Hamming errors gives the
construction perfect correctness.
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cient procedure Decode such that
∀e ∈ {0, 1}γ|Wgt(e) ≤ t, Pr
c∈C
[Decode(Err(c, e)) 6= c] ≤ δcode.
Construction 7.2.3. Let Z be an alphabet and let W = W1, ...,Wγ be a distribution
over Zγ. Let O be an obfuscator for point functions with points from Z. Let C ⊂
{0, 1}γ be an error-correcting code. We describe Gen,Rep as follows:
Gen
1. Input: w = w1, ..., wγ
2. Sample c← C.
3. For j = 1, ..., γ:
(i) If cj = 0: pj = O(Iwj).
(ii) Else: rj
$← Z.
Let pj = O(Irj).
4. Output (c, p), where p = p1 . . . pγ.
Rep
1. Input: (w′, p)
2. For j = 1, ..., γ:
(i) If pj(w
′
j) = 1: set c
′
j = 0.
(ii) Else: set c′j = 1.
3. Set c = Decode(c′).
4. Output c.
Construction 7.2.3 is secure if no distinguisher can tell whether it is working with
random obfuscations or obfuscations of Wj. By the security of point obfuscation,
anything learnable from the obfuscation is learnable from oracle access to the function.
Therefore, our construction is secure as long as enough blocks are unpredictable even
after adaptive queries to equality oracles for individual symbols. Definition 7.1.6
formalizes this intuition.
We show some examples of unguessable block sources in Appendix B. In particu-
lar, any source W where for all j, H∞(Wj) ≥ ω(log n) (but all blocks may arbitrarily
correlated) is an unguessable block source (Claim B.1.3).
Construction 7.2.3 is not a computational fuzzy extractor. The codewords c are
not uniformly distributed and it is possible to learn some bits of c (for the symbols
of W without much entropy). However, Construction 7.2.3 a computational fuzzy
111
conductor (Definition 3.3.7). Computational fuzzy conductors can be converted to
computational fuzzy extractors using standard techniques (Lemma 3.3.8).
Theorem 7.2.4. Let n be a security parameter. Let Z be an alphabet where |Z| ≥
2ω(log(n)). LetW be a family of (q, α = ω(log n), β)-unguessable block sources over Zγ,
for any q = poly(n). Furthermore, let C be a (Neight, δcode)-code over Zγ. Let O be
an γ-composable VGB obfuscator for point functions with auxiliary inputs. Then for
any ssec = poly(n) there exists some sec = ngl(n) such that Construction 7.2.3 is a
(Zγ,W , m˜ = H0(C)−β, t)-computational fuzzy conductor that is (sec, ssec)-hard with
error δcode + γ/|Z|.
7.2.1 Security of Construction 7.2.3
Security of Construction 7.2.3 is similar to the security of Construction 7.1.1. How-
ever, security is more complicated, the main difficulty is that the definition of block
unguessable sources (Definition 7.1.6) allows for weak blocks that can easily be guessed.
This means we must limit our indistinguishable distribution to blocks that are difficult
to guess. Security is proved via the following lemma:
Lemma 7.2.5. Let all variables be as in Theorem 7.2.4. For every ssec = poly(n)
there exists some sec = ngl(n) such that H
HILL
sec,ssec(C|P ) ≥ H0(C)− β.
We give a brief outline of the proof, followed by the proof. It is sufficient to show
that there exists a distribution C ′ with conditional min-entropy and
δDssec ((C,P ), (C ′, P )) ≤ ngl(n).
Let J be the set of indices that exists according to Definition 7.1.6. Define the
distribution C ′ as a uniform codeword conditioned on the values of C and C ′ being
equal on all indices outside of J . We first note that C ′ has sufficient entropy, because
H˜∞(C ′|P ) = H˜∞(C ′|CJc) ≥ H∞(C ′, CJc)−H0(CJc) = H0(C)− |J c| (the second step
is by [DORS08, Lemma 2.2b]). It is left to show δDssec ((C,P ), (C ′, P )) ≤ ngl(n).
The outline for the rest of the proof is as follows:
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• Let D be a distinguisher between (C,P ) and (C ′, P ). Since P is a collection of
obfuscated programs, there exists a simulator S (outputting a single bit), such
that Pr[D(C,P ) = 1] is close to Pr[SO(C) = 1].
• Show that even an unbounded S making a polynomial number of queries to the
stored points cannot distinguish between C and C ′. That is, SD(SO(C), SO(C ′))
is small.
• By the security of obfuscation, Pr[SO(C ′) = 1] is close to Pr[D(C ′, P ) = 1].
Proof of Lemma 7.2.5. Let O be a γ-composable VGB obfuscator with auxiliary in-
put for point programs over Z. Let W be a (q, α = ω(log n), β)-unguessable block
source. Our goal is to show that for all ssec = poly(n) there exists sec = ngl(n)
such that HHILLsec,ssec(C|P ) ≥ H0(C) − β. Suppose not, that is suppose there is some
ssec = poly(n) such that exists sec = poly(n) and H
HILL
sec,ssec(C|P ) < H0(C) − β.
By Definition 7.1.6 there exists a set of indices J such that all blocks within J are
unguessable. Define by C ′ the distribution of sampling a uniform codeword where all
locations outside J are fixed. Then H˜∞(C ′|CJc) ≥ H∞(C ′, CJc)−H0(CJc) = H0(C)−β
(by [DORS08, Lemma 2.2b]).
Let D a distinguisher of size at most ssec such that
|E[D(C,P )]− E[D(C ′, P )] > sec = 1/poly(n).
Define the distribution X as follows:
Xj =
Wj Cj = 0Rj Cj = 1.
By the security of obfuscation (Definition 2.4.1), there exists a unbounded time sim-
ulator S (making at most q queries) such that
|E[D(P1, ..., Pγ, C)]− E[SIX(·,·)(C, 1γ log |Z|)]| ≤ sec/3. (7.3)
We now prove S cannot distinguish between C and C ′.
Lemma 7.2.6. SD(SIX(·,·)(C, 1γ log |Z|), SIX(·,·)(C ′, 1γ log |Z|)) ≤ (γ − β)2−(α+1).
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Proof. It suffices to show that for any two codewords that agree on J c, the statistical
distance is at most (γ − β)2−(α+1).
Lemma 7.2.7. Let c∗ be true value encoded in X and let c′ a codeword in C ′. Then,
SD(SIX(·,·)(c∗, 1γ log |Z|), SIX(·,·)(c′, 1γ log |Z|)) ≤ (γ − β)2−(α+1).
Proof. Recall that for all j ∈ J , H˜∞(Wj|V iew(S)) ≥ α. The only information about
the correct value of c∗j is contained in the query responses. When all responses are 0
the view of S is identical when presented with c∗ or c′. We now show that for any
value of c∗ all queries on j ∈ J return 0 with probability 1−2−α+1. Suppose not, that
is suppose, the probability of at least one nonzero response on index j is > 2−(α+1).
Since w,w′ are independent of rj, the probability of this happening when c∗j = 1 is at
most q/Z or equivalently 2− log |Z|+log q. Thus, it must occur with probability:
2−α+1 < Pr[non zero response location j]
= Pr[c∗j = 1] Pr[non zero response location j ∧ c∗j = 1]
+ Pr[c∗j = 0] Pr[non zero response location j ∧ c∗j = 0]
≤ 1× 2− log |Z|+log q + 1× Pr[non zero response location j ∧ c∗j = 0] (7.4)
We now show that for an unguessable block source the remaining entropy α ≤
log |Z| − log q:
Claim 7.2.8. If W is a (q, α, β)-block unguessable source over Z then α ≤ log |Z| −
log q.
Proof. Let W be a (q, α, β)-block unguessable source. Let J ⊂ {1, ..., γ} the set of
good indices. It suffices to show that there exists an S making q queries such that for
some j ∈ J, H˜∞(Wj|SIW (·,·)) ≤ log |Z| − log q. Let j ∈ J be some arbitrary element
of J and denote by wj,1, ..., wj,q the q most likely outcomes of Wj (breaking ties
arbitrarily). Then
∑q
i=1 Pr[Wj = wj,i] ≥ q/|Z|. Suppose not, this means that there
is some wj,i with probability Pr[Wj = wj,i] < 1/|Z|. Since there are Z − q remaining
possible values of Wj for their total probability to be at least 1 − q/|Z| at least of
these values has probability at least 1/Z. This contradicts the statement wj,1, ..., wj,q
are the most likely values. Consider S that queries its oracle on (j, wj,1), .., (j, wj,q).
Denote by Bd the random variable when Wj ∈ {wj,1, .., wj,q} After these queries the
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remaining min-entropy is at most:
H˜∞(Wj|SJW (·,·)) = − log
(
Pr[Bd = 1]× 1 + Pr[Bd = 0]×max
w
Pr[Wj = w|Bd = 0]
)
≤ − log (Pr[Bd = 1]× 1)
= − log
(
q
|Z|
)
= log |Z| − log q
This completes the proof of Claim 7.2.8.
Rearranging terms in Equation 7.4, we have:
Pr[non zero response location j ∧ cj = 0] > 2−α+1 − 2−(log |Z|−log q) = 2−α
When there is a 1 response and cj = 0 this means that there is no remaining min-
entropy. If this occurs with over 2−α probability this violates the block unguessability
of W (Definition 7.1.6). By the union bound over the indices j ∈ J the total prob-
ability of a 1 in J is at most (γ − β)2−α+1. Recall that c∗, c′ match on all indices
outside of J . Thus, for all c∗, c′ the statistical distance is at most (γ − β)2−α+1. This
concludes the proof of Lemma 7.2.7.
By averaging over all points in C ′ we conclude that
SD(SIX(·,·)(C, 1γ log |Z|), SIX(·,·)(C ′, 1γ log |Z|)) < (γ − β)2−(α+1).
This completes the proof of Lemma 7.2.6.
Now by the security of obfuscation we have that
|E[D(P1, ..., Pγ, C ′)]− E[SIX(·,·)(C ′, 1γ log |Z|)]| ≤ sec/3. (7.5)
Combining Equations 7.3 and 7.5 and Lemma 7.2.6, we have
δD((P,C), (P,C ′)) ≤ |E[D(P1, ..., Pγ, C)]− E[SIX(·,·)(C, 1γ log |Z|)]|
+ |E[SIX(·,·)(C, 1γ log |Z|)]− E[SIX(·,·)(C ′, 1γ log |Z|)]|
+ |E[SIX(·,·)(C ′, 1γ log |Z|)]− E[D(P1, ..., Pγ, C ′)]|
≤ sec/3 + (γ − β)2−(α−1) + sec/3
≤ 2sec/3 + ngl(n) < sec.
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This is a contradiction and completes the proof of Lemma 7.2.5.
7.2.2 Correctness of Construction 7.2.3
We now argue correctness of Construction 7.2.3. We begin by showing that the
probability of a single 1→ 0 bit flip in c is negligible.
Lemma 7.2.9. Let all variables be as in Theorem 7.2.4. The probability of at least
one 1→ 0 bit flip (an obfuscation of a random block being interpreted as the obfusca-
tion of the point) is ≤ γ/|Z| = ngl(n).
Proof. Consider a coordinate j for which cj = 1. Since w
′ is chosen independently
of the points rj, and rj is uniform, Pr[rj = w
′
j] = 1/|Z|. The lemma follows by the
union bound, since there are at most γ such coordinates.
Since there are most t locations for which wj 6= w′j there are at most t 0 → 1
bit flips in c, which the code will correct with probability 1 − δcode, because c is
chosen independently of w′. Therefore, Construction 7.2.3 is correct with error at
most γ/|Z|.
More errors than entropy? In this section, we show that Construction 7.2.3 can
support distributions with more errors than entropy. We first calculate the size of the
Hamming ball.
log |Bt| = log
t∑
i=0
(
γ
i
)
(|Z| − 1)i > log
(
γ
t
)
(|Z| − 1)t = Θ(t log |Z|) + log
(
γ
t
)
The simplest type of unguessable block source is where each block is independent and
has super-logarithmic entropy (Claim B.1.1). For this type of source the entropy is
H∞(W ) = γω(log n). This yields:
# errors− entropy = log |Bt| − H∞(W ) >
(
Θ(t log |Z|) + log
(
γ
t
))
− γω(log n).
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When t = Θ(γ) and the entropy of each block is o(log |Z|), then the construction
supports more errors than entropy. Furthermore, the output entropy is H0(C)−β (if
C is a constant rate code, this is Θ(γ)).
Improvements If most codewords have Hamming weight close to 1/2, we can de-
crease the error tolerance needed from the code from t to about t/2, because roughly
half of the mismatches between w and w′ occur where cj = 1.
If γ is not long enough to get a sufficiently long output, the construction can be
run multiple times with the same input and independent randomness.
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Appendix A
A Definitional Equivalence
As described in Section 4.3, our negative results rule out security for an average
member of W . It may be possible to significantly improve parameters by only ruling
out security for a single member W .
Recall the security game of a fuzzy extractor: 1) the challenger specifies (SS,Rec),
2) the adversary specifies a source W ∈ W 3) The challenger wins if H˜∞(W |SS(W )) ≥
m˜. Instead of just thinking of the uniform distribution overW , consider an arbitrary
distribution V over elements of W . The minimax theorem says we can reverse which
of these actions is announced first [VN28] if A announces V instead of a single element
W . That is, the following two player games have the same equilibrium:
Experiment ExpW1 (A, C, m˜):
(SS,Rec)← C(W)
W ← A(W , SS,Rec)
If W 6∈ W , C wins.
If H˜∞(W |SS(W )) ≥ m˜, C wins.
Else A wins.
Experiment ExpW2 (A, C, m˜):
V ← A(W)
(SS,Rec)← C(V,W)
W ← V
If W 6∈ W , C wins.
If H˜∞(W |SS(W )) ≥ m˜, C wins.
Else A wins.
This means that showing security for a family of distributions W is equivalent
to showing security for all distributions V when the distribution is known to the
algorithms V . In our negative results, the adversary uses the uniform distribution V
over W . However, it may be possible to improve parameters by using a different V .
This would just rule out some member ofW not an average member. This is true for
fuzzy extractors as well and is resilient to changes in parameters including imperfect
correctness.
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Appendix B
Characterizing unguessable block sources
Definition 7.1.6 is an inherently adaptive definition and a little unwieldy. In this sec-
tion, we partially characterize sources that satisfy Definition 7.1.6. The majority of
the difficulty in characterizing Definition 7.1.6 is that different blocks may be depen-
dent, so an equality query on block imay reshape the distribution of block j. In the ex-
amples that follow we denote the adversary by S as we consider security against com-
putationally unbounded adversaries defined in VGB obfuscation (Definition 2.4.1).
We first show some sources that are unguessable block sources (Section B.1) and
then show distributions with high overall entropy that are not unguessable block
sources (Section B.2).
B.1 Positive Examples
We begin with the case of independent blocks.
Claim B.1.1. Let W = W1, ...,Wγ be a source in which all blocks Wj are mutually
independent. Let α be a parameter. Let J ⊂ {1, ..., γ} be a set of indices such that
for all j ∈ J , H∞(Wj) = α. Then for any q, W is a (q, α − log(q + 1), γ − |J |)-
unguessable block source. In particular, when α = ω(log n) and q = poly(n), then W
is a (q, ω(log n), γ − |J |)-unguessable block source.
Proof. It suffices to show that for all j ∈ J, H˜∞(Wj|V iew(SIW (·,·)) = α − log(q + 1).
We can ignore queries for all blocks but the j-th, as the blocks are independent.
Furthermore, without loss of generality, we can assume that no duplicate queries are
asked, and that the adversary is deterministic (S can calculate the best coins). Let
A1, A2, . . . Aq be the random variables representing the oracle answers for an adversary
S making q queries about the ith block. Each Ak is just a bit, and at most one of
them is equal to 1 (because duplicate queries are disallowed). Thus, the total number
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of possible responses is q + 1. Thus, we have the following,
H˜∞(Wj|V iew(SOW (·,·)) = H˜∞(Wj|A1, . . . , Aq)
= H∞(Wj)− |A1, . . . , Aq|
= α− log(q + 1) ,
where the second line follows from the first by [DORS08, Lemma 2.2].
Construction 6.1.1 is a computational fuzzy extractor for block fixing sources. Claim
B.1.1 shows that unguessable block distributions are a superset of block fixing sources.
We now consider more complicated distributions where blocks are not independent.
Claim B.1.2. Let f : {0, 1}e → Zγ be a function. Furthermore, let fj denote
the restriction of f ’s output to its jth coordinate. If for all j, fj is injective then
W = f(Ue) is a (q, e− log(q + 1), 0)-unguessable block source.
Proof. Since f is injective on each block,
H˜∞(Wj|V iew(SIW (·,·))) = H˜∞(Ue|V iew(SIW (·,·))).
Consider a query qk on block j. There are two possibilities: either qk is not in the
image of fj, or qk can be considered a query on the preimage f
−1
j (qk). Then (by
assuming S knows f) we can eliminate queries which correspond to the same value
of Ue. Then the possible responses are strings with Hamming weight at most 1
(like in the proof of Claim B.1.1), and by [DORS08, Lemma 2.2] we have for all j,
H˜∞(Wj|V iew(SIW (·,·))) ≥ H∞(Wj)− log(q + 1).
Note the total entropy of a source in Claim B.1.2 is e, so there is a family of
distributions with total entropy ω(log n) for which Construction 7.2.3 is secure. For
these distributions, all the coordinates are as dependent as possible: one determines
all others. We can prove a slightly weaker claim when the correlation between the
coordinates Wj is arbitrary:
Claim B.1.3. Let W = W1, ...,Wγ be a source. Suppose that for all j, H∞(Wj) ≥ α,
and that q ≤ 2α/4 (this holds asymptotically, in particular, if q is polynomial and α
is super-logarithmic). Then W is a (q, α− 1− log(q+ 1), 0)-unguessable block source.
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Proof. Intuitively, the claim is true because the oracle is not likely to return 1 on
any query. Formally, we proceed by induction on oracle queries, using the same
notation as in the proof of Claim B.1.1. Our inductive hypothesis is that Pr[A1 6=
0∨ · · · ∨Ak−1 6= 0] ≤ (k− 1)21−α. If the inductive hypothesis holds, then, for each j,
H∞(Wj|A1 = · · · = Ak−1 = 0) ≥ α− 1 . (B.1)
This is true for k = 1 by the condition of the theorem. It is true for k > 1 because,
as a consequence of the definition of H∞, for any random variable X and event E,
H∞(X|E) ≥ H∞(X) + log Pr[E]; and (k − 1)21−α ≤ 2q2−α ≤ 1/2.
We now show that Pr[A1 6= 0 ∨ · · · ∨ Ak 6= 0] ≤ k21−α, assuming that Pr[A1 6=
0 ∨ · · · ∨ Ak−1 6= 0] ≤ (k − 1)21−α.
Pr[A1 6= 0 ∨ · · · ∨ Ak−1 6= 0 ∨ Ak 6= 0]
= Pr[A1 6= 0 ∨ · · · ∨ Ak−1 6= 0] + Pr[A1 = · · · = Ak−1 = 0 ∧ Ak = 1]
≤ (k − 1)21−α + Pr[Ak = 1 |A1 = · · · = Ak−1 = 0]
≤ (k − 1)21−α + max
j
2−H∞(Wj |A1=···=Ak−1=0)
≤ (k − 1)21−α + 21−α
= k21−α
(where the third line follows by considering that to get Ak = 1, the adversary needs to
guess some Wj, and the fourth line follows by (B.1)). Thus, using k = q+ 1 in (B.1),
we know H∞(Wj|A1 = · · · = Aq = 0) ≥ α− 1. Finally this means that
H˜∞(Wj|A1, . . . , Aq) ≥ − log(2−H∞(Wj |A1=···=Aq=0) Pr[A1 = · · · = Aq = 0]
+ 1 · Pr[A1 6= 0 ∨ · · · ∨ Aq 6= 0])
≥ − log (2−H∞(Wj |A1=···=Aq=0) + q21−α)
≥ − log ((q + 1)21−α) = α− 1− log(q + 1) .
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B.2 Negative Examples
Claims B.1.2 and B.1.3 rest on there being no easy “entry” point to the distribution.
This is not always the case. Indeed it is possible for some blocks to have very high
entropy but lose all of it after equality queries.
Claim B.2.1. Let p = (poly(n)) and let f1, ..., fγ be injective functions where fj :
{0, 1}j×log p → {0, 1}n.1 Then define the distributions
W1 = f1(U1,...,γ),
W2 = f2(U1,...,2γ)
, ....,
Wγ = fγ(U).
There is an adversary making p× γ = poly(n) queries such that
H˜∞(W |V iew(SIW (·,·))) = 0.
Proof. Let x be the true value for Up×γ. We present an adversary S that com-
pletely determines x. S computes y11 = f1(x
1
1), ..., y
p
1 = f(x
p
1). Then S queries on
(1, y1), ..., (1, yp), exactly one answer returns 1. Let this value be y
∗
1 and its preim-
age x∗1. Then S computes y
1
2 = f2(x
∗
1, x
1
2), ..., y
p
2 = f2(x
∗
1, x
p
2) and queries y
1
2, ..., y
p
2.
Again, exactly one of these queries returns 1. This process is repeated until all of x
is recovered (and thus w).
The previous example relies on an adversaries ability to determine a block from
the previous blocks. We formalize this notion next. We define the entropy jump of a
block source as the remaining entropy when other blocks are known:
Definition B.2.2. Let W = W1, ...,Wγ be a source under ordering i1, ..., iγ. The
jump of a block ij is Jump(ij) = maxwi1 ,...,wij−1 H0(Wij |Wi1 = wi1 , ...,Wij−1 = wij−1).
If an adversary can learn blocks in succession they can eventually recover the entire
secret. In order for a source to be block unguessable the adversary must get “stuck”
1Here we assume that n ≥ γ × log p, that is the source has a small number of blocks.
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early enough in their recovery process. This translates to having a super-logarithmic
jump early enough.
Claim B.2.3. Let W be a distribution and let q be a parameter, if there exists an
ordering i1, ..., iγ such that for all j ≤ γ − β + 1, Jump(ij) = log q/(γ − β + 1), then
W is not (q, 0, β)-unguessable block source.
Proof. For convenience relabel the ordering that violates the condition as 1, ..., γ.
We describe an unbounded adversary that determines W1, ...,Wγ−β+1. As before S
queries the q/γ possible values for W1 and determines W1. Then S queries the (at
most) q/(γ−β+ 1) possible values for W2|W1. This process is repeated until Wγ−β+1
is learned.
Presenting a sufficient condition for security is more difficult as S may interleave
queries to different blocks. It seems like the optimum strategy is to focus on a single
block at a time but it is unclear how to formalize this intuition.
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